740.5/10–2453: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
1616. Limit distribution. MacArthur dined alone last night with Chaban-Delmas, Assembly group leader of URAS. Results of conversation were disquieting. Chaban commenced by saying that if EDC treaty could be amended to take into full account France’s total military effort throughout world he, Chaban, was prepared to vote for ratification and would deliver up to 70 URAS votes for ratification.
He was not entirely clear as to what amendment should say but presumably he meant that France’s voice in EDC would be weighted in accordance with her total military power rather than with forces assigned to EDC. MacArthur protested vigorously and said this would reopen treaty and contractuals from all sides and would mean indefinite delay which was now utterly inacceptable. Chaban then said that he envisaged prior full agreement on revision by France and Germany and that amendment might even be proposed by Germany. If this were case Chaban felt there should not be much difficulty in getting agreement from other signatory nations. As quid pro quo to German rede [Page 830] this arrangement Chaban said France could take Germany into full and equal partnership in development of some of French territories in Africa. Chaban said France, alone, did not have financial resources to develop all her African territories with sufficient speed. He particularly mentioned Mauritania as being suitable for partnership with Germany. Such partnership would, he said, include full freedom for German emigration and settlement. He said he was reliably informed Adenauer had on two recent occasions expressed real interest in such an arrangement. He emphasized such information from Adenauer did not come through French Foreign Office mail.
MacArthur expressed thorough disagreement with all these views but at insistence of Chaban agreed to pass them on to me. Chaban closed by saying that unless such an amendment were possible he and total URAS block would vote against ratification.
MacArthur and I are in agreement that this URAS proposition has already been outlined to Vidal and Laniel and has definitely met with interest on their part. Vidal made passing reference in earlier conversation with MacArthur to possible minor changes in EDC treaty that would make ratification very easy. When MacArthur protested vigorously and at length Vidal did not elaborate but attempted to minimize importance of proposed changes in language. It appears clear Vidal was referring to Chaban proposition.
Laniel on October 8 mentioned to me for first time that he felt he must see Adenauer personally regarding France-German arrangements. He repeated this to MacArthur and me the other night and MacArthur and I both now feel his reason for wanting to see Adenauer is to talk over something along line of Chaban proposition.
After MacArthur talk with Vidal we checked with Margerie re talk of possible new EDC amendments. He said there was always considerable talk on that subject but both Bidault and Pleven who were only Cabinet members who fully understood EDC were unalterably opposed to any further tinkering at this time and were in a position to prevent any serious consideration of such projects.
It appears that Chaban proposal has only been discussed with Laniel and that Bidault is unaware of it as yet. Proposal also clearly ties into Presidential campaign and Laniel’s need for URAS support of his candidacy. Finally it is very possible Laniel does not realize full import of such suggested change in EDC as he appears very naive and uninformed on all matters of foreign relations.
I intend to tell Bidault next week of Chaban proposal to MacArthur naturally omitting any reference to Chaban’s probable talks with Laniel and Vidal. I will inform him of our extreme concern over any such attempt to change EDC texts at this date. Bidault should be in position to head off this manoeuvre and I will report his reaction promptly.
[Page 831]This telegram not being repeated Bonn as MacArthur in position to inform HICOG orally today as far as he considers advisable.1
- In Telegram 1592 to Paris, Oct. 27, Dulles expressed full concurrence “in strong stand against Chaban proposition” and in the advisability of informing Bidault of “our concern over any attempt change EDC Treaty at this late stage”. Dulles added that the Chaban proposal would certainly be “very strongly opposed” by other EDC members and could not assure the delivery of URAS votes and that the approved protocol to Article 43 bis practically met Chaban’s desire to give France a voice in EDC commensurate with her power (740.5/10–2453). In Telegram 1709 from Paris, Oct. 30, Dillon reported he had seen Bidault who had stated “in the strongest possible terms that he would never permit any modification in the texts of the treaty and the protocols as they now stand. He said that the time had come to say yes or no, and he thought the answer would be yes” (740.5/10–3053). In Telegram 1710 from Paris of the same day, Dillon added that he had also seen Chaban and informed him that Washington supported everything that MacArthur had said. Chaban did not appear overly impressed but did seem “somewhat taken aback” though not opposed to Dillon’s intention to speak to Bidault. Dillon closed by reminding the Department of State that although Chaban was “hopeless where EDC is concerned”, his support for current French policy in Indochina was indispensable (740.5/10–3053).↩