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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, 1953–61, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 21, 19541

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Washington, December 22, 1954.

Present at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; [Page 561] the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 2); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 2); Mr. Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 2); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 2); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Report on the recent NATO Council meeting

Mr. Cutler called on the Secretary of State for a brief report on the recently concluded NATO Council meeting.

Secretary Dulles indicated that the U.S. delegation to the NATO meeting included, beside himself, Secretary Humphrey, Governor Stassen and Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson. The major issue at the meeting centered about approval of the report “MC 48”, which had been designed to permit NATO military personnel to make plans on the assumption that if an all-out Soviet attack occurred, whether atomic or otherwise, the NATO response would be a defense employing atomic weapons. Secretary Dulles pointed out that while this report had secured unanimous approval by the Military Committee, it had raised a considerable question as to where authority rested to call this atomic defense into action. Because of this question, said Secretary Dulles, he had gone to Paris a day early in order to have preliminary talks on this issue. He had talked initially with Foreign Secretary Eden and with the Canadian Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson. At this initial meeting the three had worked out a formula which adopted MC 48 as the basis for military planning and preparations, but which specified that there was to be no delegation by the NATO governments of their right as the civilian leaders to give the signal for bringing the atomic defense into action. Subsequently, said Secretary Dulles, this formula was cleared both with General Gruenther and Admiral Radford. Later on, Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden discussed the matter with Premier Mendes-France, who also gave his approval.

Thereafter, the resolution was introduced in the NATO Council by Lord Ismay, the Secretary General. It occasioned virtually no discussion or debate, and was unanimously approved by the Council.…

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Secretary Dulles said that another important point made in these discussions was the following: If the Soviets planned a non-atomic attack on the NATO area, such an attack would almost certainly be detected in advance, since it would require obvious mobilization and other preparations. Such an interval of time would afford the NATO powers a sufficient opportunity to consult with one another about using atomic weapons to repel the impending attack.

Secretary Humphrey said that when he had first got to Paris the problem which Secretary Dulles had been discussing seemed terribly serious to him. It looked like another great issue between the United States and its allies. Secretary Anderson and Secretary Dulles had responded to the challenge by two actions which were outstanding in their success. The first of these was selling to the other Foreign Ministers the formula which Secretary Dulles had described, ahead of the time of the actual meeting. As a result of this advance preparation, this phraseology was passed by the Council very easily and to Secretary Humphrey’s complete amazement. The easy passage of the resolution, said Secretary Humphrey, shows how far these people in Western Europe have progressed in their thinking and their understanding of atomic warfare.

The second major action to ensure the success of the resolution consisted of a speech by Secretary Dulles citing chapter and verse, times and places, to indicate that every time we approached a very tough decision in our national security policy, the Soviet Union had issued what seemed to be a serious threat, but after we went ahead and did what was required, they climbed down and returned to a soft line. This extraordinary speech by the Secretary of State, said Secretary Humphrey, had been very helpful to Prime Minister Mendes-France when he came to make his statement insisting that the pact should be ratified by the French Chamber.

Governor Stassen said he wished to add his personal tribute to the manner in which Secretary Dulles had handled this difficult meeting.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State, supplemented by remarks by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, on the NATO Council meeting just concluded.

[Here follows a discussion by the National Security Council of agenda item 2, “Review of Basic National Security Policy”; agenda item 3, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”; and agenda item 4, “Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East”.]

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