740.5/3–1053
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Smith)
Participants:
- The President
- Netherlands Foreign Minister J.M.A.H. Luns
- The Under Secretary—Mr. Smith
- Ambassador Van Roijen
After the usual amenities, Mr. Luns expressed his appreciation for the aid given by the United States and its armed forces in the recent disaster in Holland1 and gave a general report of conditions. The President expressed his gratitude and then said that he had wanted the opportunity to speak about the European Defense Community. He appreciated the position which the Dutch have taken so far and said that he would like to see Holland begin to take the leadership in early ratification.
Mr. Luns said the Dutch had been concerned about the French protocols. There was a difference of opinion, in that the French argued that the protocols were within the framework of EDC, whereas the Dutch felt that they added a new element. If the French were to interpret the treaty according to their national aspirations there was no reason that the Germans would not be able to do so subsequently, and while Holland was willing and anxious to see West Germany part of the European Defense Community, there remained the apprehension [Page 762] of what might develop from a rearmed Germany under the urge of unification between the east and west. The President said that he had spoken very frankly and bluntly to Adenauer about this matter, and that he himself did not share these apprehensions. It was quite impossible for Germany alone to undertake any military adventure since, regardless of her manufacturing capacity, she did not by herself have the materials or the industrial set-up to support an independent war. He thought, subject of course to any legal qualifications which the experts might advance, that the Dutch could ratify the treaty as it now stands. This would give an added impulse to the EDC movement. Their ratification might contain the flat statement that it was contingent on no modifying protocols which would change the sense of the treaty itself. Mr. Luns indicated that this might be a possibility which would have sympathetic reception in Holland, that the Dutch were willing and eager to complete the first vital step toward EDC.
Mr. Luns then reverted to the change in the NATO command structure. The Dutch were not particularly concerned about the additional responsibilities which would be vested in Marshal Juin, but they were concerned at the report that Juin intended to create another supreme headquarters with another French general in command of the ground forces. They understood the tactical necessity for one commander to conduct the battle in the center, and the impossibility of this same commander supervising campaigns which might take place simultaneously on the flanks. However, if Juin’s headquarters resolved itself into another supreme command with another French general commanding the ground forces, this multiplication of national interest would cause them grave concern. The President indicated that he had not visualized such an organization. He, himself, when commanding in Europe, had rejected the idea of a separate ground commander and had supervised the conduct of the action over the entire front, although he had under his command at the time massing of naval and air forces, which Marshal Juin would not have. He had visualized this change as simply to give Juin control over the tactical air organization which would operate with the ground forces. He suggested that the Under Secretary communicate with General Bradley and see what the actual situation was, at the same time assuring the Foreign Minister of his understanding of their apprehensions. He was aware of the possibility that this detachment of the American Supreme Commander from responsibility of the actual conduct of battle on the central front may arouse some apprehension that it was the beginning of a movement by the United States to disengage itself from Europe. This apprehension was groundless for the foreseeable future; the United States accepted the fact that its ground divisions, air forces and navy would be operating in and in connection with the [Page 763] European Defense Organization. The British also, although with their usual national restraint, were apparently willing to do about everything which the European states had asked so far in connection with actual collaboration.
- Reference was to the series of devastating floods which had afflicted the Netherlands during the winter of 1953.↩