740.5/7–853: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Department of State 1
24. In our conversation last night Stikker reiterated his position, of which I was previously aware, that he was not enthusiastic over EDC as a workable organization and even less so with regard to proposed six-nation EDC project. On other hand, he felt it was essential that Netherlands should ratify EDC at earliest possible date and that action would be forthcoming by second Chamber before recess.
His lack of enthusiasm for EDC appeared based primarily on what he felt was weakness of French and Italian positions which he thought had even deteriorated beyond that when he had evaluated situation some months ago. He said it was clear to him that France would never ratify. In this connection, he pointed out that recent Socialist Party instruction to deputies2 introduced further obstacles ratification and just last week Massigli had told British Foreign Office that France would definitely postpone any action until it became clear what were Soviet intentions. Since it was well known that there are leaks amounting to a pipe-line from French Foreign Office to Soviet, it was clear that Soviets constantly informed French thinking were in position delay French action indefinitely. This was quite apart from French distrust, fear and jealousy of Germany. He felt then that the course leading to the only correct solution, namely eventual incorporation of Germany into NATO, was for smaller states to ratify EDC promptly, thus clearly pointing at France the finger of blame for all Western peoples to see. He tended discount importance of Italian ratification saying that France was the real culprit.