Editorial Note
In preparation for the Tenth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Paris in mid-December 1952, Counselor Charles E. Bohlen, John Hay of GPA, and Russell Fessenden of RA submitted working papers for possible use by Secretary Acheson in discussing the EDC both in the forthcoming Council meetings and in bilateral talks. Bohlen’s paper, designated PBT D–1/1 and dated December 9, stressed the unhappy prospects for successful completion of EDC Treaty ratification “in the relatively near future.” There had been, Bohlen said, “a steady loss of momentum since the signature of the EDC and the Contractuals last May which has been highlighted by the postponement by the German Government of ratification until the early part of January, at the earliest, and the growing indication of great difficulty with the French Assembly.” Bohlen went on to suggest that both in his remarks before the Council and in private conversations with the French, the Secretary should stress the facts of consistent American interest in European integration, the inevitability of some form of German rearmament, the impetus to EDC given by the Europeans themselves, and especially the French, and the “tragic dilemma” that would face the United States Government, no matter which administration was in power, should the impetus to European political and military integration falter or fail. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 129) In his paper, designated PBT D–1 and dated December 10, Fessenden noted inter alia that “Two general points might be made in talks with the Foreign Ministers of each EDC country:” (1) that [Page 699] although the treaty had passed two readings in the Bundestag by a clear majority, it might well be true that some “unfavorable” action by the German Constitutional Court would occur by the time of the Paris meeting and that the tendency of the other EDC countries to “hold back” and await German action was having the effect of compounding Chancellor Adenauer’s difficulties as it appeared to many Germans that they were being asked to proceed “on their own without the support of the other countries”. (2) “A second reason for moving ahead with ratification is the onset of the ‘election season’ in Europe during the spring and summer of 1953. Unless ratification takes place by April 1, it is likely that elections will cause ratification to be delayed at least until the end of the summer” (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 129).
Hay’s paper was addressed solely to the current problem of German ratification. According to Hay, the Bundestag on December 6 had approved a second reading of the Contractual Conventions and the EDC Treaty by votes of 218–164 and 216–165, respectively, and the Chancellor had then asked and received a postponement of the third reading until January 15. This move was taken, it was supposed, in order to improve the chances that the Constitutional Court would rule in the Government’s favor on a motion made several months before by President Heuss for an. advisory opinion from the Court on the constitutionality of the treaties. Recently, Hay continued, it had become evident to Adenauer that the Court’s plenum might rule against the Government. The SPD had also threatened nonacceptance of a Court ruling favorable to the Government. On December 9, the Court had opened hearings on the Heuss request and announced that its opinion would be legally binding. The Government promptly moved for a stay of hearing and Government spokesmen challenged the Court’s right to give binding effect to an opinion. President Heuss was also prevailed upon to withdraw his request, and that, Hay concluded, was where the situation remained at the moment (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 129 “Bilateral Talks”).
Before and during the North Atlantic Council meeting at Paris, American officials held a number of talks with their European counterparts with regard to the EDC. Acheson and Jean Monnet, President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, conversed on December 14 and 15 during which time Monnet stressed the critical nature of the German Court problem and the essential need that there “should be a real yielding of sovereignty in specific fields if true European military and political integration was to proceed.” Monnet singled out the United Kingdom and Belgium as the source of “primary problems” stating that the British in particular must support and associate themselves with “true unity on the [Page 700] continent” without giving up ultimate sovereignty. Monnet then asked Acheson for “another declaration strongly supporting the unification of Europe, including the EDC,” along the lines of those made in September 1951 and May 1952. Acheson replied “that I could not propose such a declaration at this late date and doubted whether Mr. Eden and Mr. Schuman would think it appropriate” with the imminent arrival in Washington of a new administration (Memorandum of conversation by Dean Acheson, Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 131).
At luncheon on December 15, French Defense Minister Pleven “stated categorically” to Helen Kirkpatrick, Public Affairs Adviser to the Bureau of European Affairs, that the EDC would be ratified by the French Assembly in March. There would, Pleven told Kirkpatrick, be “about 400 votes for it and a qualifying clause calling for British association with it. It would not be necessary for the U.K. to join the Community, but it must associate itself in clear and unmistakable terms” (Memorandum of conversation by Helen P. Kirkpatrick, Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 131).
During the course of the Tenth Session, the North Atlantic Council on December 17 adopted a Resolution on the European Defense Community. The Resolution is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, January 3, 1953, pages 4–5. Further documentation on the Tenth Session of the North Atlantic Council is printed on pages 348 ff.