740.5/11–2454
The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes), at Paris1
Dear John: The Military Committee meeting has just been concluded here, and we are advised that all went well, particularly with reference to the Military Committee Report to the Council on the Capabilities Study which is called “The Most Effective Pattern of Military Strength for the next few years.”2
There appeared to be complete agreement on this report. We have sound reason to believe that the British and the French positions received governmental attention and represent the political as well as the military view, so we may expect that this will be reflected in their positions when the Council considers this matter at the Ministerial Meeting.
I need not stress how important we consider it that the Council approve this report at the Ministerial Meeting without getting into the more delicate and divisive aspects that are potentially present. We have two principle areas of concern:
- a.
- Failure to accept this report will create a real problem as to where NATO goes from here, and in view of the fact that we have had consultation with our Congressional leaders on this new policy, would seriously affect the attitude of Congress as well as with the Executive Branch on what we do next in Europe.
- b.
- Of even greater importance is the fact that any leak whatsoever to the Soviets that there was any lack of unity in NATO on the intention to develop a capability to repel Soviet attack with everything that we have available would seriously jeopardize our political as well as our military posture as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.
It is the importance of this latter consideration that leads me to write this letter. I think we must take some preparatory action designed to forestall, not merely a leak to the Soviets but more importantly any evidence of disunity in the Council. We believe here that the “New Approach” studies will have enough of a U.S. flavor by reason of the fact that the nuclear weapons are things within our control to make us lean over backwards to give the Military Committee Report the maximum international flavor possible and to avoid giving the impression that it is something that the U.S. is trying to force upon the other NATO nations. For that reason, it appears desirable not have the U.S. appear to be the chief spokesman on these measures.
It seems to us that the ideal man to carry the ball for us would be Lord Ismay, not only because of his international capacity but because [Page 539] it is a civilian capacity and because, in addition, he can speak from great personal experience as both a military man and as a statesman. It seems to us that it would be very desirable to have him arrange to have the Chairman of the Ministerial Meeting call upon him for some remarks as soon as the matter is called on the agenda. This agenda item should be taken up in secret session with restricted attendance. We would then hope that Lord Ismay could comment along the following lines:
- 1.
- That it is gratifying to hear for the first time that there is available to NATO a program of measures which makes the defense of Europe something which is really attainable.
- 2.
- That NATO is now presented with the opportunity of developing a real deterrent to Soviet aggression. There should be no doubt whatsoever in the mind of NATO nations that the increasing Soviet nuclear capability over the ensuing years will give to the Soviets an element of power which will be reflected in both their political and military actions. The only response to this growing element of Soviet power which will counterbalance Soviet actions based on its growing nuclear strength will be unity within NATO in firmness of intention to develop a collective nuclear strength which will make war against any NATO nation too great a risk to be entertained by the Soviet. No matter what other measures are indicated, this measure is indispensable.
- 3.
- Any indication of division of thought or purpose on this subject among the NATO nations would be welcomed by the Soviets and would jeopardize seriously the role of NATO as a deterrent. If there should be any differences of view on this item, no matter how minor, it is imperative that they not be disclosed outside the Council. There is nothing involved in this Agenda item on which agreement cannot be reached, and the place to reach agreement is in the most private sessions of the Council. Lest serious aid and comfort be given the Soviet by any news leaks on this item or by any public statements, the Members of the Council are urged to deal with this matter with the highest degree of security.
I would appreciate your views on this suggestion, and, if you agree, after exploring it with General Gruenther, hope you will proceed with it at the earliest date.
Sincerely,