Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/5–2252: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Department of State ¹

top secret
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The Hague, May 22, 1952—1 p.m.

1259. 1. As today is legal holiday in Netherlands and PriMin is in countryside electioneering I therefore delivered to Boon SecGen FonOff copy Secretary’s message to Stikker.² Boon said when I arrived that he supposed I had come to talk about EDC and message to Stikker but added that he had not yet obtained text from Strasbourg. I then handed him copy of message and made representations along lines Dept’s 1512 May 21³ together with some development Secretary’s arguments in letter itself.

2. Boon showed considerable annoyance, not at US, for he remarked he could well understand how and why Secretary felt such a message was necessary in present situation. He did however, lash out at Germany, Italy and particularly France and Schuman stating that France sinking in its power as European leader was attempting compensate its weakness which derived from domestic political instability and ineptitude by trying to regain its leadership by writing it in for 50 years in EDC treaty. He repeated well-known argument that Dutch were somewhat tired of being blamed for being “bad boy” in not wholeheartedly embracing EDC when no recriminations were apparently addressed to Denmark and Norway also small countries which had not joined. Netherlands had made really substantial concessions all along the line and interest of Dutch people in EDC was growing continually. While he appreciated difficulty French, German and Italian Govts in obtaining ratification of treaty he could not see why they should object to simple reservation on Dutch part regarding possible NATO termination.

3. Boon said Dutch were convinced that Fr still regarded the Atlantic Pact as “ephemeral” and that once treaty signed and ratified French wld insist upon very letter of law and no changes, however reasonable, which might be put forward by smaller nations would be accepted by French if they did not coincide completely with French policy. It was for this reason that Dutch had been so adamant from beginning with regard to right to withdraw shld NATO expire. In this connection he appreciated arguments brought forward by Secretary in his letter to Stikker but said Schuman had many times indicated that he felt phrase “consult together and agree on measures to be taken” meant merely a gesture permitting “consideration” of any matters raised by smaller powers but in no way implied any possibility of permitting them to leave EDC short of 50 years.

4. Although Dutch position might appear legalistic such legal language had been insisted on by Drees and Lieftinck because of French attitude. (Boon mentioned in this connection that these two men were not interested in continuing in office after Dutch elections and would not therefore be much moved by personal consideration that they might be blamed if aid program were stopped or seriously reduced.) Stikker he said was not in position alter his stand without further instructions from Cabinet which not scheduled meet until May 26.

5. Boon asserted entire difficulty with regard to duration of EDC treaty stems back to US unwillingness conclude North Atlantic Pact for longer than 20 year period. He said therefore and I quote his exact words which I read back to him: “It would be very important if the present US Govt (and he realized that with elections pending in US no firm commitment could be made) could give some indication of a desire at an early appropriate time to consult with other members of NATO for an extension of term of North Atlantic Pact.” He believed this would have very important effect on hold-out members of Netherlands Cabinet. Even if such a declaration could not be made public but were only in form of a confidential message to Dutch Govt Boon believed it would be very helpful.

6. Along these lines Boon said Dutch Govt was itself sincerely desirous finding solution to impasse and has, as I wld recall, put forward several suggestions. Dutch Delegation under instructions wld probably bring forward at Strasbourg in next day or two a proposal for resolution of the six EDC powers that they would use their influence to bring about consultations to consider extension of duration of Atlantic Pact beyond the 20 years originally concluded. He believed such a resolution wld certainly be acceptable to all since everyone in West Europe desired an extension of that pact.⁴

Chapin

1. Repeated to Paris.
2. Dated May 21, p. 667.
3. Quoted in footnote 1, ibid .
4. In telegram 146 from Strasbourg, May 22, Consul George D. Andrews reported that he had delivered the Secretary’s message to Stikker at 12:30 p.m. and that Achilles would see Stikker later in the afternoon (740.5/5–2352). In telegram 147 from Strasbourg, May 22, Achilles informed the Department that Stikker had told him that he was “under rigid Cabinet instructions reaffirmed yesterday” but nevertheless anxious to find a solution to the duration problem. Achilles added that Stikker saw two possible lines of progress, the combination of which would help materially. One was that the United States make clear its concept of NATO as a permanent institution rather than of only 17 years duration, the second was if the treaty provision clearly required not merely consultation but agreement. This, Stikker claimed, should go a considerable ways toward meeting the position of the Netherlands Government and Achilles promised to “follow this up with Fr here and in Paris.” He closed with the report that British officials had informed him that Eden “fully agrees Secretary’s position and will work on Stikker this evening” (740.5/5–2252).