396.1 LO/2–1852
In opening the meeting Mr. Eden inquired whether there was agreement to the publication of the TCC report. He understood that Mr. Adenauer was agreeable and he himself thought it would have the advantage of quieting rumors. There was general agreement.
Mr. Eden thereupon brought up the subject of the relationship between EDC and NATO, for discussion. He recalled that he and his two colleagues had proposed to Mr. Adenauer what they hoped would be a satisfactory arrangement. He had the proposal read aloud.2 Mr. Adenauer asked whether this meant that the majority of either Council decided upon the joint meeting. Messrs. Schuman and Eden assured him that it meant that any member of either organization can demand a meeting.
Mr. Adenauer observed that there should be close cooperation between the civilian and military organizations. He merely mentioned this as he did not think the absence of any relevant provision here would cause trouble. Mr. Schuman read a portion of the EDC draft treaty dealing with such military cooperation. In reply to the Chancellor’s request to see the text from which he had read, Mr. Schuman stated that the German experts knew it and in any event it was not yet finally decided. When Mr. Adenauer observed that they should decide it then and there, Mr. Schuman reminded him that the six EDC countries must decide.
Mr. Acheson felt that the difficulty was a technical and not a real one. He entirely agreed with the principle the Chancellor stated. However, the precise text must be agreed elsewhere and the exact words then cleared with the Chancellor as with the heads of other governments. The Ministers could only decide the principle. Mr. Adenauer indicated agreement.
Mr. Eden then brought up for discussion the question of war criminals. He had a revised version of the paper distributed3 and stated [Page 68] that the only change other than those suggested in the morning meeting was a change in the position of the last sentence of the first paragraph. This was necessitated by the revised order of the paragraphs. Mr. Adenauer inquired whether the sense of the sentence could not be inserted as a phrase in the second sentence in order to modify its harsh impact.
At this point Mr. Adenauer and Mr. Schuman engaged in a somewhat protracted argument over the meaning of the German word Rechtskraft. The upshot of the discussion was a proposal laughingly proffered by Mr. Eden to use the word validity (validité) in English and French and Mr. Adenauer could call it what he liked in German!
Mr. Eden then suggested that the Ministers begin discussion of their most difficult subject, security controls. He recalled that a draft paper4 on this subject had been agreed by the three Governments and he expressed the hope that the Germans could accept it. Chancellor Adenauer remarked that the paper appeared to be a declaration to be made by the Federal Government. He thought it seemed to go too far. It said three times that the Germans were prepared to give proof of their peaceful intentions. For the most part he was in agreement with the contents of the declaration. But he remarked that it was an odd partner who, on joining an enterprise, was required to say three times over that he expected to be a well-behaved member. He asked to be allowed to read three passages from the draft paper just in order to show how embarrassing this text was. He did not see why the Federal Republic should give a special declaration of its pacific character on joining the EDC. Every one must realize that treaties meant nothing unless they were based on good-will. He felt that if one said to a partner (and the Federal Republic was to become a partner) that in order to show your peaceful intentions you must promise this, that, or the other, that one displays a great lack of confidence. He had just come from seeing Prime Minister Churchill who had remarked to him in another connection that “generosity begets confidence”. There was a provision in the EDC treaty that no member will establish a military apparatus. That included any paramilitary forces. Furthermore, it was provided that no member was to produce arms unless instructed to do so by the Commissioners. In other words, it seemed to him that all which was being demanded in the draft declaration was already to be found in the EDC treaty. The U.S. and the U.K. might say that the treaty does not commit the Federal Republic as far as the U.S. and U.K. were concerned. He realized also that the EDC could argue that if no orders were given to Germany Germany might consider that to be discrimination contrary [Page 69] to the provisions of Article 3 of the treaty. Mr. Adenauer was therefore ready to declare that in view of the international tension and Germany’s geographical position, the Federal Republic would not regard it as discriminatory if no orders were placed there. He was also ready to give the U.S. and the U.K. a declaration having the same contents as the EDC treaty. He would also declare that the Federal Republic had neither the wish nor the ability to manufacture civil aircraft. He asked the three Ministers to help him to fulfill their wishes but in a manner which would not confront him with unsurmountable difficulties.
Chancellor Adenauer expressed a further wish. He said that he needed assurance that German units would be equipped in the same manner and with the same types of arms as other units. He observed furthermore than he did not understand what the anxieties of the three Powers were regarding German police forces when the Germans had no arms. He asked the Ministers to consider the situation in which the Federal Republic would find itself for a number of years. There would be—and this corresponded to his very strong hope—a considerable number of U.S.–U.K. and EDC troops on its territory. Could then anyone be afraid of an unarmed police? If the debate on these points was prolonged, he added, he would go home feeling that the Germans were infinitely stronger than they had known they were!
Mr. Eden suggested removing from the draft declaration the three phrases dealing with “pacific intentions”. He felt that these were not in any way necessary. Further to reenforce points he had made elsewhere, Adenauer read a paragraph which he said was from the EDC treaty. Mr. Schuman called his attention to the fact that what he had just read was not a passage from the treaty but from the report. Chancellor Adenauer agreed that it was from the report made by Mr. Alphand. He then read another passage from the treaty itself. He wished to add one word. As soon as the treaty would be ratified the provision prohibiting production, except by order of the Defense Commissioners, would become German law.
