Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/4–1354: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret

Washington, April 13, 1954—4:51 p.m.

3623. Paris pass USRO.

1. After consulting the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,² the US Government has the following comments on the note of the Soviet Government of March 31 in which are restated the same basic positions taken by the Soviet Government at the recent Berlin conference:

2. The Soviet Government referred to the dangers to which all nations would be exposed by the outbreak of a major armed conflict. Since 1945 the Western Powers have consistently sought to avert these dangers. Repeated efforts have been made to reach international agreement on disarmament. They have sought to achieve limitation, reduction and control of armaments in general. They have proposed not only prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons but also the international control of atomic energy, which is essential if the prohibition of the use of such weapons is to be effective. Progress made recently in the construction of thermonuclear weapons makes it all the more urgently necessary to come to an understanding on these questions. The US Government is determined to do whatever it can to help bring to a successful conclusion conversations started as a result of President Eisenhower’s initiative as well as the disarmament negotiations which have begun again in the UN. It hopes that the Soviet Government will make a constructive contribution to the solution of these problems.

3. The Soviet Government proposes the establishment of a new collective security system, including the Soviet Union, the United States and all European countries. The US Government notes that the United Nations was founded precisely to guarantee collective security. Since the practices of the Soviet Union have prevented the UN from fulfilling its proper function, it remains only for the Soviet Union to renounce those practices, which are alien to the spirit of the UN Charter, for the existing UN collective security system to become fully effective. The US Government does not believe that the idea of security can be achieved by a paper agreement including, on the one hand, members who are tied together in a captive relationship to the Soviet Union and, on the other, free nations whose regimes are responsive to the public will and founded on the principle of respect for the rights of the individual. After most careful consideration, the US Government therefore regretfully concludes that the Soviet proposal does not hold out any prospect for achieving security under present conditions.

4. The Soviet Government has also expressed willingness to consider participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This Organization was brought into being by the free nations of the West in a spirit of mutual confidence and free association for the purpose of deterring the armed aggression threatened as a result of Soviet policy since 1945. That policy has been directed toward establishment and extension of a monolithic politico-military bloc in Eastern and Central Europe under strict control of the Soviet Union. It has been a policy which has consistently sought division, dissension and disarmament in the West in the face of consolidation, suppression of freedom and unrelenting augmentation of massive armed forces within the Soviet bloc. The resulting division of Europe poses many difficult problems for which the Western powers will continue to seek constructive solutions. The offer of the Soviet Union to consider NATO membership when taken in the light of its policy in Europe does not meet the test of realism. The US Government agrees with its allies that it is but an attempt to disrupt the defenses of the West.

5. The current state of insecurity could be remedied by the step-by-step solution of the basic problems from which it results. At Berlin, the US Government put forward a plan for the unification of Germany which would have constituted a step towards the reconciliation of Europe. The Soviet Government would not even discuss the main features of this plan. The French and British Governments put forward proposals designed to reinforce the security of Europe, which the Soviet Government also rejected. Instead of signing the Austrian State Treaty in terms previously proposed by the Soviet Government, the Soviet Government introduced a number of new conditions to their signature.

6. The Soviet criticism of the plans for a European Defense Community must be viewed in the light of this history of Soviet intransigence. The concept of a community of European countries united for defense has been developed because of the policies pursued by the Soviet Government. That Government is responsible for the division of Europe. It has aggravated the risk of war. It has refused to contemplate a reunification of Germany on conditions acceptable to all. The Federal Republic of Germany cannot remain defenseless in the face of the armed forces maintained in the Eastern zone of Germany. The US Government believes that the problem of a German contribution to defense can best be solved within the framework of an association which prevents Germany from taking any individual armed action. The European Defense Community provides the most appropriate means of integrating the military forces of Western Europe for essential defense.

7. The US Government is always ready to look for ways of improving relations between states and of insuring mutual security. The security of the Soviet Government is in no way menaced by the fact that Western states have found it necessary to establish organizations for their mutual defense. The insecurity of Europe will not be removed by paper agreements, as proposed by the Soviet note of March 31. The US Government is ready to work substantively for the solution of the problems realistically underlying that insecurity. There are many actions which the Soviet Government could take to demonstrate that they on their part are similarly minded. They can reach agreement for the solution of the German problem and of the Austrian problem on conditions acceptable to all parties concerned, including in particular the Germans and Austrians themselves. They can reach agreement on the problems of disarmament and of the control of atomic weapons by negotiations in the bodies which already exist for this purpose. They can reach agreement about the most pressing problems in the Far East at the conference which is about to assemble in Geneva. Finally, they could make possible the achievement of collective security by altering their policy and action to conform to the principles and objectives of the UN.

Smith

1. Drafted by Barbour, cleared by RA, WE, GER, and BNA, initialed for the Acting Secretary by Bonbright, and repeated to Moscow.
2. Source text constituted a response to an initial draft tripartite reply to the Soviet note of Mar. 31 submitted by the French representatives to the Paris working group as transmitted to the Department in telegrams 3831 and 3832 from Paris, Apr. 10. An introductory paragraph to the first part of the text transmitted in telegram 3831, reported, inter alia, that French and United Kingdom representatives on the working group had requested that their governments have comments available by Apr. 12. Both telegrams are in file 740.5/4–1054. Telegram 3616 to Paris, April 12, stated that the draft reply contained in the aforementioned telegrams constituted a satisfactory basis for consideration in formulating a final tripartite position but that the draft as constituted “is diffuse and lacks impact and think it could be considerably improved by making shorter and by introducing certain organizational changes” (740.5/4–1054). Bohlen expressed general agreement with this reaction in telegram 1243 from Moscow, Apr. 12 (740.5/4–1254), and telegram 3622 to Paris, Apr. 13 reported that the immediately following telegram would contain a suggested revised text of a reply that would reflect “Department’s effort in that revision” to “shorten reply, sharpen impact, and emphasize Soviet responsibility existing division Europe and consequent insecurity” (740.5/4–1354).