Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/12–952: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

top secret
priority

Washington , December 12, 1952—7:01 p.m.

Topol 600. Ref Polto 948 Dec 9.² Dept concerned over pos implication Alphand sug that mins adopt res re Indochina; especially in light his subsequent comment “Fr Govt attaches great importance to acceptance by NATO of responsibility in connection with the conduct of war in Indochina”.

For fol reasons Dept considers highly advisable avoid proposal any res on Indochina:

(a) While consultation in NAC on Indochina cld be supported on basis Art 4 NAT, any res purporting extend direct NATO responsibility to Indochina wld be contrary Art 6.

(b) Presumably any res re Indochina which wld be satis to Fr wld emphasize magnitude Fr burden Indochina as limiting factor Fr contributions within NATO area, with at least implied need additional aid Fr. Such res, if omitting ref to direct NATO responsibility in Indochina, cld conceivably find support among other dels, and cld subsequently be used by Fr as added pressure in US aid negots.

(c) Any overt US opposition or participation in process of side-tracking or defeating such a res wld risk danger creating impression US minimizing Fr contrib SEA and constitute further major irritant in Fr–US relations.

(d) Any res re Indochina wld tend set precedent for similar res re Malaya, Korea, etc.

On balance wld think any NATO res re Indochina wld cause deep concern to Scandinavian countries, Benelux and Canad who ever eager limit their commitments to NATO area and deeply opposed to extension either directly or by implication. Wld hope therefore these countries wld carry burden this subj inside and outside NAC and permit US remain in background.

Dept in process discussing with Def proposed liaison arrangements in SEA, in implementation of recommendation of 5-power mil conference Oct 1952. (Paris tel 3314 Dec 5.³) Wld hope if agreement can be reached here prior tripartite talks Paris next week Fr wld be willing abandon idea obtaining res at NAC Mins mtg.

In event res is avoided and Alphand feels press conference (reported Tomus 404⁴) has committed Fr to obtaining reaction NAC to a Fr statement re Indochina at mins mtg (proposed Schuman statement under agenda item 3⁵), wld it not be adequate if US and UK simply stated appreciated Fr efforts and indicated NATO shld bear in mind burden the Fr and other NATO members bear which tho outside NATO area constitute contrib to gen def of free world against Commie aggression.

Secy shld be briefed on status this Fr move prior his seeing Schuman. If by that time subj res not abandoned Secy might sug to Schuman that any action beyond statements outlined immed preceding para shld more appropriately be the subj of bilat talks rather than NAC consideration.

Bruce

1. This telegram was drafted by Adair and cleared by Knight, Bonsal, Bonbright, and Williamson.
2. Not printed; in it Draper reported that he had talked with Alphand about a NATO resolution on the European Defense Community. Toward the end of the conversation, Alphand, who said he was speaking without instructions, asked whether it would be desirable for the NATO Ministers to adopt a resolution on Indochina. (740.5/12–952)
3. Not printed; it reported that the French wanted the NATO Foreign Ministers to discuss the question of establishing a liaison staff organization for Southeast Asia. (790.5/12–552)
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. Item 3 of the proposed agenda was “Exchange of Views on Political Matters of Common Concern.” Copies of the proposed and final agenda are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 128.