Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103
Mr. Eden opened the meeting by welcoming Chancellor Adenauer. He inquired whether the latter had any general observations to make concerning the problems confronting the four governments. The Chancellor confined himself to remarking that he was glad that the solution of the problems was so far advanced and he hoped that the four governments would soon be able to finish with these problems.
Mr. Eden suggested turning to the question of war criminals first. He asked what the Chancellor’s reaction was to the paper which had been submitted to him.2 Mr. Adenauer said that this subject played a great role in Germany. No one wanted the real war criminals to escape. He thought it would be welcomed in Germany if the previous convictions of these war criminals could be made known. Mr. Eden commented that he thought that this might have some advantages. Mr. Schuman explained that the proposal made by the three Ministers provided for a consultative body which might look into the question raised by the Chancellor to see what could be done and to take these facts into consideration.
Mr. Adenauer felt that his point had been misunderstood. He stressed the psychological role which this question played in Germany and the importance of making known before the Commission started its activity who the war criminals really are. Many of them had had previous criminal records, which fact he wished to have publicized. Perhaps this could be settled in Bonn. More specifically, as concerned the proposals laid before him he suggested a transposition of paragraphs [Page 61] 1 and 2, since the second paragraph dealing with the establishment of the Clemency Board made a better introduction to the subject from the point of view of German opinion than the first paragraph which dealt with the obligation of the German Government to accept custody and to carry out the sentences. He also suggested a merging of paragraphs 1 and 4. He said that the Western Powers could not accept revision of the sentences. But the word clemency (Gnade) implied in German a recognition of the sentences. He asked whether another expression could not be found, having the same meaning but a different connotation, for example “remission of penalty” (Straferlass). He thought there were other crimes involved than those listed in the proposed text and he pointed out that the proposal did not cover persons held in France or those not yet tried in France.
Mr. Eden pointed out that “clemency” was a legal phrase but that perhaps the legal experts could find another word. Or the word could be omitted altogether and the body could be called simply “Board” or “The Advisory Board”. Mr. Schuman and Mr. Acheson agreed that there would be no difficulty in changing the name of the Board. It was thereupon agreed by everyone at Mr. Eden’s suggestion that the word clemency should be omitted from the title of the Board in paragraph 2 and in paragraph 3 the wording should speak of the “right to pardon or to reduce or eliminate sentence”. The change of order suggested by Mr. Adenauer was also agreed.
Mr. Schuman thereupon pointed out that persons imprisoned in France for war crimes were convicted according to French law. It was a question of competence and the Ministers could not change French law. He expressed willingness to have bi-lateral conversations with the German Federal Republic about this problem. Adenauer stated that 345 persons were involved who had been sentenced or who were awaiting sentence. He pointed out that the United Kingdom and the United States had conducted all their trials in Germany and that those sentenced were held in Germany and therefore fell under the terms of the proposed agreement. On the other hand, only a small part of those held by the French came under its terms. It was important that if the agreement were published it should be made known at once that there is a plan for talks between the Federal Republic and France.
Mr. Schuman said that if there were 311 (correcting the figure cited by Adenauer) the reasons were that France was occupied for four years; the United Kingdom and the United States were not so occupied. If in the light of this fact only 311 were held, it indicates that the selection was strict. Moreover, France was not alone in holding German war criminals outside of Germany. He cited Belgium and the Netherlands. He expressed the desire of France, however, to try with the Federal Republic to attenuate the past. However, on this [Page 62] subject he could not enter a multilateral agreement. It concerned France and French law and he would have to consult his Government and Parliament. Mr. Eden suggested that the topic did indeed fall outside the scope of the paper under discussion and since Mr. Schuman had said he was ready to discuss the matter directly with the Germans that would be the best way to handle it. The Ministers were there to discuss only prisoners held in Germany. Mr. Adenauer insisted that he attached great importance to publishing something about bi-lateral talks. Mr. Schuman responded by suggesting that the German Federal Republic could publish something about them. Mr. Eden indicated that there appeared to be general agreement on this point and promised that the paper would be revised in the light of the discussion just had and presented at the next meeting.
Mr. Acheson asked whether it had been agreed that the High Commission would look into the Chancellor’s first point and arrange for the publication of the past records of prisoners held as war criminals. Mr. Eden thought that the High Commission would see what could be done and meet the Chancellor on this point.
Mr. Eden asked if the subject of finance could be taken up next. He pointed out that Mr. Adenauer had in his hands the report of the “Three Wise Men”3 which set Germany’s share in defense expenditures at 11.25 billion Deutschemarks. He expressed the hope that the Chancellor would agree to accept this recommendation but asked whether he wished to make some general observations about it. Mr. Adenauer said he had read the report with interest and found it well conceived. He could not, however, say “yes” to it today. He would have to consult his experts but he hoped agreement would be possible.
