740.5/3–752

The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden 1

confidential
priority
niact

We are very much disturbed at the situation which has developed with regard to the appointment of a Secretary General of NATO 2 and believe it very important that you and we fully appreciate each other’s point of view and reach an understanding on this matter. The purpose of this message is to try to make our attitude clear and to see where we go from here.

In Lisbon I thought that you and I both believed that the man selected for the appointment of Secretary General should be a man of the highest ability, reputation and prestige. These qualities were summed up in the phrase “Ministerial rank”. I kept stressing these qualities in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting because of the profound conviction that the person selected must give direction to NATO and bring to it the same caliber of leadership on the civilian side as General [Page 294] Eisenhower has given in the military field. It seemed to me that unless we got a man capable of doing this, rather than even the most capable official, we would in large part nullify the objective of the NATO reorganization to which we all agreed at Lisbon and to which we attach the greatest importance.

While believing that the qualities of the candidate were more important than his nationality, we have fully recognized the sacrifice involved for you in the decision to move the NATO headquarters from London to Paris.

It was with these thoughts in mind that we took a strong and, I thought, helpful position getting agreement that we should try to get Sir Oliver Franks to take the appointment. We felt that he possessed all the qualities for which we were searching and it was a matter of deep disappointment to us that he did not find it possible to accept.

When Sir Oliver indicated his unavailability we were happy to agree on Mr. Pearson who, in turn, proved not to be available. In our desire to be helpful and consistent with the standards which we were trying to set in this matter we then suggested Lord Alexander and Malcolm MacDonald. When this suggestion did not prove to be practicable, we felt that we should turn to Mr. Stikker who was the remaining person of “Ministerial rank” mentioned in Lisbon who was still available. We understood that at one point the choice of Mr. Stikker had the approval of your Government and it was again a source of real disappointment to us when his name was not accepted.

Certain problems arose for us in connection with your suggestions of Sir Edwin Plowden for whom we have high regard as well as Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, who in spite of his qualities does not, in our opinion, meet all the criteria which we have set.

I know how great a sacrifice it would be asking to suggest that a man high in your Government should be made available. Therefore, I do not suggest it but say only that if Oliver Lyttleton, Lord Alexander or Sir John Slessor were available, we should be most happy. Perhaps the same difficulty for you would not arise in connection with Lord Portal, who is not now, as I understand it, in the Government. He also would seem to us to possess the high degree of leadership which the gentlemen mentioned could bring to this important work.

If it should prove that no man of such outstanding caliber and reputation is available, we should perhaps consider turning to a solution of separating the position of Vice Chairman of the Council from that of Secretary General. I am aware that sentiment toward a solution of this kind already exists particularly among some of our continental colleagues. For our part we would come to such a solution with great reluctance since it would not only mean the abandonment of our concept of the job which we still feel is the correct one, but would also [Page 295] inevitably reopen the whole question of the functions and terms of reference of the Secretary General, thereby further delaying a decision which in the interests of our whole enterprise should be taken at once.

I should be most grateful to have your thoughts on this tangled subject. I am most eager that we should come to a meeting of minds about it. Do you agree that we should try to do this before the matter again comes before the Deputies?

Thank you for your kind message to me on my statement regarding Malaya.3

I have been distressed to hear that you have been laid low by the grippe and hope that you are now entirely well again.

With warm regards.4

Acheson
  1. The source text was transmitted to London in telegram 4399, Mar. 7, for Gifford and Spofford with the instruction that it should be delivered if neither of them saw any objection. Telegram 4399 was repeated to Paris.
  2. Regarding the decision by the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, held Feb. 20–25, at Lisbon, to appoint a Secretary General, see pp. 180 ff.
  3. For the text of Secretary Acheson’s statement on British policy in Malaya, made at his press conference on Mar. 5, see Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 427. The reference to Eden’s message has not been identified further.
  4. On Mar. 8, Gifford reported that he had delivered Secretary Acheson’s message to Eden who said that he would try to find someone who would meet U.S. specifications. Eden stated further that he knew Lord Portal very well and had some doubts about whether he was the man for the job. (Telegram 3918 from London; 740.5/3–852)