Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–453

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Washington, March 4, 1953.

Subject:

• British Association with the EDC and Extension of the NAT Commitments.

Discussion:

It is understood that Mr. Eden wishes to discuss with you² the interrelated problems of British association with the EDC and in particular the U.S. attitude toward the extension of the NAT commitment to 50 years. The British Embassy on March 3 presented to us complete texts of the French proposals for British association, the British reply, and the British counter-proposals. The British reply and counter-proposal were presented to the French yesterday, who did not agree to discussing them with the other EDC countries. The British consider it imperative that we not discuss their proposal with the French or any other EDC countries at this time.

The substance of these documents is as follows:

(1) French Proposal. The French proposal contains the following two main elements:(a) A British commitment to maintain their present level of forces on the continent for an indefinite period of time, with special provision for Britain to withdraw forces to meet a non-European emergency, (b) In exchange for this commitment, the British would acquire the right to participate in all three of the important institutions of the EDC. A British Minister would be entitled to sit on the EDC Council when matters affecting cooperation between British and EDC forces are being considered. Members of the British Parliament would be entitled to attend meetings of the EDC Assembly as observers when problems affecting Britain are being discussed. Finally, a British representative would be entitled to participate in the work of the EDC Commissariat to handle practical problems of cooperation between British and EDC forces. The essential element in the proposal is the fact that, if the British cease to maintain their forces at their present level, they would lose the “right” to participate in the institutions of the EDC.

The French have put this proposal into the form of a protocol to the EDC Treaty between the EDC signatories and the U.K. The French draft protocol also contains provisions for military cooperation between British and EDC forces and for coordination of armaments, equipment and supply programs.

(2) British Reply. The British reply turns down the main principle of the French proposal. They say they are unable to commit themselves to station troops on the continent indefinitely, since their position is essentially different from that of the continental powers. Furthermore, they claim that it is wrong to say that the British right to be represented in the institutions of the EDC should be contingent on Britain maintaining its forces at their present level. The British point out that they have submitted far-reaching proposals for the military association of their forces with those of the EDC and that the degree of military integration they are willing to agree to in these proposals should automatically entitle them to some participation in the governing institutions of the EDC.

(3) British Counter-Proposal. As a substitute for the French proposal, the British have proposed the issuance of a draft declaration which, after listing the several existing British commitments to the EDC and after describing plans for close functional association between British and EDC forces, would then go on to make two new points:

(a) British willingness to join in a proposal to other NATO countries that the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty should be extended to make it co-terminous with the EDC.

(b) British willingness, if the EDC countries so desire, to participate in the institutions of the EDC, including a special British mission to the EDC Commissariat to deal with practical problems of cooperation between British and EDC forces and the appointment of a British representative to attend the EDC Council of Ministers to discuss UK–EDC cooperation and consult on matters of common concern. The British have indicated that the level of U.K. and EDC forces to be maintained on the continent at any given time might be among the matters on which to consult.

(4) French Reaction to British Proposal. The French reaction to the British proposal has been unfavorable. (See separate memorandum summarizing the French note.)³ In essence, the French say that their little value in the British proposal to extend the NAT to 50 years and that it will not be sufficient to satisfy the desire of the French public for British ties to the EDC. They continue to insist that there must be a British commitment to maintain forces on the Continent, as called for in the original French proposal.

Recommendations:

In spite of the French reaction, some sort of extension of the NAT commitment appears to be the only feasible approach from the British point of view. The British maintain that they cannot agree to a troop commitment, and we are in no position to urge them otherwise. Furthermore, there are indications that the 50-year formula may have a favorable effect on the French Socialists, in spite of the French Government’s insistence that it would not. In any case, it is at least worth while to explore this subject with Mr. Eden. The following points are therefore recommended in connection with a discussion of this subject:

(1) The British proposal is obviously a matter of major importance affecting existing U.S. commitments. As such, the United States Government would have to consult with Congressional leaders before being able to take any kind of position. However, certain preliminary observations come to mind.

(2) The U.S. considers that existing commitments and guarantees sufficient to take care of the situation. Only if it becomes absolutely essential to EDC ratification should we consider taking any further action, and we should do so in a way that will be definitely contingent upon French ratification.

(3) As to the British proposal, it appears to have the important advantage of putting the guarantee in terms which will avoid any specific commitment to maintain troops, since it is done in NAT terms and the North Atlantic Treaty does not require any specific troop commitment.

(4) The British proposal does not take account of the fact that our NATO commitment is not really a “twenty-year” commitment, as is popularly supposed. It is a treaty of indefinite duration, and was so regarded by the U.S. Senate when ratified. Article 13 of the Treaty provides only that individual members may withdraw from NATO after twenty years; the Treaty continues in effect indefinitely. The EDC Treaty, on the other hand, is specifically limited to fifty years. For this reason, it might be better to put the emphasis on the fact that the NAT commitment is neither a twenty-year or even a fifty-year commitment, but a continuing commitment which really only puts on a paper a basic fact of international life: that the countries of the North Atlantic area must remain joined together more or less indefinitely to ensure their collective security.

(5) There would appear to be various ways to do what we are trying to do: i.e., to demonstrate to the French and others that the U.K. and the U.S. have no intention of pulling out of NATO in twenty years and hence withdrawing their support from the EDC:

(a) One way would be a formal amendment to Article 13 of the NAT whereby “fifty years” would be substituted for “twenty years” as the time when withdrawal would be permitted. This approach should serve to allay French fears and at the same time would not interfere with the “continuing commitment” concept of the NAT. It is recommended that we not go beyond actually telling the French that the U.S. and U.K. are willing to propose and support such an amendment to the Treaty, with completion of the actual amendment being made contingent upon French ratification of the Treaty.

(b) A second approach would be to amend the North Atlantic Treaty so that it would actually terminate with the EDC Treaty. (As we read it, this appears to be the British proposal, although they may have had in mind something more like (a). This might be clarified with Mr. Eden.) If the British actually propose to have NAT terminate with the EDC Treaty, then there would be the rather serious disadvantage of destroying the “continuing commitment” concept of the NAT.

(c) Although probably less valuable from the French ratification point of view, a third approach would be a well-timed announcement either by the U.K. alone, the U.S. and the U.K. together, or even all non-EDC NATO countries, to the effect that they regard the NATO commitment a continuing one, that they have no intention of withdrawing from the NAT when the twenty-year period is over, and that they can therefore be counted on to support EDC while it is in existence. Such a declaration would have the advantage of not requiring an amendment to the NAT and hence would avoid a possible delaying factor.

(6) It is recommended that approach (c) be the initial position, that approach (a) be used only if absolutely necessary and only in a way so as to be contingent upon French ratification.

(7) There is an added element which the British have not brought out fully and which might make the fifty-year NAT extension more acceptable to the French. By extending their NAT commitment to fifty years, the British would thereby be extending their strong commitment under the special U.K.–EDC Treaty signed May 27, 1952.⁴ Under this Treaty, the U.K. extends a strong Brussels Treaty commitment to the EDC (i.e. a “go to war” commitment much stronger than NAT), but does so only for the life of the NAT. Extending the NAT to fifty years would automatically extend this stronger U.K. commitment to fifty years; a fact which should be given maximum emphasis.

1. Drafted by Fessenden. Cleared by Knight, Raynor, and Moore.
2. Foreign Secretary Eden visited Washington Mar. 4–6 for discussions with American officials including Dulles and President Eisenhower. That portion of the discussions dealing with EDC and the Saar is printed in UKPT MIN–1, infra.
3. Not printed.
4. See editorial note, p. 684.