Eisenhower Library, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 141st Meeting of the National Security Council, April 28, 1953
eyes only
Present at the 141st meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant [Page 398] to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret.), Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.
1. Developments at recent NATO conference
Secretary Dulles briefed the members of the Council on the NATO meeting from which he had just returned. The meeting, he said, was significant for two primary reasons. First, we had at last got onto a more realistic planning basis in NATO; henceforth we will concentrate on quality rather than quantity of assistance to our NATO allies. We are trying to find a military posture consonant with the economic health of the member nations. Secondly, said Secretary Dulles, the United States was trying a different approach to the whole NATO concept. We now propose to look on NATO as the defense of Europe by Europe with United States assistance. Both these new ideas, said Secretary Dulles, had been accepted with equanimity, and had occasioned no tailspin, and we now could look forward to moving ahead along more rational lines than in the past. The NATO program is now more alive than ever and more than ever before should be considered a long-range operation.
His one great worry in retrospect, reported Secretary Dulles, was the delay and failure to ratify the EDC treaties and to secure the desired German contribution. While there was no prospect that any of the other states could make up for the lack of German forces, Secretary Dulles informed the Council that a message from Conant, which he had read on his return, stated Chancellor Adenauer’s conviction that he had tactics to secure German ratification in approximately six weeks’ time. Secretary Dulles did not know what the Chancellor’s tactics were, but he believed that they were quite likely to succeed. Even so, the United States could not count on the European Defense Community as an actuality before next October. Secretary Dulles reported the growing realization in European government circles of the necessity of securing ratification of the EDC treaties before the Soviets moved in to mix the situation up. We must therefore preempt the negotiating field in Europe by promptly moving ahead with the Austrian peace treaty.1 The British and the French were in agreement with us on this point. If the Austrians are willing to accept the long treaty instead of the short one, Secretary Dulles said that we should probably go along on that course.
The President replied to Secretary Dulles’ last point by suggesting [Page 399] that the views of the Department of Defense on the subject of the Austrian peace treaty should be promptly put on the Council’s agenda. While, said the President, the short treaty is much better, we certainly could not refuse to negotiate on the basis of the longer form.
Secretary Dulles answered that it would be possible to open our negotiations on the basis of the short treaty but subsequently shift to a consideration of the longer version. We must, however, hurry to give the British and French the green light on resuming the meetings of the Deputy Foreign Ministers. The objective, continued Secretary Dulles, was to stave off a Russian initiative for a Foreign Ministers meeting on the German problem. The Austrian treaty offered the best means to avert this. Time, therefore, was of the essence.
The President said that it would be possible to discuss this subject as early as Thursday morning if speed was essential, rather than to wait until the next scheduled meeting of the Council.
The National Security Council:
Noted the oral report by the Secretary of State on the results of the recent NATO conference.
[Here follows a discussion of the remaining five items on the agenda: (2) Indochina, (3) Formosa and Nationalist China, (4) sale of aircraft to Latin America, (5) the Mutual Security Program, and (6) President Eisenhower’s address on April 16 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors.]
Deputy Executive Secretary
- Documentation on the Austrian State Treaty question is presented in volume vii .↩