033.5111/9–2053

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Laniel 1

secret

Dear Mr. President: I appreciated very much your message conveyed to me through Ambassador Dillon, and while I was disappointed that it was not possible for you to visit the United States at this particular time, I fully understand and appreciate the reasons why you deemed it inadvisable.

I was most encouraged to hear through Ambassador Dillon that both you and M. Bidault believe the situation now propitious for the French Government to move ahead quickly toward ratification of the EDC and that both of you now are concentrating your efforts to bring this about this year. You should remain confident of the continuing wholehearted support of the United States for the EDC concept, which sprang from French vision. It has always been our hope that this great project, which holds the promise of such magnificent permanent benefits for Europe, would come into being at the earliest possible time.

I know that you were encouraged by the results of the September 6 elections in Germany. In all our efforts to consolidate the foundation for a new Europe, I believe that perhaps the most important element is the state of mind with which the three Western nations who played the greatest part in defeating Hitler’s Germany during the last war now approach their relations with the new Germany. Fortunately, the recent elections have demonstrated that contrary to the Weimar Republic, the Bonn regime has struck roots; in the four years since the first Bundestag elections, the forces of democracy and common sense [Page 813] have grown considerably in strength, and the new voters have overwhelmingly supported the center forces dedicated to European cooperation, and rejected the extremes of right and left. It is our responsibility both to develop this situation for the common good and to strengthen it further. Therefore, it is most urgent that in all our relations with Germany we be guided by a new spirit of friendship and trust and that the last vestige of a spirit of occupation disappear.

We are not blind to history, and we know the difficulties this presents for the French people. But, we also know that the spectre of a Germany rapidly increasing its strength outside the ties of Western European unity would cause France even greater concern. Hence, we are confident that the leaders of France will not miss this historic opportunity for a Franco-German rapprochement which now offers itself, but which will certainly fade away if not seized resolutely and promptly.

Finally, Mr. President, I want to wish for you the utmost success in your approach toward the solution of France’s problems and the realization of the common aims of the Western nations, an approach which to me reflects statesmanship and courage in the highest degree and is in keeping with France’s traditions as a world leader.2

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower
  1. Transmitted to Paris in telegram 1049, Sept. 20, for the Ambassador with the following preliminary message: “We conveyed to President Eisenhower Laniel’s messages of appreciation for consideration shown re his visit to US (urtels and telecons). [Laniel had visited Washington with Mayer, Mar. 25–28; see telegram 4992 to Paris, Mar. 26, p. 781.] President has now approved following reply Laniel which unless you perceive objection you should deliver to him. Original of following letter signed by President will be forwarded to you for subsequent delivery to Laniel. This letter is not to be made public although we would expect Laniel might wish show it to some of his Cabinet colleagues if he deemed this helpful. (Purpose of letter is to be helpful and also to nail down a bit the verbal statements to you by both Laniel and Bidault with respect to pushing forward with EDC and necessity for real Franco-German rapprochement.)”
  2. In telegram 1178 from Paris, Sept. 22, Dillon reported that he had delivered the President’s letter to Laniel as directed and that Laniel had spoken “fully and frankly for 45 minutes” on EDC. Laniel stated he was “fully prepared to go ahead with EDC” as soon as (1) a solution could be found to the Saar issue, (2) a satisfactory relationship could be established between the United Kingdom and the EDC, and (3) completion of work on the protocols had been assured. Laniel added inter alia “that the first battle in the EDC ratification struggle had taken place last week in the cabinet over instructions to be given to the French delegation to the Rome conference on the EPC. He explained that he felt it was important that real progress be made on the Political Community before the EDC came to a vote in the French Parliament” (740.5/9–2253).