Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 104

Report by the Council Deputies to the North Atlantic Council ¹

top secret
C9–D/1

[London,] 6th February 1952.

Soviet Foreign Policy

introduction

The North Atlantic Council at its Eighth Session requested that the Council Deputies complete their study of Soviet foreign policy, its aims and means, as a basis for a report to the next meeting of the Council (C8–D/13, paragraph (b); C8–R/5, paragraph 19).² In response to this request, the Council Deputies present the following report to the Ninth Session of the Council.

I. Main basis of Soviet foreign policy

1. Soviet foreign policy under Stalin is the offspring of a marriage between traditional Russian imperialism and Communist doctrine as developed by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. It is revolutionary, expansionist and fundamentally hostile to all non-Communist forms of government. It has the character of an inspired crusade and is based on the belief that time and history are on the side of Communism. It aims ultimately at establishing a Communist world order dominated and directed from Moscow. No other form of Communism is acceptable; Soviet policy therefore risks alienating those Communists who do not accept the thesis that Soviet national interests are paramount, as happened in Yugoslavia.

2. Soviet foreign policy relies for its internal acceptance upon traditionally strong Russian nationalist sentiments, supported by the ideology of the “liberation of the masses” through Communism, and by the thesis that the Soviet people is threatened by hostile capitalist countries. The internal political conditions which support Soviet foreign policy are set forth in the Annex. A review of the Soviet economic and military potential appears in the joint report of the Council Deputies and the Military Committee to the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, entitled “Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at present and in the immediate future” (MC 33³).

3. A primary factor in all Soviet policy is that the Soviet Union itself, as the seat of the Stalinist power and the essential base of the Stalinist world revolution, must not be exposed to any excessive risk. Fear of encirclement and of aggression, whether real or artificial, is therefore a characteristic of Soviet policy. Hence the Soviet leaders’ first preoccupation is to secure the strategic approaches to the USSR and to prevent the establishment in Europe or Asia of forces capable of threatening the USSR. For this purpose the Soviet Union seeks to consolidate Russian control over the states in the Soviet bloc, to extend this area wherever an opportunity is offered to do so without serious risk to the USSR or to its interests, and to obstruct the growth of Western strength and unity. This process serves at the same time to expand the Communist Empire.

4. The Soviet leaders consider NATO a threat to the success of Soviet policies and perhaps a potential threat to their own security. To weaken and disrupt NATO is therefore an immediate Soviet objective. Similarly, the Soviet Government seeks to paralyse any non-Communist power combination and, in the longer run, to see pro-Soviet régimes established wherever possible.

II. Principal aims of Soviet foreign policy

(a) Europe

5. The Soviet aims in Eastern Europe are to consolidate Soviet control over the satellites and to develop their economic, political and military integration with the Soviet Union so as to make the maximum use of their industrial potential, to seal the area off from Western contact and to reinforce the Soviet military potential.

6. In Finland, the Soviet aim is to keep the country neutral and open to immediate use by Soviet forces in the event of war.

7. In Yugoslavia, the Soviet aim is to eliminate Marshal Tito’s régime and to replace it by a government subservient to Moscow. Short of a concerted satellite attack on Yugoslavia (which is a possibility) this aim is unlikely to be achieved in the near future. In the meantime, Soviet policy relies on economic, diplomatic and psychological pressure and internal subversion, with a view to discouraging any deviationist tendency in the satellite states.

8. Morally, politically and economically, Western Europe is of profound importance in the world struggle. It is therefore a vital aim of Soviet policy both to weaken Western Europe and to increase Soviet influence in the area. To do this, the Soviet Union seeks to divide Western Europe from the United States and to prevent the successful execution of the NATO defence programme, to hamper economic recovery and development and, in the longer run, to bring Communist governments into power in countries of the area.

9. Germany’s formidable industrial and military potential makes her, in the Soviet view, the key to control of all Europe. It therefore seems that the Soviet aim is to neutralize the whole of Germany and to set up there, if possible, a government devoted to Moscow, the changes which have taken place under Soviet authority in Eastern Germany being intended to serve as a starting point for carrying out their plans with regard to the country as a whole. But if they realize Germany’s potential value to Soviet policy, the Soviet leaders, especially after their wartime experience, are equally conscious of her as a potential threat. In view of Germany’s natural Western orientation, the immediate Soviet aim must be to prevent Western Germany from being effectively integrated into Western Europe, above all in the military sphere. To this end Soviet policy will continue to exploit German fear of war and desire for unity. The Soviet Government, through its East German satellite, is following the tactic of offering ostensible concessions in an attempt to wean the West Germans away from the Western Powers and to induce them to support German unification along the lines desired by the Soviets. The Soviets, however, have given, up to the present time, no indication that they are willing to sacrifice effective Communist control of East Germany to secure either German unity or German neutrality. In any case, since the Soviet leaders might well regard any prospect of a rearmed united Germany, free to associate with the West, as intolerable, they are hardly likely to withdraw from the Eastern zone on any terms involving such a threat. Rearmament limited to Western Germany, provided it remains subject to the safeguards now proposed by the Western Governments, is not considered likely in itself to provoke the Soviet Government into action risking war; but they will do their utmost to prevent it by means short of war, and the undertaking must contain an element of calculated risk for the West.