Mr. Eden asked how far apart the Ministers were and what was the best method to handle the two texts before them (including a German text).
Mr. Adenauer repeated that the production of all weapons would be forbidden so soon as the EDC treaty was ratified. It appeared to him that the three Ministers had not sufficiently considered the legal position. Mr. Schuman recognized that the treaty would create the legal position outlined by Mr. Adenauer. However, the Commission in acting would have to apply a rule. He pointed out that no rule had been specified for the Commission. There was no prohibition on placing orders. He re-read the appropriate article of the EDC treaty. The Commission was supposed to utilize the technical and economic [Page 70] capacity of each state. There was no compulsion not to place orders in Germany. The outlook might alter. Decisions would be made by a majority and the majority might prefer to place orders in Germany. He accepted it that the present Federal Government did not desire orders. But he felt the position might change. Mr. Schuman wished to be quite frank. The Ministers must take account of the psychological reaction in different countries. The manufacture of arms in Germany might increase tension. Orders might lead to the construction of new factories. The impression might be created that Germany was becoming an arsenal. Turning to Mr. Adenauer he said that he wanted to pay tribute to the latter’s peaceful intention and solidarity. The French were only concerned with certain exceptional armaments. There seemed to him to be only two solutions. First, the Germans could make a voluntary declaration as the three Ministers had suggested. Second, there could be a provision inserted in the EDC treaty giving a directive to the Commissioners with regard to the placing of orders. Of course the other four EDC states would have to agree to this. He saw no other possibilities and asked which of these would be the more acceptable to the Chancellor.
Mr. Adenauer pointed out that the program for production would have to be approved by the Council by a two-thirds vote. “Program” might be clarified and expanded to include references to the geographical situation of areas marked for production. He repeated that he was ready to declare in writing that in view of existing international tension and the location of Germany, the Federal Republic would not regard it as discriminatory if the Commission did not place certain orders in Germany. As for the security worries of other countries to which he understood Mr. Schuman to have referred, he presumed Russia was meant. He thought Russia would not be pleased by any of our “works”.
Mr. Schuman took the position that “program” was not concerned with orders but only with over-all requirements. The placing of orders devolved on the Commissioners, who had no directive. If the rule were to be introduced that such and such could not be made here or there, that would be all right but such a rule would have to be approved by the other four EDC countries. Mr. Adenauer thought Mr. Schuman over-looked the fact that EDC budget estimates must be based on the programs and that these would run by categories and countries.
Mr. Acheson intervened to say that he felt that there was a large area of agreement. Leaving the drafts aside, the Chancellor was clear that the Federal Republic would carry out the EDC treaty as a matter of German law. He recalled that Mr. Adenauer had said he would not protest non-allocation of orders to Germany. He had also said that he was ready to declare that the same obligation will run to the U.S. and U.K. On the other hand, Mr. Schuman had said there [Page 71] is no rule to guide the Commissioners. For that matter the same difficulty inhered in the proposal of the three Ministers which excepted these items listed by the EDC treaty. He inquired whether it was not possible to put into the EDC treaty a provision listing the items not to be allocated. He thought the Ministers only needed to agree on the list.
At this point there was an intermission.
Upon reconvening, Mr. Eden suggested and the other Ministers agreed that the advisers should be asked to produce a text by 11:00 a.m. the next day. He thought some work should also be done on a communiqué.
Mr. Schuman referred again to the problem of deconcentration and decartelization and said that a settlement was urgent. His Parliament had instructed him not to ratify the coal-steel plan until the question of the DKV was settled. Mr. Adenauer assured him that the Federal Republic had the same wish to end the matter and that his Government was doing everything possible about it.
- The source text indicates that these minutes were prepared or completed on Mar. 12, 1952, when Laukhuff and other members of the U.S. Delegation to the London and Lisbon meetings had returned to Washington. Copies of these minutes were circulated within the Department of State as document GER–London MIN 4, Apr. 16, 1952. A summary account of the meeting was sent to the Department in telegram Secto 24, Feb. 21, from Lisbon. (740.5/2–2152) A photograph of the four Foreign Ministers before this meeting is printed on p. 563.↩
- Presumably what was read at this point was the text of paragraph 9 (b) of document D–D (52) 35 Final, the Deputies Report on relations between NATO and EDC, p. 249.↩
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The account of this discussion of war criminals was reported in telegram Secto 24 (see footnote 1, above) as follows:
“2. War criminals. After brief discussion the Mins accepted with one drafting change revised text on war criminals prepared on basis of earlier discussion.”
For the text of the agreed article on war criminals, see p. 101.
↩ - The draft paper referred to here is presumably the declaration discussed at the tripartite meetings of Feb. 17 and 18 and reported upon in telegrams Secto 12, Feb. 18 and Secto 19, Feb. 19, pp. 55 and 65. For the text of the declaration, see Appendix B to document MOG/3 Final, Feb. 16, p. 100.↩