Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/2–2352: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State ¹

secret
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Bonn, February 23, 1952—6 p.m.

1682. 1. HICOG considers that strict interpretation London agreements four FonMins wld limit controls in field atomic energy to those which properly fall under definition of atomic weapons to be eventually included in annex to EDC treaty. Bonn’s tel sent Dept 1664 rptd Paris 535 London 444 Lisbon 9, Feb 21² gives verbatim text definition suggested by tripartite working party and notes that this definition does not include the key prohibition on facilities capable of producing atomic weapons or significant quantities of nuclear fuels or the less important limitation on production, processing and stockpiling of natural uranium. Deptel to Bonn 1694 rptd London 4036 Paris 4965 Lisbon Tosec 23 Feb 21³ (which apparently crossed above reftel) now raises addit problems re scope FedReps commitments in field of atomic energy.

2. It is HICOGs tentative view that some device outside of EDC framework, such as third letter from Chancellor will be necessary if commitment re facilities for production of atomic weapons and nuclear fuels is to be obtained. This could, if para 7–A–(iii) of FonMins Sept decisions not abrogated by London decisions, also include provisos re export and source material controls and security checks along lines Depts previous recommendations as well as commitments on legislation in atomic energy field.

3. Comments US delegation to London now at Lisbon solicited urgently re fourth sentence Deptel to Bonn 1694 rptd Lisbon Tosec 23.⁴

Mccloy

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London, Paris, and Lisbon.

2. Not printed. It reported that an American–British–French working party, acting under instructions of the Allied High Commissioners for Germany, had recommended the following definition of atomic weapons:

   “Atomic weapon includes any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilize, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury, or mass poisoning. It includes also any part, device, or assembly especially designed for, or primarily useful in, such a weapon. The production of less than 500 grams of nuclear fuel per year will not be considered as contributing to the production of atomic weapons.

   “Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, U–233, U–235, uranium containing over 2.1 percent by weight of U–235, materials containing the foregoing or any other materials capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy thru nuclear chain reaction of the material.” (740.5/2–2152)

3. Not printed. It proposed consideration be given to measures to assure that the Federal Republic of Germany would undertake to maintain controls in the field of atomic energy beyond the prohibition of the production of atomic bombs. (740.5/2–1952) Such an undertaking had been specified in paragraph 7 A(iii) of the letter of instructions from the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers to the Allied High Commissioners for Germany agreed upon at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Washington, Sept. 10–14, 1951. Documentation on those meetings, including the instructions under reference, is presented in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff.
4. The sentence under reference reads as follows: “Not clear to us whether this problem considered at London or whether instr para 7 A(iii) remains in effect.”