Mr. Eden said there were three questions outstanding. First, what amount should Germany contribute for this year? Second, what method should be used for determining the amount in subsequent years? Third, what would be the method of taking care of the needs of non-EDC troops in Germany? He asked if the Ministers could make some progress on these points. Mr. Adenauer again rejoined that he had seen the report on the previous evening for the first time and that he could not negotiate about it yet. He thought his experts must study it but he did not anticipate a long delay and he thought he could begin to negotiate about it in Bonn immediately upon his return.
Mr. Acheson noted that the Chancellor had said he thought there would be no important delay. He thought it was of the most vital importance to reach agreement soon. The Lisbon meeting would have before it a report approving the plan for the EDC. Conclusion of the EDC was dependent on the contractual agreements. Each matter depended on the other. He was hopeful that the Ministers could return [Page 63] from Lisbon with agreement in principle on the EDC and on the contractual agreements. Mr. Adenauer inquired how long the Lisbon meeting would last and was told by Sir. Acheson that it would last until a week from the next day. Mr. Adenauer said he thought it could be settled by then. Mr. Schuman pointed out that the Ministers would have to have a reply before they left Lisbon in order to make their decisions. Mr. Adenauer said, smilingly, that he understood that, that the Ministers could not wait until their suitcases were packed. Mr. Eden joined his colleagues in pressing for a German reply by the end of the week and Mr. Adenauer said he thought he could give a reply by then.
Mr. Eden observed that there did not seem to be much use in expounding the ideas which he, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Schuman had discussed yesterday on other financial points. He suggested that they could give the Chancellor a document based on their conversations. Mr. Adenauer said it was difficult to separate the various questions. Mr. Schuman agreed that they were all aspects of the same problem but pointed out that the second question had to be discussed at Lisbon and that it would be difficult to settle without the answer to all three questions. Mr. Adenauer thought, however, that there was only one great interest for the Lisbon meeting—the total amount. He thought they ought to be satisfied with that and he feared that the time was too short to discuss all the problems.
Mr. Eden pointed out that the difficulty was partly a mechanical and economical one. He and Mr. Schuman and Mr. Acheson would be in Lisbon. The Chancellor would be in Bonn. The division of the German contribution would be discussed in Paris. He wondered whether the EDC could have representatives in Bonn. Mr. Schuman pointed out that the EDC did not exist and that all six countries must be present at any discussion. Mr. Adenauer felt that all of this argued in favor of his thesis. The EDC need only be informed of the global amount after the discussion at Lisbon. Mr. Schuman agreed that this was true from a formal point of view. However, all of the members of NATO had to be informed and a gap would exist in their communiqué on this subject.
Mr. Acheson urged that they all keep the great objective in mind. Out of these meetings in London, out of the debates in the French and German Parliaments and out of the meetings in Lisbon something must come. The Ministers must make not only progress but they must reach conclusions. They had to strive to be in a position to say that they had settled the outstanding questions concerning the EDC, the German agreements and so forth. He urged that the Ministers come as close as they could to settlement.
Mr. Adenauer thought that Secretary Acheson was fully justified. He only feared that if the Ministers simultaneously tackled the question [Page 64] of global amount and the distribution they would be delayed. He suggested that they put the global amount first in priority and in principle. The other question was really for discussion between the United States–United Kingdom and the EDC. Mr. Schuman pointed out that the division concerned not only the EDC but was a subject also for tripartite discussion and the Germans should discuss it also outside the EDC.
Mr. Eden in summary thought it had been agreed that everything should be done at Bonn to reach agreement by the end of the week on the global amount and also to work there on the principle of the division. He adjourned the meeting until 4:30 p.m.
- The source text indicates that these minutes were prepared and possibly completed on Mar. 10, 1952, when Laukhuff and other members of the U.S. Delegation to the London and Lisbon meetings had already long returned to Washington. Copies of these minutes were circulated in the Department of State as document GER–London MIN 3, Apr. 16, 1952. A summary account of the meeting was sent to the Department of State in telegram Secto 16, Feb. 18, from London. (396.1 LO/2–1852)↩
- The “paper” submitted to Chancellor Adenauer was the draft article on war criminals described in telegram Secto 12, Feb. 18, p. 55.↩
- The reference here is to the Report of the Temporary Council Committee (often referred to as the “Three Wise Men”) of Dec. 18, 1951; that report is summarized in document LIS D–4/la, Feb. 6, p. 203.↩