(b) Far East and South-East Asia

10. Soviet policy in the Far East is broadly aimed at eliminating Western influence and establishing Communist régimes, although the degree of direct Soviet control of these régimes will presumably depend in large measure on the nature of the relationship established with China. It is probable that the Soviet Government not only regards this as an end in itself, but still holds to Lenin’s doctrine that victory throughout Asia will ultimately assure victory in the West as well. To this end the USSR, like China, is supporting violent but limited warfare throughout the area, especially in Korea, Indo-China and Malaya. The Soviet’s alliance with China is of vital importance but is still for the most part an unknown factor. The Immediate aims are to consolidate China’s membership of the Soviet bloc and, to the extent consistent with this, to develop China’s economic and military potential, to overthrow with Chinese co-operation the present Governments in South-East Asia and replace them by Communist régimes, and to promote the maximum tension and unrest throughout the area in order to deny its economic resources to the free world and divert Western military effort. It appears that for the present at least the USSR is ready to give China the main role in the carrying out of this policy.

11. Although the Communist powers are now committed primarily in Korea, they have other tempting objectives in South-East Asia. The position of the non-Communist Government in Burma is especially weak, and the Chinese Government may well increase its aid to the Burmese Communists in the hopes of enabling them progressively to win control. There is a continuing threat of large-scale Chinese intervention in Indo-China. If both countries fell, Siam might soon follow, and the Communists would not only deprive the West of essential raw materials but control the main rice-exporting area in Asia. They could then exert effective economic pressure on the rice-importing countries, Malaya, India, Ceylon and Indonesia. Moreover, such a débâcle in Burma, Indo-China and Siam would give great, and possibly decisive, encouragement to the Communist movements in Malaya and Indonesia.

12. The Soviet Union has only limited opportunities for direct pressure upon India, but is seeking to spread Communist influence there, and in the long run India probably ranks in importance second only to China as a Soviet objective in Asia.

13. With regard to Japan, the Soviet aim is first to neutralize the country in order to prevent its becoming a threat to Chinese and Soviet security, to exploit its industrial power and ultimately to integrate it into the Soviet bloc. Both the Soviet and Chinese Governments would probably regard a substantially rearmed Japan as a serious threat to their position in the Far East, but it is difficult to forecast their reactions to Japanese rearmament except in the light of the general development of the world situation.

(c) Middle East and North Africa

14. An important traditional element in Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East is to prevent any hostile power from gaining control over the Straits. Similarly, it wishes to prevent the emergence of any military threat from unfriendly forces in Turkey, Persia or Afghanistan. Soviet policy seeks further, to under-mine Western influence in the area, to deny to the West the resources and communications of the area, and ultimately to secure control of all these countries.

15. Social and economic conditions throughout most of the Middle East and North Africa provide a favourable ground for Communist subversive and revolutionary tactics; however, the Communist Parties are generally weak or have been forced underground by Government action. Communist policy is therefore forced at present to operate indirectly. It does so:

(a) by seeking to encourage and ultimately control the so-called “anti-imperialist” movements, e.g. in Egypt and Morocco, and

(b) through the “Peace Campaign”, which seeks to encourage “Neutralism” and hamper co-operation with the West, especially in defence.

Communist propaganda and the “Peace Campaign” are now beginning to take a much more active interest in the area both because of the opportunities offered by disputes with the West and to meet the challenge of the proposed Middle East Command. The Soviet Government has begun, and may well continue, to exploit the present uneasy situation by diplomatic pressure on the Middle East Governments to dissuade them from co-operating in Western defence arrangements.

(d) Dependent and colonial territories

16. In the dependent and colonial territories, which Communist theory regards as one of the chief economic and strategic bases of “imperialist” power, Soviet policy attempts to foster national aspirations for independence in order to weaken Western influence as the first step toward the establishment of eventual Communist control.

(e) United Nations

17. The Soviet Union regards the United Nations merely as an instrument in its foreign policy adapted to serve three basic and overlapping objectives: the protection of fundamental Soviet state interests; aggravation of differences in the non-Soviet world, and worldwide dissemination of Soviet propaganda. The value of the United Nations to the Soviet Union has somewhat decreased, largely as a result of the General Assembly’s increased authority in security matters. The possibility of a Soviet withdrawal, and the proclamation of the World Peace Council as a substitute, even though it appears less likely now than some months ago, cannot be discounted.

