Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/2–1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret
priority

Washington, February 18, 1953—7:11 p.m.

4481. Re:(a) Embtel 4558.² (b) Section II Bonn’s 3388 [3832],³ rptd Paris 1035 (Reply to German statement reftel b being covered in separate message.) (c) Embtel 4581.⁴ Subject is Department’s preliminary comments on French EDC protocols which you requested:

A. General Reaction.

Before formulation complete position on French protocols, Department needs clarification of intent of several provisions. Complete reaction other EDC countries also must be taken into account. Reftel (c) indicates that most countries except Germany feel that French protocols can be negotiated into acceptable positions.

Believe we must work on assumption that protocols represent first French negotiating position, and that French can be brought around to more reasonable position that will result in eliminating features of protocols which (a) give French a special position not required by realities of her overseas responsibilities or (b) discriminate against other parties to the Community, in particular Germany. With a view to achieving this objective, it would be helpful if all countries will take flexible and moderate attitude in EDC/IC.

Department is concerned regarding Alphand’s statement reported in para 4 of your 4503⁵ that French are unwilling to give assurance that protocols they have submitted represent complete list of French desiderata with respect to Treaty itself. It appears to us that uncertainty on this point will make it difficult to negotiate protocols since other countries will be reluctant to go as far as they might in meeting individual French points if they do not know totality of French demands. Furthermore, French position would seriously militate against getting early parliamentary action in other countries. In view of elections to be held in several countries, this could result in further protracted delays in ratification.

B. General Principles.

In addition to general principles re protocols outlined in para 1 Deptel 4028 to Paris, January 24,⁶ Department feels following additional objectives should be kept in mind:

(a) All changes should be worked out in context of EDC Treaty thereby avoiding modifications in contractuals or changes involving NATO Council action.

(b) The protocols should be drafted so as to be EDC-wide in application, rather than confined to France only. Obvious that other EDC countries will insist on this in any case. Fact that French have already used EDC-wide language in several protocols is argument for extending principle to all. French Government can spell out to Assembly specific effect in France of generally applicable protocols.

(c) Unnecessary and pointed discrimination against Germany should be avoided. In view of fact that German “equality” is of prime importance to German ratification, French protocols which appear to go out of way to discriminate against Germany do more harm than good to over-all effort to ratify EDC.

(d) Possibility exists that some French points can be met by negotiations in EDC Interim Commission rather than by detailed protocols requiring full publicity of six-country ratification. This might apply to such matters as personnel statute and Article 107 licenses. Recognize that procedural and administrative solutions worked out in EDC/ IC would not be binding like protocols, and hence not as useful to French in ratification. Nevertheless feel that some useful purpose might be served by such approach.

(e) Finally, believe protocols should in general be drafted so as to make plain they apply to France’s legitimate overseas requirements as defined paragraph 1 Article 10 of Treaty. This necessary to allay suspicions other EDC countries that France trying to buildup national forces located in Metropole.

C. Specific Comments.

Following detailed comments correspond numbered and lettered paragraphs reference telegram (a). Where pertinent, comments called for by reference telegram (b) worked in:

1. Article 13. For your info on background of U.S. position on this Article, Department is repeating Topols 868, 858, 806, and Polto 1400⁷ to all info addressees this cable. Request that all EDC governments be informed of general U.S. opposition to French protocol as submitted to EDC/IC. Paragraph 4 reftel (b) indicates that statement of general U.S. opposition to French protocol as drafted would be particularly helpful to Adenauer. No public statement of U.S. position should be made, however. U.S. representatives should not attempt to indicate details of U.S. objections, nor should type of protocol U.S. would desire be made known at this time to other governments. U.S. representatives should indicate, however, that only U.S. objection is toward that aspect of French proposal that calls for NAC action as integral part of formula, when matter might be handled by understanding solely between EDC nations.

(a) Re idea of two division limit under Article 13 of Treaty. We are opposed thereto for following reasons:

(1) Bad as precedent for EDC and NATO.

(2) Principle should be that forces to be withdrawn under Treaty Article 13 would be those required to meet overseas emergency and which could be spared from European defense in light of situation as it may actually exist. It is impossible to prejudge, now, even though it be labelled as a ceiling, is both to invite it to become the normal quantum and to bar a greater withdrawal if worse situation is indicated. Flexibility under broad principle far more desirable.

