Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/1–352: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State ¹

top secret
priority

Bonn, January 3, 1952—3 p.m.

927. Eyes only for Secretary and Byroade. From reading Bruce’s cables on EDF meeting² and with benefit of long personal report from Bowie,³ I have following reactions:

Paris meeting shows we have been able to achieve a clear-cut German support of the EDC concept and a full adherence of the German Government to the integration of Germany in that community. Indeed, Adenauer seems to have been the most stalwart support of this concept throughout conference, with France and Italy closely allied. This is not a result of an accident and I cannot avoid the conclusion that the absence of strong representation in Brussels and The Hague during this period has been a handicap to the conclusion of a completely successful Paris meeting. The absence of Murphy and Chapin has been unfortunate. The activity in Paris, Rome and Bonn has not been paralleled by similar activity in Benelux. I have impression that Benelux position is partially the result of earlier British representations and some minor defection talk on our own side. I therefore strongly urge that serious conversations be undertaken at once, preferably the Secretary, with the Dutch and Belgians, pointing out that we have an historic, even a momentous opportunity which cannot be allowed to lapse.

Moreover, after reading Bruce’s 3917⁴ which quotes Schuman on what Adenauer had to say, I believe all should be convinced as I have been for some time, that there is just no other way open, at least for the measurable future.

Naturally, I cannot guarantee German ratification of EDC any more than I suppose Bruce can in Paris, if as well. There are dangerous complications in the local political situation and tremendous forces from the East are actively at work opposing with every device and strength German integration with the West. But I do feel that the chances of ratification will be prejudiced if continued opposition on the part of the Benelux countries to the historically significant effort of the Germans and French to produce a European community continues.

Even before concentrating on detailed differences of view, I would press upon the Benelux Ministers in Washington the following points:

(1) That contrary to the argument that the creation of an EDC would induce a lesser interest on the part of the US, any demonstration that Europe is capable of organizing a defense of its own will induce a much more enthusiastic and continued response from the US.

(2) That in the administration of mutual security aid, the US is bound by the congressional purpose stated in the act, namely to use the funds in such a manner as to foster the integration of Europe. This need not be stated as a threat, but simply as a fact, and on the basis of this purpose of the act certainly preference will be given to those who move in that direction rather than to those who stand aside.

(3) Opinion in the US would hardly understand a situation where the Benelux countries would oppose concrete steps designed to form a community in which the long-time antagonisms of Europe might be buried and the pressures from the past adequately met, while France and Germany and Italy are prepared to take these steps.

While I feel that we must constantly maintain pressure, I do not believe we should be unrealistic in regard to target dates. The French request for a postponement of Lisbon seems to be reasonable, and if Bruce feels that it is, it would be ridiculous on our part to insist on a date or to suggest we might be compelled to seek other alternatives if the original date was not met, particularly when from the French point of view there is just no other alternative apparent, and as long as Adenauer remains Chancellor in Germany, there is no other alternative here.

While dictating the above, Secretary’s 869⁵ came in. I will talk with Adenauer as soon as possible, but I am sending this message off at once as I believe it answers in substance the questions raised by the Secretary’s telegram. Will follow this cable with results my talk with Adenauer.⁶

Mccloy

1. This telegram was repeated to Paris, eyes only for Eisenhower and Bruce, and to Rome, eyes only for Dunn.
2. The reference here is to the Six-Power Foreign Ministers Meetings in Paris, Dec. 27–30, 1951, the subject of telegram 3958, Jan. 3, from Paris, supra.
3. Bowie was part of the informal group of U.S. observers at the Paris Foreign Ministers meetings.
4. Not printed.
5. Same as telegram 3784, Jan. 2, to Paris, p. 571.
6. In telegram 948, Jan. 4, from Bonn, McCloy reported upon his meeting with Adenauer that day at which Hallstein and Blankenhorn were also present. Adenauer’s impression of the Paris meetings was that none of the Ministers had any real sense of urgency or wide realization of the actual world situation. The Chancellor urged that the United States bring general pressure upon the Benelux nations by pointing out in emphatic terms the great opportunity that was presented by the creation of a supra-national agency. (740.5/1–452)