III. Methods and timing of Soviet policy

18. As stated in paragraph 3 above, it is a cardinal principle of Soviet policy not to expose the Soviet Union itself, as the base of Stalinist power and world revolution, to any excessive risk. The Soviet Union is therefore likely to rely, wherever possible, on methods of “cold war”—diplomacy, propaganda, and subversion—and to keep the Soviet forces in the background to strengthen Soviet policy simply by the threat of overwhelming military power. The Soviet leaders have made great gains since 1945, and despite the growing pressure of Western containment the probability is that they still believe they can ultimately achieve their longer-term aims by means short of deliberate initiation of full-scale war. It can be considered that the cold war waged by the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War is a logical expression of Communist ideology. In the most plausible interpretation of the texts which serve as a basis for Communist teaching, the Capitalist and Communist systems in fact seem hardly compatible. It would therefore seem that the statements by the Soviet rulers to the effect that “peaceful co-existence” between the Communist and non-Communist world is possible should not be regarded as sincere. Soviet theorists have frequently admitted that offers of “peaceful co-existence” between the Communist and capitalist systems are purely tactical: such “peaceful co-existence” merely means absence of war, a period during which the political struggle continues and the Soviet Union builds up overwhelming strength for the final decisive conflict with capitalism.

19. “Cold war” methods include: utilization of Communist parties (sometimes in “united fronts”) and Communist-controlled organizations, building up of the Cominform, intensification of the “peace campaign”, and political intimidation, all of which seek to destroy the will and ability of free peoples to resist Soviet expansion. More direct methods of Soviet policy include encouragement of nationalist uprisings in various parts of the world and support of localized military actions (“war by proxy”). Indeed, these latter methods enter the sphere of “hot war”, although they fall short of military measures by the Soviet armed forces. Enthusiasm for “war by proxy” has doubtless been dampened somewhat by the Korean experience. It nevertheless remains true that in Asia there are several areas favourable to the method of “war by proxy”, in particular Indo-China and Burma, and that, in addition, China is passing through a period of revolutionary dynamism the consequences of which are at present difficult to forecast. It is not unlikely that Soviet planning in the field of “cold war” and “war by proxy” is stimulated by the thought that the Western World, and particularly the United States, in attempting to meet and counteract Communist irritations at all points where they occur, will overtax its resources and suffer economic collapse.

20. Nevertheless, Stalinist doctrine holds that certain wars are “just” and therefore does not exclude the aggressive use of the Soviet military forces. If the Soviet Government decides that there are no other means of reaching its objectives there is the possibility that it may resort to armed attack involving Soviet forces. In assessing this possibility it may be assumed that the Soviet rulers realize the danger—or in the case of attack on the NATO powers the certainty—that such a step will result in military counter-measures by the Western alliance and lead to world-wide war. They must therefore consider the factors which would weigh for and against their ultimate victory. The main factor in favour of this is at present Soviet predominance in military power both as regards land and air forces. Other favourable factors are the presence of considerable potential fifth columns in Western countries, unrest in vital areas like the Middle East and war-weariness coupled with defeatism in some Western countries. Against such a victory the Soviet rulers must reckon with the present Western supremacy in naval power and in atomic weapons and the potentially greater ability of the West to sustain a long war. On the other hand, if the Kremlin concluded that a western attack on the USSR were imminent and unavoidable, and that Soviet chances of surviving such an attack were improved by seizing the initiative and attacking first, it would almost certainly do so.

21. Soviet foreign policy follows a preordained general strategy of revolution, the implementation of which is facilitated by the Soviet Government’s almost complete immunity to the pressure of public opinion. But Soviet policy is also extremely flexible and the Soviet leaders do not hesitate to modify their strategy when expediency dictates. There is, moreover, no evidence for the existence of any timetable laying down dates by which particular objectives must be achieved.

22. Thus, while the broad strategy of Soviet policy is to an extent preordained, current tactics will be dictated largely by the way the outside world reacts to Soviet moves. On the one hand this raises the possibility that, in resisting aggression and creating positions of strength, the West may convince the Soviet leaders, for instance as a result of German and Japanese rearmament, that vital Soviet interests are threatened to an extent justifying military counter-measures, even at the risk of general war. Action by the Western Powers that might be regarded by the Soviet Union as unnecessary provocation, especially in bordering territories, could also result in military measures being taken by the Soviet Government. On the other hand there are grounds for believing that, with prudence as well as firmness, the West can succeed in building such strength as to deter the Soviet Union from further encroachments, whilst yet avoiding war. In following this policy the West is accepting a calculated risk; but without accepting it there is no foreseeable means of inducing the Soviet Union to relax its aggressive and expansionist pressure. The West should prepare for a long drawn-out period during which they must remain firm and vigilant.