2. Integrity French Forces.

(a) We are not entirely clear as to significance Article 2 of protocol. We note that second paragraph refers to “exchanges between personnel” whereas paragraph 5 of Article 10 of Treaty refers to “exchange of individual personnel”. Perhaps this is point which has given rise to worry on part of both von Starckenburgh and Germans. We agree that French intentions must be clarified.

(b) Since requirement of unanimous vote carried under Article 44 of Treaty applies in any case, reference to it in protocol unnecessary. This is certainly illustration of kind of point French can make in parliamentary presentation without having to have unnecessary reference in protocol.

(c) Suggest that lack of statute for German forces during initial period be brought to attention French, perhaps with suggestion it might be necessary to provide for Germans drawing up own statute during interim period. This might cause French to change attitude toward this provision in protocol.

(d) We agree that problem of discrimination against Germany is raised most strongly by this Convention. Believe that it is essential that protocol be limited to greatest extent possible to such points as are strictly necessary to meet legitimate problem of maintenance of French overseas forces without altering character of Treaty.

(e) Article 3 of protocol appears inconsistent with Article 31 of Treaty. Moreover, as we understand it, it goes far beyond question of promotions by bringing entire subject personnel policy within scope national determination. This article appears to us to raise quite serious problems.

(f) Would appreciate further embassy comment on background of negotiation and relationship of French proposal to provisions of Chapter III of Military Protocol to Treaty.

3. Weighted Voting (Article 43 bis): We are unable to appraise seriousness of change which protocol on this article would make until solutions on other problems, notably Treaty Article 13, are found. Recall, in negotiation of Treaty, Germans appeared willing to agree to fixed parity between German and French voting rights within framework of weighted voting formula, but this solution was objectionable to other countries. We suggest that it might be well to lay this problem aside in discussions until progress has been made in dealing with other French proposals.

Dutch here have objected that protocol as drafted gives French veto over possibility changing to Treaty Article 43 voting system. We have pointed out only real objection would be if French could cut back EDC defense effort through Treaty Article 13 withdraws and other means and at same time maintain fixed voting parity provided for in 43 bis. Hence, if Treaty Article 13, integrity forces, etc., satisfactorily worked out, there should be little objection to proposed protocol.

As additional argument, cautiously used, suggest following might be pointed out:

Realize that real French concern is with voting strength several years from now, when German military effort (and hence voting strength) will be predominant. Situation very different, however, during period when Treaty Article 43 voting system first goes into effect, which will be approximately two years after ratification. Very rough estimate, based on projection EDC defense expenditures and manpower contributions at end of first echelon build-up (allowing 25 percent non-NATO French contribution), is that percentage voting strength under Treaty Article 43 would be on the order of France 38, Germany 28, Italy 18, Belgium 8, Netherlands 7, Luxembourg 1, as compared with 3–3–3–2–2–1 ratio under Article 43 bis. Hence at least during immediate post-build-up period, France would have powerful voting position under Treaty Article 43, with possible veto on measures requiring two-thirds Council vote, as well as those requiring unanimous vote. Under Treaty Article 43, therefore, Italy and Benelux countries would all suffer serious cutbacks in their voting strength. Benelux in particular bound to be better off under 43 bis formula.

4. Production and Export of Armaments. Basic problem here appears to be to reconcile (a) fear of other EDC countries that France will use this protocol to build up own armament industry for national forces with (b) French fear that it will be hamstrung by EDC in producing and exporting armaments for forces in Indo-China. Should be possible to work out protocol in way that will reconcile these points of view.

Agree with Paris and Bonn comments re difficulty which French proposal raises for Germans. Obviously, licensing of arms production, etc., for overseas forces will have to be handled with flexibility. However, French stipulations that licenses must be irrevocable without quantitative limitation and without duration completely negates second sentence of Paragraph 4(e) of Treaty Article 107 which gives Commissariat right to insure that licenses are not used beyond needs specified in that sub-paragraph.

5. Mobilization. Agree that two French proposals appear to tend in direction maintaining full national control over mobilization, but cannot comment until have clearer notion of what French mean by “requirements of these forces”. Does French proposal mean, as Germans think, that national authorities would have final decision with respect to number of troops to be mobilized? If so, we would agree that proposal affects functions of Commissariat as they have been envisaged in Treaty.

