Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–1653

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

secret

Washington, March 16, 1953.

Subject:

• Foreign Minister Van Zeeland’s Call on the President¹

Participants:

• The President
• Mr. Van Zeeland, Belgian Foreign Minister
• Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. L. T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

At the outset of the conversation, the President reminded the Foreign Minister of talks they had had in the past concerning the necessity of the European countries taking additional steps in furtherance of their own defense. He stated that the United States is watching attentively developments in Europe at the present time and he referred to the difficulties of securing continued public and Congressional support for our aid programs in the absence of tangible progress abroad. The President then brought up the subject of the ratification of the EDC Treaty, recalling the fact that M. Pleven was its author. The President emphasized the importance of speed on ratification of the Treaty and suggested that, if the Benelux countries and Western Germany proceeded promptly with their own ratification processes, the pressures on France would be powerful and she would be compelled to move forward in the interests of the role of leadership on the continent to which she rightfully aspires.

The Foreign Minister expressed confidence regarding the ratification situation in Belgium. He said that there was no question at this time of its successful passage but that he had been working for and was continuing to seek to achieve the largest possible majority. He indicated a two-thirds favorable vote in Parliament as his objective and he assured the President that Belgium would not delay the going into force of the Treaty by a single hour. It was obvious from his remarks, however, that he had some reluctance in placing Belgium out in front and he expressed some real doubt as to whether advance action by certain of her partners would, in fact, be persuasive to the French Parliament. At a later point the President asked him what his view would be on a purely private inquiry (possibly by Mr. David Bruce) of M. Mayer to ascertain whether or not in the latter’s view prior ratification by several of France’s partners would be helpful or damaging to him in the French Parliament. The Foreign Minister gave the impression of being doubtful as to the wisdom of this, remarking that it was a question of how it was put and that it was important to avoid any impression of interfering in French internal affairs. He did, however, emphasize his complete conviction that Mayer and the French Cabinet are wholeheartedly seeking French ratification of the Treaty.

The Foreign Minister then raised two command problems,² the first relating to Marshal Juin’s assumption of the Central European Ground Command. He stated that he thought it was important that if he assumed this command he surrender any purely national command over French forces. The President indicated that he regarded this as reasonable. The Foreign Minister then suggested that it was important that not all the major commands be held by officers of the three Standing Group countries and put forward Belgian claims for an important command for one of its generals with the thought that this would not be permanent and that he might be succeeded by a Dutch general or some other NATO national other than the big three. The President again indicated that this seemed personally reasonable to him but only if an officer of the proper qualifications could be provided. He also emphasized the importance of SACEUR’s absolute right to remove immediately any officer who failed to display the necessary qualifications for command. The President went on to say that he did not know what arguments might be developed in a discussion of this matter but that personally he was in agreement that all the important positions of command should not be monopolized by the three Standing Group countries.

In closing the conversation, the President agreed with the Foreign Minister that the Belgians in general had been among the leaders within NATO in its defense effort. He made it clear that whereas the U.S. by reason of its size, productive capacity and location must play the more important role in the material aspects of the alliance, we look to countries such as Belgium to provide a role of inspirational leadership and example on the continent.³

1. Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland visited Washington, Mar. 14–18, 1053, for discussions with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other government officials. Material on the visit of the Belgian Foreign Minister is in EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Van Zeeland Visit”.
2. Further documentation on problems of command structure and jurisdiction within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is printed on pp. 1 ff.
3. In telegram Edcol 20 to Paris, Mar. 18, Bruce was informed that the point had been pressed with Van Zeeland in his Washington talks that prior ratification by Belgium “would be helpful” in securing ratification of the EDC Treaty in France. “When pressed on this point last evening Van Zeeland indicated this was insufficient basis on which to proceed but he stated that if he received from Mayer or Bidault a message that prior action his part would advance their efforts for ratification he would be happy to move ahead. We doubt feasibility securing any helpful word from Bidault but if you see no objection suggest you take first opportunity sound out Mayer on possibility his sending through you confidential message for Van Zeeland along foregoing lines” (740.5/3–1753).