Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

396.1 LO/2–1852: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

London, February 18, 1952—1 a.m.

Secto 12. Secretary met with Eden and Schuman twice today.

2. Schuman briefly explained situation at Paris. Draft resolution to be voted on in Assembly Tues.² It contains series of recommendations, not binding conditions. Nevertheless, they reveal parliamentary state of mind and French Govt must make every effort to meet them. Chances for ratification EDC treaty will be improved to extent recommendations met.

3. Mtgs with Adenauer. Mins agreed to meet Adenauer Mon morning.

4. War criminals, Mins accepted report by subcomite of officials giving text of article proposed for inclusion in Part I of convention on acts and programs (text being telegraphed).³ This proposed article has subsequently been given to Adenauer and will be discussed with him tomorrow. Briefly, proposal commits Germans to accept custody and carry out sentence. Clemency board of six members wld be created, three Germans and one national from each of powers. Such board wld have advisory power only, except that unanimous recommendations wld be binding upon power which imposed sentence. Members of board wld have free access to prisons and to persons confined.

5. German financial contribution. (Reported in separate telegram⁴).

6. Security controls. Mins had before them two drafts of declaration which Germans might make on this subject.⁵ US draft based on idea German Fed Govt shld declare itself prepared to accept as nondiscriminatory any decision by EDC commissioners not to allocate for production in Fed Rep items on specified list. UK–French draft was in form of declaration by Fed Rep Govt that it wld not permit production of, and scientific research in fields of certain armaments. Mins agreed declaration shld be unilateral by Germans; French thus relinquished original demand for contractual agreement. Schuman felt US approach was not satisfactory because EDC method of procedure wld not give sufficient protection as it wld operate by majority action of defense commissioners. Secretary felt we all agreed on objective and only question was which method wld most easily bring German acceptance. He was prepared to try UK–French approach and if Adenauer wld not accept that perhaps US approach based on EDC offered possibility. Discussion then centered largely on list of prohibited armaments. All agreed on atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, mil aircraft, naval vessels except minor defensive craft, and guided missiles. British and French wished to add civil aircraft and French wished to add propellants and gun barrels over 105 mm. Secretary offered to accept civil aircraft. He further offered to accept a British-French proposal for German declaration to include commitment to limit police force to scale required or function of maintaining internal law and order, on basis comparable with other EDC countries. He made both concessions conditional on dropping of propellants and gun barrels from agreement. He added he did not believe Adenauer wld accept civil aircraft and aid wld make no effort to persuade him to do so. Schuman, however, insisted on necessity retaining two items involved on ground we shld not build up German war industry. Secretary emphasized speed to bring about German production these items, especially gunpowder, and minimized inherent dangerousness of this particular item from security viewpoint. No agreement reached. Secretary repeatedly stated belief that we must present to Adenauer list we really believe in and will defend. Otherwise we will begin withdrawing items and will get nowhere with Adenauer. Schuman refused to concede point but agreed to consider overnight. Other points brought out in discussion were statement by Schuman that French inclined to permit scientific research in military items, though he made no specific proposal. Secretary also suggested that if Adenauer refuses declaration in UK–French form, and we fall back upon EDC arrangements, we might propose adding whatever list we agree to EDC treaty as items not to be allocated for production in “forward zones.”

7. EDC–NATO relationships. Eden raised point of unresolved differences in para 9 of deputies report.⁶ Three alternative proposals are to have joint mtgs of EDC and NATO councils (a) when either council wishes, or (b) when both councils wish, or (c) when any member of either organization wishes. Inconclusive discussion followed. Secretary referred to language which US is proposing in CD and indicated US agreement for proposal to permit joint consultation whenever desired by any member of either organization. British indicated agreement. Schuman said he wld consider and reply on Mon.

8. US–UK guarantee to EDC. British circulated draft form which their own guarantee to EDC might take. French circulated drafts of declarations which cld be made by UK and all three powers as well as comments concerning possible US declaration.⁷ Secretary indicated we are devoting study to this problem and hoped we cld do something useful. He indicated doubt about possibility of using French text of tripartite declaration which seemed to say US will not change its forces in Europe without agreement by all three powers. Such solution wld be difficult if not impossible for him. Mins agreed that if formal declarations were possible they shld be made when EDC treaty and German agreements were signed. Eden raised question of what cld be said publicly now by Mins in answer to questions sure to arise since French Assembly already fully aware of question. Mins agreed to consider what might usefully be said in communiqué and meanwhile to have experts exchange views on British and French drafts and to tell Adenauer that matter under study. Eden commented he did not believe Adenauer wld raise difficulties as he had already indicated acceptance of idea so long as guarantee was in general terms and directed against anybody in EDC rather than Germany specifically.

9. Deconcentration. Schuman indicated he attached great importance to this subject and had committed himself not to complete negots with Germans unless deconcentration was completed. It was agreed after brief discussion that McCloy shld tell Adenauer that Fed Rep must stop equivocating on DKV.⁸

10. Saar. Secretary asked if it wld be possible for Schuman and Adenauer to have private words about possibility of removing Saar problem from field of controversy and to announce they had discussed the problem with each other and with Eden and himself and that US–UK anxious to be of help on solving problem. Schuman replied he is ready for conversation with Adenauer as he believes Adenauer is and that he wld keep his colleagues informed.

11. It was agreed to have official-level mtg with Benelux rep Mon.⁹

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, Bonn, and Lisbon. Like other messages in the Secto series reporting on the talks in London, this telegram was transmitted to Washington in the name of the Secretary of State but was, of course, prepared by officers of the Department who accompanied him to London.
2. The reference here is to the resolution on a European Defense Force and German participation in the European Defense Community, adopted by the French National Assembly on Feb. 19. For the text of the resolution, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 81–83. Regarding the resolution, see telegrams 5048 and 5049, both Feb. 17, from Paris, pp. 615 and 616.
3. The report under reference here, circulated as document MOG/2 Final, Feb. 16, 1952, presented a draft article on war criminals for insertion in the proposed Convention on Acts and Interests to be concluded between the occupying powers and the Federal German Republic. The text of the draft article was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 3573, Feb. 18, from London. (740.5/2–1852) For the text agreed upon by the four Foreign Ministers, see p. 101. The composition of the “sub-committee” or “official group” preparing the report and article has not been determined, but Frank Roberts presented the report to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Regarding the Foreign Ministers decision to have such an article drafted, see the U.S. minutes of the Acheson–Eden meeting of Feb. 16, p. 45.
4. Telegram Secto 11, Feb. 18, from London, infra.
5. The two drafts under reference here are printed as Appendixes A and B to document MOG/3 Final, Feb. 16, pp. 99 and 100.
6. The reference here is to document D–D (52) 35 (Final), Feb. 20, p. 247.
7. The British and French drafts under reference here have not been further identified. It is possible that the British draft and a later version of the French draft worked out by American, British, and French experts are among the drafts transmitted in telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103.
8. Documentation on the problem of deconcentration of West German industry and the status of the Deutschekohlverein is presented in volume vii .

9. No record has been found of any “official-level” meeting or any other meeting between American, British, and French officials and any Benelux representative in London.

   In telegram Secto 9, Feb. 17, from London, one of several telegrams intended to provide background for the guidance of the press, Kirkpatrick informed Leverich that the tripartite meetings had made “considerable progress,” and analyzed the situation as follows:

   “Atmosphere appears surprisingly good and promising for producing results prior to Lisbon but much depends on Monday’s quadripartite, and media will have to play presently thin news coverage straight avoiding speculation on guarantees, breakdowns or alternatives to EDC” (396.1 LO/2–1752)