740.5/10–2952: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
niact
2484. Eyes only for Merchant from Perkins and Martin.
1. Wish to convey to you for ur info certain considerations which are in our minds in weighing what shld be done about Annual Review time schedule. Want to make clear these are not US Govt views and are not even Dept of State views.
2. It seems to us of great importance to do everything possible to have AR decision at Dec 15 mtg of Council if at all possible. We are quite prepared to say this limited to 1953 force targets if necessary. It is important to US to have 1953 figures as guides to distribution of 1953 aid, some of which is being withheld pending AR decisions. We wld also assume that some other countries need 1953 targets as soon as possible to guide their 1953 mil programs. Part of our feeling of urgency about doing the job in Dec reflects the difficulties we see in doing a much better job later on. We also fear that a decision not to have an AR in Dec will be interpreted, regardless of when the decision is made or what is said about it, as reflecting uncertainty arising from US election. This kind of uncertainty is not good in Eur, particularly at time when the Soviets are bending all their efforts to exploiting and expanding differences between US and Eur.
While we wld have to defer to ur judgment as to what can in fact be done about 1953 in time for Dec 15 mtg, we wld not want to postpone action without exploring every possibility of securing reasonably sound set of 1953 targets. We think US might even be ready to accept lower targets than we might otherwise want to argue for if this were necessary to secure agreement by Dec 15.
If delay in British submittal is major stumbling block, believe approach at highest level shld be made to Brit by Draper or you immediately to attempt to speed up their submittal. However, on basis London tel 24882 rather doubt that Brit figures will become major issue.
3. Believe we are reasonably well reconciled here to not getting much, if anything, for 1954 or 1955 by Dec 15. However wld be very valuable if quite tentative 1954 figures cld be agreed even though more [Page 338] qualified than Lisbon second year figures were. This again relates to practicality of dealing with these years more efficiently at early subsequent mtg and need for both US and Europeans to have guidance in training and production fields on forces to be created by end 1954.
4. Our assumption wld be that if despite best efforts impossible have AR decision by Dec 15, Council mtg wld be called off. However, in view long time since last mtg before reaching final decision, wld want explore further other items on agenda and decisions Council might take on 1952 and 1953 AR, or both, which wld make subsequent mtgs on them more effective operations.
5. Can not tell extent to which, by Dec 15, US position on AR can have bipartisan backing until after next Tuesday. Under certain circumstances consensus here wld be, we believe, that it wld not be possible by that time. However, it is not clear to us that that shld make major difference with respect to 1953 since end items needed in 1953 all funded and by and large counterpart accruals in last half of CY 1953 will be from FY 1953 dollar aid. While might be some uncertainty in minds Europeans, do not believe in nature of situation as it has developed that there is justification for any more uncertainty about what US will do in FY 1954 which wld affect the 1953 buildup than there was re 1952 last Feb before Congress had acted.
6. One possibility which has occurred to us is that if problem is primarily one of processing time in Paris, mtg might be postponed 3 or 4 weeks and held some time first half of Jan. However it will be quite difficult if not impossible for top personnel to be away from here then.
7. Agree fully with London tel 2488 criticisms of Brit proposal for May–June mtg to handle 1954 and 1955.
8. Real question about alternatives to Dec 15, none of which we like, seems to us to be whether late Feb mtg wld be feasible or useful. Clearly if Dec mtg cancelled, wld provide time to process submittals and secure better 1953 figures. Believe it shld be possible to have firm position with respect to those US matters which affect 1953 by this time but probably will be difficult to detach cabinet members for period necessary for Council mtg if purpose was solely to firm up 1953. In first 4 to 6 weeks after installation of new administration there will be many demands on them.
In addition to above factor it seems to us highly desirable that by Feb some decisions are reached about 1954 and at least tentatively 1955 in order to permit proper planning to go forward here and in Eur. Although perhaps not absolutely essential, wld be very helpful to Congressional presentation to have such targets agreed.
However, hardly think it likely that new administration wld have reached conclusions by this time which wld enable them to project firmly US plans for 1954 and 1955, or to have views about what NATO goals as a whole shld be.
[Page 339]Not clear from London tel 2488 what Brit are holding up on with respect to 1954 and 1955. If it is just matter of spelling out their programs, assume that by late Feb this might well be possible. If however, as we suspect, they wish either to have high level talks with new US administration about whole range of economic relationships or wish to take advantage of new strategic and tactical thinking prior to firming up 1954 and 1955, or both, we wld think late Feb clearly much too early for them.
9. If Dec 15 mtg not held we are thus in dilemma to which we do not see easy solution. Perhaps it lies along line of setting, either at Dec or Jan or Feb mtg, or at permanent Council mtg, very rough 1954 and 1955 targets, even being perhaps ranges in some cases, pending anticipated basic re-evaluation of both requirements and programs which we have anticipated wld take place in connection with 1953 AR and which, by starting early, might be completed in Sept or early Oct.
10. Appreciate any views or comments you or your asssociates may have on above. Feel strongly that alternatives to Dec 15 mtg are all bad but that if must be considered they are sufficiently affected by Tuesday outcome that we wld be unable to reach US Govt position until latter part next week. For example, above pessimism about US being ready to deal with 1954 and 1955 by late Feb might, under certain circumstances, be excessive. Appreciate usefulness of making decision prior to Tuesday from certain public relations angles but believe a change in plan will be interpreted the same way regardless, and do not think we can make as wise decisions before as we can after. In any case believe strongly shld continue to press for actions necessary to adequate Dec 15 operation for another week at least.
11. Martin cancelling reservation per suggestion Vass tel con.
- This telegram, which was drafted by Martin (S/MSA) and cleared in substance by Matthews and Perkins, was repeated to London, eyes only for Gordon. The source text bears the typewritten notation “No distribution outside State”.↩
- Not printed; it reported that the British seemed to be reverting to the sponsorship of a two-part annual review, comprising a very limited December agreement confined practically to status of forces for 1953 and a second Ministerial meeting in May or June 1953 to consider 1954 and 1955. The telegram stated further that the British view seemed unattractive since it would mean a major Council meeting at the peak of U.S. Congressional consideration of the 1954 program and would be too late to help such consideration and too early to take full advantage of studies being done by SHAPE. (740.5/10–2852)↩