Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95. CF 130

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

secret

Paris, December 17, 1952.

Today at close of third day of current NATO mtg we can begin to see where we stand. While I look forward to reporting to you in detail when I arrive home, I wanted in meantime to give you a brief account. Thus far mtg has proceeded in most respects more smoothly than we had expected, but, as you know, it will not produce results comparable to those of Lisbon mtg. Here in Paris we are confronted with an atmosphere quite different from that of Lisbon.

In the first place quite evidently other countries recognize that at this late stage we cannot commit U.S. on any new proposals and so they have not chosen to press us too hard on a number of matters of interest to them such as a greater share of load in Indochina. No doubt this is being reserved for our successors. Also this is the first mtg since the reorganization last spring and we now have an international staff under Lord Ismay which has taken control of the Conference quite well and is independent of the national delegations. This is good for NATO and probably also for us in long run but it is different from days when Chuck Spofford occupied the most nearly comparable position, although Bill Draper has done a really great job in maintaining our point of view.

So far we have not had any real difficulty in keeping to the line on the various agenda items which we agreed with John Snyder, Bob Lovett and Averell Harriman before leaving. Bob is struggling with his usual good humor on the thorny problem of infrastructure (which is the NATO word for airfields and other permanent installations) and at last report was hopeful of reaching agreement on a program which General Ridgway can live with. He will be busy with this tomorrow too.

This morning we agreed in the Council on a satisfactory resolution supporting ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty and the NATO protocol related to it. We also passed a resolution on Indochina which the French wanted but it does not point the finger at us for more help or involve the NATO out there.²

The series of military progress reports and intelligence estimates which were ready for the Council have all gone through satisfactorily. They include a paper on Soviet foreign policy trends, Soviet military capabilities, and a new strategic guidance for NATO Commanders. While none of these are of major importance they do record that there is a basic unity of view and purpose among us. The most important action on the military part of the agenda was a settlement of the long standing problem of Mediterranean command which has already come out in the press.³ This settlement, which was an acceptable compromise, should make for better working relations with the British. You no doubt remember how strongly WINSTON Churchill felt about it.⁴

We had hoped to reach agreement this afternoon on a progress report on the 1952 Annual Review and also a resolution which would facilitate its completion early next spring but both the British and French have come up with amendments which have to be analyzed tonight. It is important that we do what we can so that the programs for military forces in 1953 may be made definite as early as possible in the new year.

At tomorrow’s mtg of the Council I have about decided to make a final talk which Lord Ismay and others seem to want me to make. As I now envisage it, the talk will review some of the events of the past few years which you and I have worked on and for which your administration is going to be remembered.⁵

It has been good as always to be with John and Bob and Averell, and I think that I can speak for them when I say that the team which has worked harmoniously together through so many NATO meetings has gotten along famously once again. We had a fine trip over on the Independence and look forward to seeing you at your convenience any time from Friday morning when, if all goes on schedule, we should arrive in Washington.

Respectfully,

Dean

1. The source text was transmitted in priority telegram Actel 1 from Paris, Dec. 17, with instructions to the Executive Secretariat to pass it immediately to the President.
2. For the texts of the resolutions on the European Defense Community and Indochina, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 5, 1953, pp. 4–5.
3. According to MC 38/3 Final, dated Dec. 10, the Commander in Chief Mediterranean (CINCMED) would be directly subordinate and responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and would initially be a British Naval Officer. At the final session on Dec. 18, General Ridgway introduced Admiral Louis Mountbatten (Lord Mountbatten of Burma) as the first Commander in Chief Mediterranean. A copy of MC 38/3 Final is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 123.
4. Reference is presumably to comments made by Churchill during his visit to the United States in early January 1953. Regarding this visit, see volume vi .
5. For the text of Secretary Acheson’s remarks to the Council at its final session on Dec. 18, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 5, 1953, pp. 5–7.