Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/4–254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

confidential
priority

Washington , April 2, 1954—7:31 p.m.

5144. Reference Deptel 5110 London,² repeated Paris 3434, USRO Paris unn, Moscow 615, HICOG Bonn 2776.

Following, together with Department’s statement March 31, are views Department regarding Soviet note March 31 and suggested points to be discussed in NAC and considered for inclusion in formal reply to Soviet Government:

1. Department regards Soviet note as move designed promote Soviet aim of undermining West’s security and timed with eye to EDC ratification, Geneva Conference, and public concern H-bomb.³ It costs Soviets nothing and fits in well with Soviet campaign appear reasonable and peace-loving. Despite superficial astuteness of note, it is transparent proposal which fails conceal basic discrepancy between Soviet professions peaceful intent and unwillingness take necessary actions bring about relaxation tensions. Soviet note therefore represents no change from substance Soviet position at Berlin. Soviet note may be turned to advantage West by using it to make unmistakably clear that so long as Soviet Government maintains menacing level armament and control satellites European security is endangered.

2. While note contains several elements, i.e., discussion disarmament, expression concern regarding hydrogen bomb, proposals on European Security Pact and NATO, Department believes fundamental point of substance is that of European security. We feel strongly this should not be obscured and that primary emphasis in Western reply to Moscow should be on this point. We also believe European security aspect should be emphasized by British, French, US in NAC, although not of course to exclusion other points, and that burden comments on particular question of Soviet entry NATO might better be left to other NATO countries.

3. Regarding European security, it is essential concentrate on Soviet responsibility for division of Europe. Because of Soviet actions, nations Western Europe compelled take measures strengthen their defense. Although UN Charter constitutes general non-aggression pact, there is no confidence that all members will observe Charter. Western European security arrangements are defensive, based on mutual faith and confidence free countries determined maintain freedom in face threat posed by Soviet bloc. Intransigence Soviet Union and refusal make meaningful contribution European security clearly revealed at Berlin Conference on problems Germany and Austria.

4. Soviet control over Central and Eastern European satellites is basic threat to European security. So long as Soviets retain iron hold on these captive peoples, and continue maintain monolithic politico-military system, Soviet bloc can contribute nothing to realization European peace and security.

5. In connection with Soviet proposal on European security pact, useful recall that this contemplates participation Federal German Republic and GDR, thus legalizing and perpetuating division of Germany. Soviet security pact linked at Berlin Conference with Soviet proposal for quadripartite agreement on withdrawal troops from Germany, which would further expose West Germany and Western Europe threat of aggression.

6. Content and timing Soviet note make obvious it intended wreck EDC. EDC is a pillar defense European security and practical means avoiding future German militarism.

7. Problem disarmament discussed Berlin Conference and Four Powers agreed exchange views regarding arms limitation as contemplated by UN resolution November 28, 1953.⁴ (Doubt desirable raise President’s atomic energy pool proposal,⁵ since discussion this context might tend move that proposal into propagandistic sphere, whereas we have endeavored so far successfully keep atomic pool talks on serious confidential basis.)

8. Some sarcastic comment may be appropriate during NAC discussion referring Molotov’s bitter opposition NATO at Berlin Conference (where he compared it to anti-Comintern Pact) and present expressed willingness join NATO if only some changes made.

9. In NAC discussion as well as in reply to Moscow believe extensive use can and should be made statements Western representatives on European security matters at Berlin Conference.

Embassies London. Paris discuss with Foreign Offices.

USRO consult with British, French colleagues in order work out general lines tripartite comments at NAC meeting April 7. As noted Point 2 above, Department believes major tripartite emphasis should be on substance Soviet note—European security and Soviet responsibility for division Europe—and that remarks on special NATO aspect of Soviet package should be left largely up to other members.⁶

Dulles

1. Drafted by Stoessel, cleared by Merchant and by MacArthur in draft and also by WE, RA, BNA, and GER. Initialed for the Secretary by Murphy and sent also to Paris for the Embassy and USRO and repeated to Moscow, Bonn, and all NATO capitals.
2. Not printed; it transmitted the immediate U.S. response of Mar. 31 to the Soviet note. See the editorial note, p. 487.
3. In telegram 4317 from London, Apr. 2, Aldrich reported the views of “competent observers here including Foreign Office officials” that recent Soviet tactics had successfully taken “Western Communists out of isolation into which they had fallen owing to provocatively anti-Western attitudes” (740.5/4–254). In telegram 3665 from Paris, Apr. 2, Dillon reported that Bidault had expressed the belief that the Soviet note merited serious study because it represented “quite a change from what Molotov had said at Berlin” (740.5/4–254).
4. Documentation on the United Nations disarmament resolution of Nov. 28, 1953 is presented in volume ii .
5. Documentation on President Eisenhower’s proposals for the peaceful use of atomic energy, made to the United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 8 is presented ibid .
6. In telegram 3697 from Paris, Apr. 3, Dillon reported that the French Foreign Ministry agreed that the tripartite working group on reply to the Soviet note should meet in Paris within the week (740.5/4–354). In telegram 4351 from London, Apr. 5, Aldrich reported that the Foreign Office appeared to be in close agreement with the Department’s views as set forth in the source text and that a draft reply was now in the early stages of preparation based upon the same central themes. However, the Foreign Office did question the wisdom of utilizing in the Western response extensive quotations made by Western representatives at the Berlin Conference as proposed in paragraph 9 of the source text (740.5/4–554).