Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/2–154

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)¹

top secret

Washington, February 1, 1954.

Subject:

• The JCS “New Look”

In planning our next moves in connection with the forthcoming EDC² ratification debate in France and in our day-to-day NATO problems, including planning the 1954 Annual Review, we find ourselves somewhat handicapped by our lack of knowledge regarding the “New Look” which we understand the JCS has taken at U.S. defense policy, which underlies the Administration’s 1955 defense budget.³ Furthermore, USIA is without guidance from us on this extremely sensitive issue, and we must begin weaving the “New Look” into our 1955 aid philosophy.

As you know, there is a long-standing suspicion in Western Europe that our interest in that area is limited and transient and that there is real and imminent danger of our retreating to isolationism or, almost as bad, to a peripheral strategy. At the present time, we are examining within the Department various types of assurances which we might be able to give in order to allay these fears and to afford the Europeans a sense of confidence that they will not be left either to the mercy of the Soviets or to internecine strife.

We have, of course, a number of the pieces of the “New Look” jigsaw puzzle, such as NSC 162/1,⁴ the recent speeches by the Secretary before the Foreign Policy Association and the National Press Club and Admiral Radford’s speech before the latter Organization.⁵ The basic elements of the new policy, as we understand them, appear to be:

(1) a withdrawal back to the United States of substantial numbers of our troops presently stationed overseas, thereby achieving greater flexibility and mobility for any necessary emergency redeployment of our forces;

(2) a recognition of the fact that any withdrawal from Europe would seriously undermine the strength and cohesion of the defense arrangements which we have undertaken with our allies, which in turn necessitates

(3) diplomatic action to convince our allies that the new arrangements insure maximum efficiency of common defense and that they must bear the primary responsibility for local ground defense;

(4) primary emphasis on the deterrent effect of massive atomic action against an aggressor; and

(5) retaliation, in the case of localized aggression, at places and under conditions of our own choosing.

What is not clear in the foregoing is how the Joint Chiefs (and the Administration) envisage this policy would be specifically applied in Western Europe. We would assume that the Joint Chiefs’ appreciation of the political factors in the immediate situation ahead of us, particularly the delicacy of the forthcoming EDC debate, is sufficient to preclude any plans for an early withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. We are not so clear, however, about what the Joint Chiefs have in mind over a longer period or whether they will refrain from talking about the longer-range prospects. It might, for example, be self-defeating in the long run if we were to attempt through political commitments or through our information media to convey the impression that we intend to maintain substantial American ground forces in Western Europe on a long-term basis and then be faced within a few months of EDC ratification with a situation in which we had to explain the necessity of withdrawing them. Such a development would run the serious danger of indicating to those elements in France which have been luke-warm all along to EDC that we played fast and loose with them solely in order to bring EDC into existence. Any such impression could, of course, seriously prejudice the successful operation of EDC which, in the last analysis, will only be as strong as the will of the participating countries to make it work.

In addition to the general range of problems alluded to above, there are specific reports which persistently come to our attention and which seem to indicate a trend in military thinking toward a peripheral strategy. For example, we have heard that the Pentagon is giving serious attention to the forthcoming Report of the House Armed Services Subcommittee for the deployment of U.S. forces in Spain; also to a suggestion which was deleted from the Report at the suggestion of the Department regarding the relocation in Spain of certain U.S. headquarters presently located elsewhere in Europe (particularly CINCNELM).⁶ Moreover, there have been indications that the Air Force may not be as interested as formerly in two of the TAC bases for which we are presently negotiating in Northern Italy.

I wonder if it would be possible for one or two of us to have a word with you in order to explore the best means of smoking out Defense on this highly important subject.

1. Drafted by Palmer.
2. For documentation on United States efforts to secure ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty, see pp. 571 ff.
3. Documentation on the so-called “New Look” or “New Approach” to U.S. military policy, which involved greater emphasis and reliance upon nuclear weaponry of both a strategic and tactical nature, is printed in volume ii .
4. NSC 162/1, entitled “Review of Basic National Security Policy” and dated Oct. 19, 1953, was one of the products, along with the NSC 151 and 153 series, of a general study of armaments and U.S. policy conducted throughout the spring, summer, and autumn of 1953. A conclusion reached in NSC 162/1, and subsequently included as part of NSC 162/2 of Oct. 30, 1953, was that “In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions. Where the consent of an ally is required for the use of these weapons from United States bases on the territory of such an ally, the United States should promptly obtain the advance consent of such an ally for such use. The United States should also seek, as and when feasible, the understanding and approval of this policy by free nations”. Documentation on NSC series 151, 153, and 162 is ibid .
5. Reference is presumably to the Secretary’s address made before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, on Jan. 12, and to the Secretary’s address to the National Press Club, Washington, Dec. 22, 1953. For texts of these addresses, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 107–110, and Jan. 4, 1954, pp. 3–7. During the course of both of these speeches, the Secretary discussed military policy with respect to Western Europe at some length and during the former address Dulles, enunciated the doctrine of “massive and instant retaliation”. Admiral Radford addressed the National Press Club on Dec. 14, 1953.
6. Vice Adm. Jerauld Wright, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), had his headquarters in London.