Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/10–553: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

top secret

Washington, October 5, 1953.

CA–1860. Subject: Comments on Colux 3.² For Bruce and Ambassadors only.

For your information and possible comments, we are sending you our views on Colux 3 of September 20, the cable from the Luxembourg Ambassadors’ meeting outlining a program of action on the EDC. The primary purpose is to give our general reactions to Colux 3 and also to propose certain additional steps. Specific action along several of the lines suggested in Colux 3 is currently going forward, being covered by separate cables.

We fully concur with the need for a clear demonstration of intentions regarding the EDC by our Allies and with the conclusion that now is the time for an all-out push with a view to ratification and implementation by early 1954. We also concur in the need for action along a number of lines indicated in Colux 3, taking care of course to keep our efforts confined to behind-the-scenes activity.

As a general comment, we agree that we can usefully exert pressure on the French by working through the Germans because the latter are ready to negotiate and the government is strong enough to afford to make concessions to the French. However, we should not rely entirely on indirect pressure through the Germans. Too much pressure from the Germans is likely to antagonize the French. We should, therefore, also make representations in Paris, both to high level and working level French officials, on a number of matters as indicated below.

Below are specific comments on the suggested lines of action proposed in Colux 3 (Paragraph numbers correspond to those in reference Telegram):

2. United Kingdom: A Churchill statement endorsing EDC would have an excellent impact. In addition to the subjects mentioned, we assume that this statement would be the forum for official announcement of UK proposals on association with the EDC, including the declaration regarding fifty year association. Perhaps the most appropriate means for suggesting a Churchill statement might be in the context of discussions with the British in the near future working out plans for a coordinated UK–US effort to bring about EDC ratification. (Such a discussion on EDC tactics with the British might be consolidated with the high level talks on over-all NATO problems which the British have proposed to us.) We also understand that Adenauer is planning a personal visit to Churchill. It would be helpful if he discussed with Churchill the desirability of the Prime Minister’s making a statement on the EDC.³

[3.] Italy: We agree that US direct efforts to encourage Italian ratification are unlikely to be productive until positive Western proposals are forthcoming on Trieste, and we are taking this into account in our efforts to deal with the Trieste problem. However, if France and the other EDC countries ratify and Trieste continues to be a condition to Italian ratification, we will have to consider alternative courses of action, including the possibility of going ahead with implementation before completion of Italian action. We believe it will be helpful if Adenauer carries out his intention of stressing to the Italians the need for early ratification. The close ties between Adenauer’s and Pella’s Governments and the fact that the Germans are not associated with the Trieste issue should make Adenauer’s approach effective, particularly in breaking the informal French-Italian understanding whereby Italians agree not to ratify, until the French are prepared to move. This understanding might cause Italian procrastination to continue oven if progress were made on Trieste. If the Italian Government procrastinates after substantial progress has been made in other countries, we should consider exerting pressure on the government through our control of end-item allocations, similar to action suggested for military assistance with France in paragraph 5 below.