6. Schools. Appears here that this proposal in one sense is actually improvement. If national forces attend European schools, as provided paragraph 1 protocol, they would thereby acquire European doctrine, which should facilitate their subsequent interchange with EDF forces, if this should occur. What was meant by Alphand’s reference to need to work out “financial consequences” this protocol? If French intend share cost European schools in proportion their national troops attending, this should cause no difficulty.

7. Length of Service. If Belgian Government insists on Protocol regarding common length of service as firm condition to ratification, appears to be little that can be done about it. However, everything should be done to ensure that Protocol will not permanently fix EDC length of service at 18 months, but will leave way open to later increase. U.S. SHAPE observer should make known views expressed by Ridgway regarding importance 24 months service period to sound defense effort. (See Topol 738 January 21⁸ regarding U.S. position on length of service question.)

8. UK–EDC Association. Basic U.S. position this question set forth Topol ———————————, still applies. Request whether any developments on Department’s earlier suggestion that possible solution regarding UK support costs problem might be worked out in context UK association with EDF. Also request whether SHAPE has given any thought to “brigading in” of UK troops in EDF, with integrated command and logistical implications.⁹

9 and 10. Status and support costs. Covered in separate cable.

11. US Item Aid. Authorization to discuss coming within few days.

12. Indo-China. No comment.

13. Saar. See separate telegram.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Reinstein, Hay, and Fessenden. Cleared by Riddleberger, Knight, and Moore. Initialed for the Secretary by Bonbright. Repeated to The Hague, Brussels, Rome, London, Bonn, and Luxembourg.
2. Summarized in footnote 2 to telegram 4595, p. 730.
3. Dated Feb. 15, p. 729. Section II of that telegram is not printed.
4. Not printed; it reported in detail on the general reactions of the heads of the EDC Delegations to the French protocols which “are substantially same as our own” (740.5/2–1653).
5. Dated Feb. 12, p. 719.
6. Ante, p. 706.
7. None printed. Telegrams Polto 1400 and Topol 858 are summarized in footnote 2, p. 726. Topols 806 and 868 also dealt with the French protocol to Article 13 of the EDC Treaty. Topol 806 to Paris, Jan. 30, informed the Embassy inter alia that the NATO Treaty was silent on the subject of troop withdrawals and that there existed no binding legal impediment to withdrawal of national contributions of troops except for paragraph 41 of DC 24/3 which did reserve for consideration by the North Atlantic Council any political issue which might be created by a member nation withdrawing forces without equivalent replacements, and “We would not like to see DC 24/3 amended or interpreted in any way re EDC which might affect its status in NATO or its observance therein”. (740.5/1–2553) Topol 868 reported the determination of the U.S. Government that no protocol to Article 13 could be agreed to which would in any way impair control of SACEUR over NATO forces under his command without prior consultation between SACEUR and appropriate authorities of the EDC (740.5/2–1053) For text of DC 24/3, Dec. 12, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, p. 548.
8. Not printed, but see telegram 609 to Brussels, Nov. 8, 1952, p. 695 regarding this subject.
9. In telegram 4707 from Paris, Feb. 21, Dunn reported that in his opening statement before the heads of the EDC Delegations on Feb. 20, Alphand had expressed surprise at the emotion created by the French protocols, deplored the fact that bad drafting or unfortunate statements of his own had suggested French desires to change the existing EDC Treaty and reaffirmed that “France did not intend to drift from its European policy.” Alphand then gave as an example of current misunderstanding the German interpretation of his observation “on need for status of EDC forces in Germany” which had been construed as an attempt to create a special position for France by prolonging the occupation, whereas all the French Government wished was an assurance of some short transitional period in which to adapt its forces in Germany to EDC status. Blank then replied with a prepared statement stressing among other things the need not to slow down ratification by long consideration of the protocols, that under no circumstance should acceptance of the protocols be made a condition for ratification, and that the fundamental principles of the treaty must be maintained (740.5/2–2153). A translation of Blank’s remarks was subsequently sent to the Department in telegram 4714 (740.5/2–2153).