Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/1–2653: Telegram

The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, January 26, 1953—9 p.m.

Polto 1246. Limit distribution. Personal for the Secretary from Draper.

1. I realize that there is little I can add to information available to you in Washington in preparation for your trip.¹ Nevertheless, I thought it might be helpful if I laid before you my thoughts on what to me is the most pressing current problem in Europe for the security of our country. This is the EDC, with which I have inevitably become involved by reason of its organic connection with NATO and the part it plays in all our concerns in Europe under the Mutual Security program. Since my return from the United States nearly every other permanent representative has raised with me the problem of EDC.

2. In all six signatory countries progress since last May toward ratification has been desultory and disappointing. The excuses and explanations vary, but I am convinced the real difficulty lies in France and Germany. The other four will follow the lead and present no insurmountable problem.

3. If we accept the fact that our controlling interest is to secure an effective German military contribution to the defense of free Europe on terms which bind Germany to us and our allies, bury age-old Franco-German hostility and reassure our smaller allies, then the EDC remains the only available instrument (however imperfect) for our purpose. I do not, of course, exclude certain interpretive protocols which would not reopen the text of the treaty for renegotiation.

4. The alternatives seem to me either inacceptable or unachievable. Let me list them: a. Immediate German entrance into NATO (probably acceptable to 12 of our partners but surely vetoed at this time by France);

b. Bilateral US security pact with Germany (involving violent objection by France as a clear choice between France and Germany with the result United States troops up front would be backed against an unfriendly France with their loc running parallel to their front).

5. Apart from the fact that the EDC is in fact Hobson’s choice, it has the very considerable asset of being European conceived and negotiated. It is after all the Pleven Plan.

6. The problem then is how to bring it into existence to brace our defenses and to avoid the risk of American patience running out. The time available is short. In late spring the Italians shortly followed by the Germans will hold national elections. If the treaty is still unratified when the campaigns go into full swing, it will inevitably be an issue. Even if it escapes mutilation or rejection in one or both of the campaigns, a further delay of months seems inevitable.

7. As I said, France and Germany are the key countries—the former because the original leadership was hers and it is here that the most serious public doubts are now expressed—Germany because there is understandable reluctance in all other five countries to ratify until there is visible proof that the defeated enemy has accepted not only EDC but the companion contractual agreement.

8. The situation in Germany of course complicated by the constitutional issue which may be raised by the court in its forthcoming opinion which might affect aspects of EDC treaty or the contractual agreement or both. If a problem were thereby raised in connection with treaty (and a two-thirds majority necessary to ratify) it might be necessary then to consider some device (possibly bringing EDC and hence FedRep into more intimate association with NAC) for the purpose of attracting SPD support.

9. The United States has left Europe in no doubt either before or after the election that it supports EDC fully. Although I believe this support should be reiterated publicly from time to time by the President and yourself, I do not believe that this alone will be enough. Nor do I believe that public threats from the United States will help. It is essential that European initiative, best taken under French leadership, be clear both in fact and in appearance.

10. It seems to me your impending trip to Europe provides the opportunity for you to warn the leaders of Europe privately and with great gravity that time is running out on EDC and that the consequences of its abandonment, or further serious delay in its ratification, are literally incalculable. They in turn could make effective use of this private warning in their efforts to rally the wavering. I suggest that you particularly emphasize this to the French and the Germans but also make the same point to the other four, since prompt and even independent action by one or more of them would generate in some degree pressure on France.

11. I have the impression that the United Kingdom shares our sense of urgency in this matter. Some action on their part, properly timed, and presented to strengthen their practical but not constitutional association with the EDC, would seem to be an important factor in securing French ratification. I assume this will come up in your talks in London.

12. I do appreciate that the purpose of your entire trip is to listen. Nevertheless, it provides an unusual opportunity which may not recur to move forward the project which is central to all our policies in Europe and which is now faltering.

Draper

1. For documentation on Secretary Dulles’ trip to Europe, Jan. 31–Feb. 8, 1953, see pp. 1548 ff.