Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/2–152: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Bonn, February 1, 1952—7 p.m.

1385. I have just read Schuman’s ltr,² and from this distance it appears to me to be outcome of the growing uneasiness on the part of the Fr as it seemed apparent that the negots for a Ger contrib were really coming to a head. It also reflects, I think the utter Fr diff of opinion which has never been entirely resolved during the negots. Though the Eur army is a Fr concept they have never fully accepted its full implications. The Gers will always create difficulties, but I don’t believe it was the evolution of the Bonn negots which induced this ltr as much as fundamental hesitation on the part of elements in the FonOff and perhaps in Parliament to accept wholly a Ger mil contrib even within the frame of a Eur army. There have been some maneuvers here, to be sure, on the part of Adenauer, to press for a gen vertrag, leaving the conventions to be dealt with later, but they have been only maneuvers and can be readily blocked in my judgment if we remain firm on this point. In short, I think it has been the Paris negots rather than the Bonn negots which have brought about Schuman’s ltr. In the Paris negots the Gers have so completely accepted the concept of the Eur Army that they have rather frightened the Fr of the consequences. The Fr, therefore, seem now to rest their security less upon the Eur army concept and rather more on outside commitments, and as I read the letter there emerges from it more a fear of Ger escape thru their very adherence to the Eur community than anything else.

I do not feel that the Gers can be justly blamed for endeavoring to settle within the Eur framework the problem of arms manufacture and the cost of maintaining allied troops. It helps them politically and they were largely encouraged to this attitude by those Fr reps with whom they were largely dealing in Paris, I do not understand the logic which wld induce the Fr to balk so completely at the thought of having the upkeep of American and Brit troops a part of the community budget. Why not if they are here to support Eur def, but do not believe that this is something upon which the Gers insist if there was real objection.

Everyone who is aware of the situation here has to take into acct the almost hysterical attitude of the Gers on the discrimination issue. The importance of this issue in Ger politics largely accounts for the fact that the Ger Govt wld be induced to embrace the concept of such a community. It now seems that Fr wants both discrimination and nondiscrimination, and being a little appalled at the onrushing dates for decision seeks a pause to try and get both more clearly established.

Taking up the particular points in the ltr:

(1) I do not feel that their explanation on the Saar is adequate. If it is a mere evolution to a dipl mission from a comm such as we contemplate here, why not wait until that transition takes place in Ger proper? While I discount Hallstein’s talk of an SPD takeover (Adenauer being no man to surrender power readily), no observer, least of all one as astute as Francois-Poncet, cld possibly have reported to his govt that his step wld not create a real polit rumpus here and quite possibly destroy the prospect of a successful Lisbon.

(2) On the matter of the possible secession of Ger, I feel that there wld be less chance of secession if Ger were a member of NATO than if she were not. I think Ger is more dangerous outside of NATO than in it. In their present mood, however, I do not believe we are going to convince the Fr of this and I wld not press it.

I believe that were it not for the Saar controversy we wld have no trouble working out the “technical” solution of the NATO problem. What success we can have now, I do not know.

The fin contrib is always serious as long as Schaeffer is negotiating and the only thing is to see what happens with the Wise Men,³ for I can’t believe we will have a solution by Monday, on that here. I believe that, if the present atmosphere cld be clarified we cld settle this security control problem here provided the Fr ease up a little on their rather extreme position re heavy weapons and propellants. I even think we can solve the war criminals problem, but I cannot venture any estimate as yet of these probabilities in the present atmosphere until I have a chance to talk with the chancellor and others again.

The best thing I can think of at the moment is to put to the Fr the necessity of doing something with respect to the Saar, perhaps referring to freedom of elections there even if in a somewhat more qualified form than Hallstein seeks. I wld also keep putting forward the idea of a “European” solution which even seems to be taking on here fairly well. In a partially relieved atmosphere we can restart negots but I am afraid, however, it is going to be terribly hard to pick up the pieces before London.

It might be possible, however, to make some capital out of London mtg by announcing that the Chancellor was being invited to come to discuss not only the question of Germany’s def contrib but also other pending problems including that of the Saar. This wld enable him to make an announcement to the Bundestag and ask them not to tie his hands in such important negots by unfavorable votes or decisions.

Mccloy

1. Repeated for information to London and Paris.
2. Reference is to Schuman’s message of Jan. 29 to Acheson, p. 7.
3. The reference here is to the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Council. For documentation on the activities of the Committee during January and February 1952, see pp. 203 ff.