Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/5–2652

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

secret

Bonn, May 26, 1952.

Dear Mr. President: This morning we reached complete agreement between ourselves, the British, the French, and the Germans on the text of the contractual relations to be established between us.² As of noon yesterday this agreement seemed hardly possible, as you certainly gathered from the several messages which were communicated to you from me and from the pessimistic rumors which were circulating. I think we have reason to be pleased for we now have successfully completed another phase in our postwar policy: containment of the new threat with the cooperation of our former enemy.

Of course the European Defense Community is not yet signed, but this is now pure formality. Indeed the three documents which will be signed in the next two days are an interrelated whole and the last thing the French would do would be to sign the contractual relations convention which gives a generous measure of freedom for Germany without also signing the European Defense Community which brings the Germans voluntarily into the common defense under the control of common institutions.

Since I said goodby to you on Thursday, we have gone through greater emotions than any mystery story could provide. The unusual thing about this thriller is that the villain changed his identity. Prior to my departure from Washington the complications stemmed principally from our estimable, if stubborn Dutch friends. As you know, they are practical in everything and traditionally turned toward the sea and the world, rather than toward the continent at their back. Furthermore, they are forever afraid that membership in the European Defense Community will reduce the aid which they expect to receive from us, and their hesitations have been reflected in an unending series, the last one of which was their demand that they could withdraw from the European Defense Community if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be dissolved before the fifty year term of the former. While this sounds eminently reasonable, it reflects a fundamental point of cleavage, as the French, Germans and Italians, the three major parties, are going into this understanding with the idea that it is permanent. Consequently, they considered that any injection at the start of doubt as to the permanence would automatically prevent the implementation of the treaty provisions in a manner leading to permanence.

Day before yesterday at Strasbourg agreement was reached between the Foreign Ministers of the six European Defense Community countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) on this point. It is not perfect, but it has obtained the agreement of all: if, before the end of the fifty year term of the European Defense Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be dissolved or the United Kingdom or ourselves withdraw from it, the European Defense Community countries will consult as to what to do. Frankly, I believe that all this is largely theoretical. Seventeen years hence either the European Defense Community will be a strong, vital community from which no component would wish to withdraw, or else long before then it will have received the kiss of death and be but a hollow shell.

When I landed in Bonn, the French problems had taken the place of the Dutch. As you read this, you might bear in mind the general state of mind in France. Events have moved swiftly and the French people, while anxious for a new day, can not quite yet believe that Germany’s perspective has fundamentally changed. Furthermore, the present French Government of Mr. Pinay, in addition to stabilizing the franc, is definitely more traditionally minded than its immediate predecessors.

We had heard just before my departure that the French would not sign unless they were satisfied about many points. Most of these can be reduced to their fear of being quickly outdistanced by their German neighbors. (You should remember that their inferiority complex relative to the German birth rate and industriousness is increased by such things as their burden in Indochina, which haunts them as distracting too much of their resources in all fields from the European theater where the Germans can concentrate their all.) Likewise they are worried about maintaining their position in North Africa, to which they attach the greatest importance. These fears of the French crystallized into one, which is a symptom of all: What could the United States and the United Kingdom do to guarantee France against German secession from the European Defense Community, when German contingents would be built up and could threaten her anew? Obviously we could not agree to their two first proposals to be incorporated in the tripartite declaration to be issued upon signature of the German contractuals—European Defense Community tandem. It is only because of your personal approval of our counterproposal of last evening that they have gone along. Schuman knows that our intent is genuine and that we in fact consider this complex of treaties and conventions as a whole essential to our own interests. However, they still have the problem of convincing their public opinion, unreasonable as it may be in view of our actions since the war.

I am grateful to Schuman for having obtained his government’s agreement to sign the treaties. This evening after informing me of this decision he told me of a request from President Auriol for some modifications in the text of the declaration. These are not a condition and are not a request by the French Government as such, but a personal indication of President Auriol’s views. I am reporting these in a separate telegram. One of them seems to be possible. The other, I believe, is not.³

Eden has been most cooperative and has helped much in overcoming both Dutch and French difficulties. Adenauer, although a good and patriotic bargainer, has revealed himself again as a European statesman knowing when essential to compromise in order to save a possible great future from the threat of present difficulties of detail. I hope we have him with us for a long while.

Of course the Soviet’s note⁴ may open a new cycle of difficulties, but I am fairly optimistic. The timing of the note was as anticipated. The contents could have been more troublesome. We may well experience trouble in Berlin and in Western Germany as the Communists like and need a few martyrs. All of us realize this, and I believe none will be deflected from their course.

I have emphasized with my colleagues here the importance of early ratification and our intention to urge the Senate to take favorable action before Congress adjourns.

Finally, I think that a fair indication of our leadership is the friendly cooperative spirit which characterized today’s meeting, as compared with the dissensions, bitterness, and acrimony prevalent at Versailles less than a quarter century ago.⁵

Acheson

1. Transmitted in telegram 3064 from Bonn, May 26, with instructions to “deliver immediately” to the President.
2. See editorial note, p. 684.
3. Telegram 3065 from Bonn, May 26, reported that Alphand had presented details of the French suggestions for minor changes in language to Acheson, McCloy, and the British Delegate O’Neill that evening after the Chancellor’s dinner. The first suggestion dealt with dividing that sentence of the declaration having to do with reactions to threats to the integrity of the proposed Community which Acheson indicated was acceptable. The second suggestion dealt with that sentence of paragraph 5 concerning the permanent stationing of U.S. and U.K. forces on the Continent including the Federal Republic. The French believed the clause “as they deem necessary” was too weak, but Acheson replied that the words were taken directly from the North Atlantic Treaty, and he hesitated to make the change suggested by the French “lest variation between the declaration and the treaty cause difficulty in US Congress.” The telegram also reported that “Alphand explained carefully that these two proposals did not represent a condition precedent to signing of either contractuals or EDC and were put forth just as personal suggestions of President Auriol and were outside governmental channel” (740.5/5–2652).
4. Regarding the Soviet note of May 24, see volume vii .
5. Acting Secretary Bruce met with President Truman on May 26 to discuss a variety of matters including the Soviet note, a recent message from Chester Bowles, and hearings on S.J. Res. 130 proposing a constitutional amendment relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements. Bruce gave the President a copy of the source text to which Truman responded that he “was delighted over the signature of the contractuals and thought this was of great historical significance”. At the same time, Bruce asked if the President wished to go over the materials, including telegram 3065 from Bonn, May 26, relating to changes in the texts of the Tripartite Declaration and the President’s own suggested message to the Senate. Truman “said he did not need to have anything left with him and that he was satisfied with the decisions reached” (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, “Memcons w/Pres, 1952”).