Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/4–453: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Paris, April 4, 1953—7 p.m.

Polto 1950. Hoyer Millar and Alphand called on me this morning at their request. Alphand, acting as principal spokesman, said they were anxious to exchange views with me prior to my departure for Washington.² He reviewed briefly recent French-United States talks in Washington,³ stating there had been an exchange of views on defense financing problems and subject of long-range financing had been discussed but no commitments asked or made. Alphand said matter of this importance would have to be discussed and resolved on multilateral basis in NATO.⁴

He felt that current Soviet peace moves, coming as they are in rapid succession, are beginning to have effect on European populations. He said he had in fact noted change in French public sentiment since his return from United States and he is extremely concerned lest these Soviet maneuvers, which could not be better timed from point of view of USSR, undermine Atlantic unity, destroy chances of ratification of EDC, render April Minister’s meeting sterile and result in possible disintegration of NATO.

Plans must therefore be laid quickly to ensure success of April meeting. European governments cannot make firm plans for future defense effort in absence of more definite information concerning American aid program.

Alphand pointed to press reports of Secretary Dulles press conference yesterday in which he is said to have stated Soviet peace moves have not reduced risk to West,⁵ which should continue its military build-up, but at same time that administration could substantially cut proposed foreign aid budget of $7.6 billion. He, seconded by Hoyer Millar, wished to impress upon me the need for continued united effort which would, he stressed, require, among other things, some decision by United States administration re future aid policy. Both representatives felt clarification amounts to be recommended to Congress by United States essential to success of AR and April meeting. Both representatives also urged desirability of knowing United States’ proposals prior to joint MC–PC meeting scheduled for April 20 in order that may be possible to present Ministers, for what will be short meeting in any case, as few unresolved issues as possible. Without this information, feared Ministers’ meeting would have to start with several major issues still unresolved by governments whose defense program heavily dependent on United States position.

Alphand suggested that it would be extremely useful if United States, United Kingdom and French Ministers could meet in Paris one or two days prior to Minister’s meeting to lay groundwork for successful outcome of meeting itself, so necessary to thwart Soviet moves.

I said I could not predict course which United States administration would follow re aid policy, that whole matter now under study by administration, but that I would transmit their views to Washington and hoped to discuss matter with appropriate officials there next week.⁶

Draper

1. Repeated to London.
2. Draper would be in Washington Apr. 7–14 in connection with U.S. preparations for the North Atlantic Council meeting and for the OEEC talks scheduled to start Apr. 10.
3. Documentation on the Mayer–Bidault talks in Washington at the end of March is presented in the compilation on France in volume vi .
4. Documentation on general U.S. economic and military assistance to Western Europe is presented in volume vi .
5. For the text of Secretary Dulles’ remarks on the Soviet Union at his news conference on Apr. 3, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1953, pp. 524–525.
6. On Apr. 9 Draper reported further that during the preceding 2 or 3 days several NAC delegations had indicated that the recent Soviet peace moves had vastly increased the importance of the ministerial meeting, that the ministerial meeting had taken on a more pointed political aspect, and that “discussion and public utterances on Soviet policy and general policy of West [were] perhaps most important item for NAC action.” Draper also stated that he was substantially in agreement with this evaluation. (Telegram Polto 1991 from Paris; 740.5/4–953)