Annex

Political Conditions

A. Stability of the Regime.

1. There can be no doubt about the internal stability of the Soviet regime. It is probably more secure today than it has been at any time since 1917, and unless some chance or outside agency (e.g. a world war) brings about a radical change it is likely in future to become even stronger. In the past the regime has survived domestic crises more severe than any which now seem likely to develop.

2. For its secure exercise of power the Stalinist regime relies upon communist party machinery and the security forces. The monolithic character of the regime, the rigidity of Communist Party discipline and its all-pervasive activities enable the leaders effectively to control every aspect of life in the Soviet Union. While the death of Stalin might create difficulties over the succession it is not thought that it would produce a split in the Party or a modification of the present system.

3. The strength of the Soviet Government can also be attributed to the efficiency, skill and effectiveness of their propaganda to an uncritical public deliberately isolated from all outside influences. The authorities are able to present to the Soviet people a convincing picture of the threat to their homeland from the so-called “capitalist-imperialist” countries. They are also successful in enlisting the national pride of the Russian people in the accomplishments of the Government, a process which has been greatly aided by the victories of the Second World War.

4. The hope which the Government holds out to the people for an improvement in living conditions is reinforced by a certain gradual raising of the standard of life.

B. Areas of Discontent

5. It is recognised that areas of discontent do exist but except perhaps in the event of war they are not such as to present a threat to the regime. Under the present system it is impossible to foresee the creation of any centre around which opposition to the regime can crystallize.

6. Dislike of the regime and passive resistance is undoubtedly widespread among the peasants but there is no evidence that this resentment ever flares up except in the new territories such as the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine where land collectivization is being implemented for the first time. There may also be discontent occasioned by the new Agrogorod programme; the caution shown in top Soviet circles at the beginning of March, 1951, with respect to some phases of the consolidation campaign, would appear to support this conclusion.

7. While there is evidence of discontent among industrial workers, this discontent does not constitute a threat to the security of the regime.

8. The intelligentsia form a relatively privileged class which has a vested interest in the regime for both material and intellectual reasons. Many intellectuals must privately resent the tight controls exercised by the Party over the intellectual life of the country, but these very controls preclude the possibility of overt opposition from this quarter.

9. Care has been taken by the Soviet regime to subordinate the military to civilian control, though the military in general occupy a preferred position. The average soldier is at least better off than the average peasant; the officer class is one of the privileged groups. Broadly speaking, there is no possibility of the military threatening the regime during peacetime. One of the possible reasons why the Soviet Government would prefer the continuation of the cold war to actual hostilities is that under present conditions the military can be used most effectively to support both the foreign and internal policies of the regime.

10. The regime may regard the church as a possible rallying point of opposition but control is so thorough that the church could not, under present conditions, prove a danger to the state.

11. It is impossible to make an estimate of the degree of discontent among the various nationalities, but nationalism amongst the non-Russian groups in the Soviet Union is the product of a long historical process, is still a potent force and is one of the factors most likely to be productive of latent hostility to the regime. This is probably most true in such new territories as the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, but applies also to such territories as the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia which have always been a part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet regime has been skilful in reconciling the national minorities to the process of Sovietization by allowing them to retain a degree of cultural autonomy.

1. This report was considered by the Foreign Ministers at their meeting on the morning of Feb. 21 (see telegram Secto 34, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 120) and at the third meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the afternoon of Feb. 22 (see telegram Secto 49, Feb. 22, p. 136).

   This report was evaluated in document LIS D–17b, Feb. 19, 1952, one of a series of preparatory papers drafted in the Department of State in advance of the Lisbon session of the North Atlantic Council, as follows:

   “As a result of discussions at the working group level and by the Council Deputies, we have been able to reach agreement with the other Governments on all major points in the report prepared on this subject. This report now represents an agreed paper, which in its final version includes several concessions to objections which we had raised to the original draft paper. We have reservations now about only two relatively minor points: we are not convinced that the ‘USSR is ready to give China the main role’ in Southeast Asia (paragraph 10), and we disagree that the Soviet intelligentsia supports the regime to the extent indicated in paragraph 8, Annex.

   “While our position eventually was accepted, there was a strong tendency at the working group level to interpret Soviet policy toward Germany as one of offering ‘considerable concessions’ in order to secure a ‘neutralized united Germany’—an interpretation which we strongly oppose—and there is the possibility that this view may be advanced again.” (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105)

2. For documentation on the Council decision described here, done at Rome on Nov. 28, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 693 ff.
3. Document MC 33 is not printed, but it is considered further in the documentation cited in footnote 2, above.