[4.] Germany: The reference Telegram contains a number of suggestions for action by the Federal Republic. We concur generally on the need for action along the lines indicated, but as indicated above, we believe too much reliance should not be placed on indirect pressure on the French through the Germans and that there should be direct approaches to the French on a number of the matters listed. Our comments on specific subjects follow in the order given in paragraph 4: (a) On the court issue, no U.S. action appears necessary. (b) On the Saar, we are taking steps to encourage both the French and the Germans to hold a high-level meeting as soon as possible. At this stage, we and the British do not propose to become involved in the substance of the problem. We intend to save our influence until such time as the negotiations reach the critical or decisive stage. (c) On the interim status EDC forces, the major problem appears to us not so much to be German initiative, as French acceptance of the principle that agreement must be worked out within the framework of the EDC Treaty, rather than through amendment of the Contractuals. Therefore, we feel that we should make an approach to the French, at a high level if necessary, to obtain clear acceptance of this principle. (d) On support costs, it is not clear to us why any new agreement necessarily is a prerequisite to ratification, since the April 25, 1953 agreement on German financial contribution covers the period up to June 30, 1954. (e) On the US–EDC military aid bilateral, negotiations in the EDC Interim Commission have so far gone very well, and full agreement on the text apparently could be reached without too much difficulty. Up to now we have deliberately avoided reaching final agreement. This has been partly due to our desire to hold off French pressure to release the agreement prior to ratification. It has also been due to our desire for the Interim Commission to come up with concrete proposals on how end-item equipment, particularly for forces of German origin, is to be handled during the period immediately after ratification. (This latter is important to USCINCEUR.) We should continue to press for concrete proposals on this matter, which appears to depend primarily on the Germans taking the initiative. However, as soon as satisfactory progress has been made, we should also take steps to complete as soon as possible preliminary agreement on the text of the bilateral. After agreement has been reached, we should consider either releasing the agreement itself or making an announcement of its contents, if it becomes clear that publicity on the agreement will be definitely helpful in encouraging French ratification. We also feel that we should now take the initiative in beginning negotiation in Bonn of the supplementary military assistance agreement with the Federal Republic. As far as we are aware, negotiation of this agreement has not yet begun. For us to urge that negotiations begin now would be another way to make clear our general sense of urgency. Also, although negotiation of the agreement should not present any serious obstacles, it might prove time-consuming. (f) We do not feel that German initiative in the EDC/IC will be particularly effective with respect to U.K. association, since the real initiative obviously rests with the British and French. The British have just presented the EDC/IC with a revised draft, and negotiations on this subject appear to have acquired a new impetus, (g) On the signature of the protocols, we were encouraged to learn that Adenauer indicated in a conversation with Bruce and Conant on September 9 that he was willing to sign the protocols himself as Foreign Minister. Signature of the protocols is important because it will help ensure against any further protocol proposals by the French. (h) On the need for the Germans holding firm for a strong EPC, we understand that the German delegation at Rome is taking such a position, (i) Although it will be useful for the US High Commissioner to support measures in the High Commission which will impress the French with the urgency of ratifying the EDC and contractuals, we believe this should be only part of larger effort, involving parallel efforts in Paris making sure French are aware of what we are saying and doing in Germany. In this connection we should determine what anticipatory action we think desirable. Request that HICOG submit suggestions for possible anticipatory action which would have useful effects on the French as well as being of value in speeding up the German build-up.

5. France: On the general subject of pressing the French, we believe it is important that we make unmistakably clear to French generally our firm expectations that EDC must soon become reality. We fully agree that we should keep France pinned to her previous commitments to ratify and should strongly oppose any efforts to introduce new conditions, protocols, or delaying tactics. As to your suggestion that we prevail on Laniel and Bidault to press ratification, we have already moved forward on this front with Eisenhower letter to Laniel and other steps.

In addition to the actions suggested in Colux 3, we believe it is also important that the US use its influence in the EDC/IC to encourage constructive planning on the EDC build-up, particularly for German contingents. Compilation of the EDC submission to the NATO AR is one step which must move forward. We are taking steps to remove the security question as a preliminary to making possible a more meaningful questionnaire. The long-standing French unwillingness to permit planning must be overcome. We do not consider that planning would shock the French people and parliament. In France, as here, we believe that it is generally assumed that planning has been largely completed since we have been discussing German rearmament for three years and the EDC/IC has been meeting for a year.

In addition, we should also consider exerting indirect pressure through our control over military aid. The French military have a vested interest in delaying EDC because they realize it will mean the end of their right to receive end-items bilaterally. We are not in a particularly strong bargaining position with respect to future appropriations for military end-items, since the French requirements will not be great. However, we do have considerable leverage with respect to the allocation of 1954 aid in the light of the Richards amendment. We should consider making plain to French officials that the Administration will not take steps to have the Richards amendment ban lifted or modified with respect to countries which have not ratified the EDC.

6. Benelux : Finally, we feel that we must continue with present efforts to encourage ratification in the Benelux countries although avoiding pressure which will be counter-productive. Encouraging the British to work on the Benelux countries should also be helpful.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Fessenden; cleared with Merchant, Knight, and Reinstein. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, and Rome.
2. Dated Sept. 20, p. 808.
3. On Oct. 10, Churchill addressed the annual conference of the Conservative Party at Margate and stated that the American alliance was vital, asserted that it would be a disaster if Germany were needlessly made an enemy of the United Kingdom and the free world, reminded his hearers of the overwhelming Soviet strength in Europe, reaffirmed undertakings already given, and specifically promoted the formation of a European army with a strong German contingent, promising that the United Kingdom, like the United States, would maintain its forces in Europe. The Prime Minister added that if France should reject the EDC, the United Kingdom would have to acquiesce in some new arrangement for joining German strength to that of the West through NATO. For the text of his address, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, p. 95.