Editorial Note
In early September 1952, various bureaus and offices in the Department of State, including EUR, RA, WE, GER, the Policy Planning Staff, the office of Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, and that of Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, became interested in seeking a definition of United States policy in the event of nonratification of the EDC and/or the German Contractuals. Various position papers were drafted, initially prompted by telegram 887 from Bonn, August 28, in which the new United States High Commissioner, Walter J. Donnelly, emphasized the growing dynamism of the Federal Republic and the growing imbalance in power relationships between the Federal Republic and France. This was evident in the Saar issue in which Germany’s demand for either the total “Europeanization” of the region within an EDC framework or its outright return to Germany was opposed by French desires to see the Saar totally alienated from Germany “and its incorporation in Fr econ complex as essential to even approx Fr parity with Ger.” (662A.00/8–2852) In a memorandum to Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, dated September 9, Philip H. Watts of the Policy Planning Staff enclosed a copy of a memorandum “re Germany’s position in Europe” written by Leon Fuller, Deputy Director of GPA. Watts informed Howe inter alia that Fuller “is currently working with Ger and some of your boys on possible courses of action in the event EDC is not ratified.” (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Chronological, 1952”) In a memorandum to Perkins, Bonbright, and Riddleberger of the same day, Watts stated that the Fuller memorandum was “based on Bonn’s 887 of August 28”. Fuller’s initial working paper seems to have been drafted on September 2 and a companion paper, title unknown, was [Page 694] drafted on September 13. (Memorandum by Watts to Perkins, et al., September 13, 1952) A further draft of the September 2 working paper, dated October 3, was submitted to Jessup by Watts on October 7 (memorandum by Watts to Jessup), and a third draft, dated October 27, was submitted by Watts to Laukhuff and Williamson on October 28 (memorandum by Watts to Laukhuff and Williamson). (All three drafts are in the PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Chronological, 1952”) A two-page memorandum from Moore to Williamson, October 17, commenting “on the S/P paper on the EDC situation” which also evidently dealt with the problem of nonratification, is in file 740.5/10–1752.
None of the above reference draft papers have been found in Department of State files. However, a paper entitled “United States Policy in the Event of Non-Ratification of the EDC and Contractual Agreements”, drafted by “L. W. Fuller: S/P” and dated December 3, 1952 with the notation “Fifth Draft” is in the PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Record Copies, Dec 1952”. Appended to this 30-page study is a 12-page Annex also written by Fuller and dated December 16, 1952. In this draft, Fuller stated inter alia that France and the Federal Republic continued to hold the key to eventual ratification; success in these two countries depended upon the ability of Adenauer and Pinay to overcome strong oppositional forces, while “there need be little concern as to the eventual behavior of the Benelux countries and Italy, although their procrastination may prove vexatious and embarrassing” (page 5). Various alternatives to the EDC, which received extended analysis in the paper, included outright German membership in NATO, German association with NATO, German rearmament independent of NATO, some form of German non-military contribution to Western defense, or retreat to a peripheral defense of Europe based on an arc from Norway through the British Isles to Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. In recommending a course of action, Fuller admitted that “we may find ourselves under the necessity of submitting to a species of blackmail in order to salvage a dangerous situation” (page 22). It might be necessary to offer the French various inducements including “the extension of more specific assurances against German violation of the EDC treaty, efforts to secure closer relationships between the UK and the EDC, an increase in our aid to the full $650 million expected by the French, more favorable terms for France respecting off-short procurement, a willingness to agree to some formula of burden-sharing as the basis of future assistance, the assumption of increased responsibility for French costs in Indo-China, a pledge of support for the French population in North Africa, and arrangements that will give France more participation in the higher military direction for area [defense?] of the NATO area” (pages 22a–23).