Conference flies, lot 59 D 95, CF 103
Mr. Eden opened the meeting by referring to the short draft communiqué prepared for issuance by the Three Powers.2 He expressed the hope that it would not be the only reference made to the European Defense Community, adding his understanding there would be another communiqué on this subject.
Mr. Schuman said there was also to be a reference to the EDC in the Four Power communiqué.3 His major reaction to the present draft was that it was a bit “thin”. In his opinion, the tripartite meetings had been more important than this communiqué indicated and he thought the communiqué should reflect this importance. He inquired as to whether the reference to the US and UK interest in the EDC could not be strengthened and also supplemented with some indication that the two powers intended to study means whereby they could display their confidence in and support of the organization.
Mr. Acheson suggested that there were two separate questions at issue. The first was how to handle the tripartite announcement. He felt it might well be issued as a part of but following the quadripartite communiqué. The second question was the wording to be used. [Page 73] He felt that the tripartite section might be introduced by some terminology such as “while in London the Three Ministers had also found time to cover points not covered with Adenauer”. This communiqué would then go on to express the abiding US–UK interest in EDC, as proposed by Mr. Schuman, and then add that this matter would be one of continued consultation among the Three Ministers.
Mr. Schuman said he had doubts about Mr. Acheson’s first suggestion since the meetings in London had actually commenced as tripartite discussions. He thought it would create a false impression with the public if the ministers were to handle the two communiqués as a combined document and with the implication that the tripartite talks were subsidiary and subsequent to the quadripartite meetings.
Mr. Eden asked if there was an agreement on a single communiqué. Mr. Schuman said he preferred two communiqués, and Mr. Acheson said that what he had proposed was two communiqués issued on the same piece of paper. Mr. Schuman said the method of issuance was immaterial, but he preferred two communiqués and wanted to start with the tripartite report since that had been the first meeting.
Mr. Eden said he thought they could agree on that and suggested the appointment of a drafting group to go to work on the communiqué. This was agreed and the drafting group immediately left the room. Mr. Eden then suggested that they turn to the report of the working group on security controls.4
Mr. Acheson noted that the prohibition on civil aviation remained in the document. He had understood that agreement had been reached the day before to handle it separately.
Mr. Eden replied that Adenauer had said he could not make a separate statement. However, if the Germans preferred that course, the British would be quite willing to accept it. The line suggested the previous day for the separate statement was to the effect that Germany did not have the capacity and did not intend to develop the capacity for a civil aviation industry.
The discussion then turned to propellants, with Mr. Eden pointing out that it was the United States and not Germany which had expressed the hope that propellants could be removed from the list. Mr. Schuman said he would! have great difficulty at home on that point. He would do all he could and would use the argument that the United States would not accept a security control agreement which included propellants, but he was not sure he could succeed.
Mr. Eden said he had understood that an agreement was reached the previous day that Mr. Schuman would not allow the negotiations to fail over the issue of propellants. Mr. Schuman said that was not correct; he would rather give way on the question of large guns. [Page 74] Mr. Acheson suggested that the list be agreed ad referendum, allowing Mr. Schuman time to raise this point with his government. He said it was probable the United States and Germany could not agree to the security controls so long as propellants remained on the list.
Mr. Schuman said his position would be easier on propellants if civil aviation were retained on the list. Mr. Eden pointed out that civil aviation could not be included in a list of military items, but Mr. Schuman said he thought it could be listed as a non-military item. Mr. Eden said he thought this had been settled the day before but now it appeared the Ministers had made no progress. After Mr. Schuman explained his proposal again, Mr. Eden said he did not understand it but was willing to agree to it. During this discussion, Mr. Schuman also commented that he could not accept the concept contained in the present draft that the Federal Republic of Germany was the only strategically exposed area.
It was finally agreed that the Ministers would proceed with their meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, and that the United States and the United Kingdom would remain silent while Mr. Schuman attempted to persuade Adenauer of his proposal on security controls.
- Neither a telegraphic summary nor any other record of this meeting has been found.↩
- The draft communiqué under reference cannot be positively identified; presumably it is the draft quoted in telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103. For the tripartite communiqué issued on Feb. 19, see p. 105.↩
- The quadripartite communiqué referred to here has not been positively identified although a draft communiqué is included in CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, “London–Lisbon, Misc.” For the quadripartite communiqué issued on Feb. 19, see p. 106.↩
- The report under reference here has not been found. Its content may be further discerned from the account in telegram Secto 30, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 75.↩