740.5/2–1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

secret
priority

4508. Limit distribution. Subject is European Defense Community.

1.
Alphand telephoned me 20 minutes before meeting of Interim Committee this afternoon to tell me on a confidential basis that Mayer and Bidault had just given him instructions to submit earlier draft of French protocol on Article 13 (transmitted Polto 1378 of February 7)1 to Interim Committee instead of draft that had been worked out in conversations with us. (See Polto 1400 of February 10.)2 He said that Mayer and Bidault did not disagree with the latter draft but they insisted that the earlier draft had to be submitted this afternoon. Alphand was very embarrassed and apologetic. He said he had done his very best to have these instructions reversed and had given all the obvious arguments why such an action would be most unfortunate, but he had been unsuccessful and now there was nothing to do but to follow his instructions.
2.
I told Alphand that this action seemed incredible in view of Bidault’s previously expressed wish not to proceed on basis of a text which would be generally unacceptable to the US and in view of his own statement that French Government would prefer to hold back text on Article 13 if an understanding had not been reached with us. [Page 727] Alphand replied that he had prepared for this afternoon’s meeting on this basis but had been overruled. (Paragraph 2 of note submitted by French delegation and cabled in Embtel 4503,3 bears this out.) He could do nothing but follow his instructions.
3.
I asked Alphand if I could telephone Bidault immediately and urge him to hold up text, pointing out unfortunate impression which would be created in the US by this conduct. Alphand replied that this was not possible because I was not supposed to know what his instructions were in advance of the meeting.
4.
During meeting, Alphand submitted protocol on Article 13 nearly identical with text sent in Polto 1378, February 7. (Exact text in immediately following cable.)4 He did not comment on conflict with statement in paragraph I of note submitted at same time (see Embtel 4504)5 but did stress repeatedly that this text was put forward as a basis of discussion and that he appreciated other delegates would probably have comments to make to improve presentation. He pointed out that Article 13 problem regarding withdrawal of forces is more theoretical than practical. Only twice in last thirty years have French sent forces overseas, and no one believes that SACEUR would withhold his consent if emergency arose. Unfortunately, criticisms are being made on juridical grounds, and practical answers will not suffice, hence the need for a protocol of some sort.
5.
After meeting, I again told Alphand that we were dismayed by the highly irregular way in which discussions had been conducted with the US Government, particularly when his government had been informed of importance we attached to avoiding discussions and action in NAC and to avoiding highlighting question of withdrawal of forces from NATO. Alphand explained that Bidault was not in disagreement with our text but he considered it advisable to begin negotiations with language in preamble of previous text and Bidault also could not be shaken from his opinion that NAC had to give instructions to SACEUR in order to make conditions in protocol binding on him. Alphand continued that he still believed it was far preferable for French Government to submit protocol on Article 13 worked out with us, rather than for the US to do so. He said that Bidault would not be available until late Saturday because of his trip to London. He believed Bidault’s agreement could be obtained if I would stress to him that SACEUR could not insist upon his right to veto withdrawal under Article 13 if he were notified of the protocol approved by the six EDC countries. I asked Alphand to arrange for me to see Bidault as soon as possible so that question could be handled in this way. I told him that in view of the fact that [Page 728] other delegates now have a proposed protocol on Article 13, we must inform them immediately of the reasons why we do not find the protocol as submitted to them acceptable.
Dunn
  1. Not printed (740.5/2–753).
  2. Not printed; it contained a translation of the latest French draft protocol on Article 13 following discussions with American Embassy officials pursuant to telegram Topol 858 to Paris, Feb. 7. Topol 858 proposed various changes in the emerging French draft in order that the “formula of protocol appear to be interpretation rather than modification of treaty”. Polto 1400 is in file 740.5/2–1053. Topol 858 is in file 740.5/2–753.
  3. Dated Feb. 12, p. 719.
  4. Telegram 4509, Feb. 12, supra.
  5. Dated Feb. 12, p. 721.