Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/4–754: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, April 7, 1954—noon.

3759. Following are French views as presented to us last evening² by Margerie. He emphasized they are working level suggestions of line Foreign Office has in mind for Western reply and have had no top level approval.

1. General arguments.

Basis of Soviet argument is that any grouping of powers is dangerous because it creates oppositions. This argument is false on two counts:

(a) Distinction must be made between offensive and defensive groupings. Two defensive groupings can co-exist without war, as experience has showed; and defensive alliances cannot be banned. Moreover, if Soviet reasoning is admitted, it is difficult for USSR explain origin war of 1939 because there were power groupings then—Hitlerite Germany and USSR on one hand, and France and UK on other.

(b) Second argument is that USSR reasons as if UN Charter did not explicitly authorize under Article 51 legitimate defensive organizations; these would have less role play if world security established but none can claim it is. It is not by wrecking present organizations that greater security can be obtained.

As to question of security, Western powers have much more experience with it than has USSR. It has been their concern since 1919, whereas USSR began interest itself in it only in 1934.

Since 1945, numerous efforts have been made on our side achieve understanding with USSR: Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, Byrnes treaty proposal, Marshall Plan, attempts at compromise in China and Asia. Results have been accentuate division of world, with USSR extending its influence more and more over Europe and Asia. Juridical formulae will not contribute to remedying this situation.

2. There are three types of security: World security, Western security and Soviet security.

World security. Dangers of H-bomb, et cetera. Problem now under examination at UN. Mention of President Eisenhower’s initiative³ and hope it will permit progressive emergence from deadlock.

Attempt make UN function; carry out there more comprehensive policy; apply clauses of Charter. This would greatly help strengthen sense of security.

This inevitably slow effort cannot begin with destruction of more limited security systems which are result of present state of things.

Western security. Its foundations: Freedom; mutual confidence; representative governments expressing and controlled by public opinion; its technical organization, distribution of military charges, mutual aid, unified command, integrated forces. Very few states now capable carrying out adequate defense within limits their sovereignty; grouping has become indispensable; normal that such grouping be between states inspired by common traditions and recognizing same principles.

Eventually, continue same reasoning on European plane, saying that European nations seek go beyond national framework and have undertaken effort renounce old rivalries, and that this is now element which has no relation classical type assistance pact. There can be no deal on Western security and no state alien to system is justified in demanding its transformation.

Soviet security. We do not place it in question. We have made no claim against USSR; we are ready take account Soviet security but not at price our own.

On other hand, Soviet note proposes:

(1) Abandonment EDC. in return for divided and evacuated Germany (but under threat constant reoccupation), or united and rearmed Germany but subject regime partial neutralization. All that already rejected at Berlin.

(2) Transformation NATO, which would amount to disavowal by Western powers of all they have done up to now. Thus, question not just pure and simple admission USSR into NATO but destruction of latter to make way for European Security Pact.

(3) European plan. New Soviet proposal becomes world pact, without any guarantee it could function better than UN Charter. Furthermore, it remains subject basic assumption that a pact of mutual guarantee with states which have contrary ideas to ours on aggression, legitimate defense, et cetera, can offer no security.

3. Conclusions.

One could conclude by asking certain questions, such as:

(a) On world plane, is USSR ready ensure normal functioning UN organs, renounce obstructionist tactics and abuse of veto?

(b) Also on world plane, would it favor progress of talks on disarmament? In which case, channels are available.

(c) Finally, is it ready to recognize that aggressions which have occurred and been denounced by UN are in fact aggressions? This essential point.

(d) On European plane, is USSR ready accept existence present Western system and recognize that being essentially defensive, it is perfectly compatible with requirements its own security?

(e) Does it recognize that states inspired by principles different from its own can organize independently of it without organizing against it?

(f) Finally, on such bases, can it state exactly what it has in mind as requirements its own security in concrete fashion so that it might be possible seek type of agreement to prevent aggression?

On such bases real progress could be achieved.

As alternative to conclusion posing question, conclusion might be formulated advancing specific proposals, such as: Further discussions of President’s atomic pool proposal,⁴ specific disarmament proposals, renewal Bidault’s and Eden’s Berlin offers extend Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet pacts, and possibly proposals for non-aggression pacts with USSR.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Moscow.
2. See telegram 3758, supra.
3. See footnote 5, p. 491.
4. See footnote 5, p. 491.