740.5/5–352: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State 1
6775. From MacArthur. Following is my résumé of Adenauer–Eisenhower conversation at Bonn yesterday. I did not take notes but think fol is reasonably accurate summary.
Gen Eisenhower opened saying he had not wished to leave Europe2 without coming to Bonn to pay farewell visit to Adenauer and also to have talk with him about European problems. Adenauer expressed deep appreciation for Eisenhower’s visit, particularly, in view of latter’s heavy schedule.
Gen Eisenhower then said he wld like to expound few of his views on Europe. He believed we are on threshold of developments of historic importance whereby Eur will move steadily toward unification, with Ger being integrated into European community on basis of full [Page 650] equality but also equal responsibility. Signature of EDC and contractuals in May is essential as first step toward process of European federation. Hopes and expectations have been built up which shld not be blasted by procrastination or delay. Delay in signature will not win any new supporters to EDC or contractuals and will only be exploited by opponents to create confusion and increase opposition to both agreements and to Eur federation. In addition to dangerous effect delay wld have in Eur, it wld also create very bad reaction in US. US has invested billions of dollars in trying first to reestablish Europe’s war-torn economy and second to assist in building up adequate Eur defensive strength. Conviction in US is Eur can be viable only if it makes maximum collective use of its individual capabilities. EDC is a positive and constructive step in this process and its signature and entry into effect wld, in Gen Eisenhower’s view, do much toward assuring US continued interest and desire to aid Eur reach point where it is viable in both econ and security fields. Eisenhower believed completion of contractuals and EDC leading eventually to econ and polit federation was only way in sight by which Eur over period of coming years cld raise and maintain necessary minimum security forces and at same time hold out hope for improved living standards. These were essential points in maintenance of peace.
Gen Eisenhower then said at heart of problem is question of understanding between France and Germany. Each must concentrate not only on its own problems but endeavor to assist other in reaching sound understanding. He had spent much time in pressing these views on France and he thought France had come long way in past year in facing up to problems. They were trying to be realistic. At same time they had serious problems with parliamentary and public opinion based on historic experience with Ger. He recognized West Ger Govt had similar problems. But in desire to solve individual problems neither France nor Ger shld complicate overall and essential objective of a real Franco-Ger entente.
Chancellor Adenauer said he agreed with Gen Eisenhower. It was essential EDC and contractuals be signed and he was confident signature cld be achieved about May 20. Delay wld be fatal. He then said he was going to tell Gen Eisenhower something which might startle him. He had just received results of public opinion poll on contractual agreements in West Ger which covered about three thousand Germans of different walks of life. 82% of those polled did not even know what contractuals were about. This despite fact there had been good deal about them in Ger press. This was indicative of a sort of mental apathy on part of Ger people—a lack of awareness and interest. It was essential public opinion everywhere, and particularly in Ger, know what was going on. He felt when EDC and contractuals cld be made [Page 651] public, there wld be something concrete to put before public opinion. On other hand, picture was not as dark as public opinion poll indicated. On April 30, he had addressed meeting of 12,000 Germans, 9,000 of which were workers. He had set forth his views on new role envisaged for Ger and he had detected no opposition and indeed approval of his program. He, therefore, believed when more info cld be made public, it wld be possible to develop healthy interest in Germany’s position and its new role in international affairs.
Adenauer felt there wld be more approval in Ger EDC than contractuals. Some rather serious difficulties had developed within his coalition Govt on contractuals which coincided with but were in no way related to Gen Eisenhower’s trip. Two members of coalition indicated publicly and in press they were not in agreement with envisaged contractual arrangements. This was unfortunate development but he hoped to be able to solve it.
Referring to Gen Eisenhower’s view that Franco-Ger relations were at heart of problem of Eur, Adenauer fully agreed. He said Germans had endeavored develop a program of exchange visits between people of different walks of life in France and Ger, particularly youth workers, intellectuals, etc. French did not seem anxious proceed in this direction. He did not believe this was necessarily policy of French govt but perhaps a question of French governmental red tape, etc. However, anything Gen Eisenhower might be able to say to encourage such a program so that peoples of the two countries can get to know each other better wld be most helpful.
Gen Eisenhower asked for Adenauer’s views re effect of Soviet notes3 on Ger opinion. Adenauer did not believe Sov efforts to inject question of Ger unification as means of preventing Germany’s integration with West wld succeed. People in East Ger were submitted to Commie regime that was twice as bad as Nazi regime, because it was even more oppressive and had an oriental quality of cruelty. Neutralism in Eastern Ger was not an issue. He had had reliable reports that Pastor Niemoller had been very poorly received when he had recently visited East Ger to preach his neutralist doctrine. East Germans, he believed, wld rather continue their present fate than risk possibility of having all Ger united under Sov regime. He believed best hope for eventual Ger unification was if West Ger were first integrated solidly with west.
In conclusion, Adenauer said he wished to express his own appreciation and that of his people for the enlightened and constructive policy which US had carried out with respect to Europe and particularly Germany.