740.5/10–2653: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
priority
1623. From Secretary for Dillon, Conant, Bruce.
In connection with EDC, if we cannot get French ratification prior to French presidential elections, it is all the more imperative that period between now and presidential elections be used to work out basis for Franco-German Saar settlement (Re Paris Embtel 1636).2 If agreement on principles of Saar settlement are not reached prior to presidential elections, we anticipate it will be extremely difficult if not impossible to bring EDC to vote in French Assembly immediately after elections.
Paris and Bonn should use every influence at their disposal to urge French and Germans respectively to push forward with Saar settlement on basis of reasonableness. If French insist on bringing Saar Conventions before Assembly, reaction in Germany will I believe be violent. In particular I am apprehensive Germans will take position that at very moment they prepared to sit down to work out Saar settlement, France is taking final action on Saar settlement by ratification of Conventions. If French insist on ratifying Saar Conventions and there is violent German reaction and breakdown in Franco-German talks on Saar, impression may be created French have deliberately injected Saar Conventions to prevent Saar agreement and thus to sabotage early French action EDC.
Amb Dillon should therefore continue do everything possible persuade French not act on Saar Conventions at precise time when they are getting ready to talk with Adenauer. In particular Bidault should be left in no doubt as to catastrophic effect on France’s position if French take unreasonable action which makes agreement on Saar near future impossible. Bidault should also know that if French nevertheless proceed with ratification Franco-Saar Conventions, and as result are subsequently unable arrive at agreement on Saar with Federal [Page 834] Republic, US Govt will find it exceedingly difficult give support to French position with respect to future status Saar.
Amb Conant should continue urge Adenauer be as forthcoming with French as possible re Saar and in particular prevent public utterances in Germany which may be interpreted as threatening French since these serve as ammunition to French opponents EDC and are resented by French supporters of EDC. Amb Dillon should likewise urge French not make any public statements which might aggravate situation.3
- Drafted and initialed for the Secretary by MacArthur. Cleared by Dulles and Bonbright; repeated to Bonn.↩
- Not printed; it reported that barring unforeseen favorable developments it appeared impossible that debate on the ratification of the EDC Treaty in the French Assembly could begin prior to the inauguration of a new French president in mid-January (740.5/10–2653).↩
- On Oct. 30, the source text was repeated to London In Telegram 2338 with the request that it be brought to the attention of the Foreign Office “so that British may be fully informed of actions we taking” with respect to the Saar issue (740.5/10–3053). The same day, in telegram 1629 to Paris, Dulles instructed the Embassy in France to maintain “continuous discreet pressure on French Govt to hold” the EDC Treaty debate “as soon as possible, in spite forecasted delay” reported in telegram 1636 from Paris. Dulles stressed that a “Most serious risk” existed in the possibility that the outcome of the presidential election “would bring on prolonged cabinet crisis, and likelihood further long EDC delay running on into ‘critical’ period next spring, when pressure resulting from Congressional impatience and German insistence on independent status will reach breaking point” (740.5/10–2653).↩