Mr. Eden asked if there were agreement on the proposed tripartite declaration on Austria.2 He remarked that the first sentence of the second paragraph did not seem to follow the language of the Moscow Declaration on Austria.3 He felt that the phrase “promised her sovereignty” should read “promised to restore her full sovereignty”. It was agreed that the exact words of the Moscow Declaration would be used.
Mr. Schuman asked that the reference to the French Committee of National Liberation in the following sentence be altered and that the sentence read “France associated herself with this declaration on the [Page 164]16th of November 1943.” The following sentence would begin “The Governments then announced their determination”, etc.
With these changes the text of the declaration was agreed. It was further agreed that the declaration would be released on Thursday, February 28 at 3:30 p.m., (Greenwich mean time).
Mr. Acheson said he understood this was the first step. In about two weeks each of the governments would send a note to the Soviet Government proposing the abbreviated treaty. The treaty would include the French proposal regarding the prohibition of an Anschluss.
Mr. Schuman asked what the advantages of the abbreviated treaty are.
Mr. Acheson said that it had the advantage of constituting a new proposal. This was a new Allied initiative designed for its effect in Austria.
Mr. Schuman remarked that the proposal would not facilitate agreement with the USSR.
Mr. Acheson agreed.
Mr. Schuman suggested that the note to the Soviet Government should recall that it was not the content of the treaty which had given rise to difficulties, but the raising of unrelated points such as the Trieste question.
Mr. Perkins asked what language would be used with regard to the prohibition of an Anschluss. He said the three Allied High Commissioners in Austria had recommended two formulas. One was the inclusion in the treaty of the following language:
“The Allied and Associated Powers declare that political and economic union between Austria and Germany is prohibited. Austria recognizes its responsibilities in this matter.”
The other method would be a three power declaration on the subject with which the Soviet Government would be invited to associate itself.
Mr. Schuman pointed out that there has been a clause on this subject in the old treaty which had been agreed to by the Soviets.
It was agreed that the prohibition would be included in the treaty subject to a further study of the wording set forth above. It was further agreed that the note to the Soviet Government would be dispatched two weeks after the tripartite declaration.
Mr. Schuman asked whether the abbreviated treaty would be proposed as an alternative to the present draft.
It was agreed that the abbreviated draft would be put forward as the basis for discussion by the Allies, but that this would not include a discussion of the long treaty or any proposals which the Soviets might put forward.[Page 165]
Mr. Schuman said that on the question of security control everything appeared to be settled except the list of items which would not be allocated for production in the Federal Republic. In the name of his Government he wished to make the following proposal with respect to propellants. The manufacture of gun powder could be concentrated in a few factories which should be in less exposed regions. This was a standardized job. It should be given to the EDC as a common task. All members of the EDC would participate and there would be no discrimination. He thought that new factories could be set up at once. In setting them up, attention would be paid to such factors as labor. Italy, for example, has an unemployment problem. He said that he had spoken to De Gasperi who supported the idea and suggested Sardinia as a location for the factories. France would also like to use North Africa. He thought this would be a constructive proposal, in the common good. He recalled also that the German Chancellor had informed the Ministers that he had no intention of building new factories. He pointed out that France produces only half the pre-war amounts and that Germany was in the same position. There was thus a common European need and the burden of supply should be taken off the United States.
Ambassador Bruce inquired how Mr. Schuman would deal with the existing powder factories. Would they be bought by the EDC, he inquired? Mr. Schuman replied that they would continue as they are at present and they would not be bought by the EDC. His proposal was only that any new construction should be undertaken by the EDC. The treaty would specify that the Commissioners would have a monopoly for the future. Mr. Acheson observed that our only concern was to get practical results.
Mr. Schuman then said that he wished to maintain civil aviation on the list. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden both pointed out that the ED Commission would not place orders for civil aircraft. Mr. Schuman rejoined that the difference between civil and military aircraft was not great and that civil aircraft production could easily be converted to military aircraft production.
Mr. Acheson said he had trouble not with the abstract logic but with the practical result of adding civil aircraft to the list. He read out the proposed text of Article A–4 of the EDC treaty. As he saw it, under Mr. Schuman’s proposal the EDC would not place orders for civil aircraft but the German Government would be free to do so. Mr. Schuman replied that there were two lists involved. In list 1 are found all armaments which are not to be made except with EDC approval. [Page 166]List 2 are those which are not to be made in strategic areas. His proposal was to add civil aircraft to list 2.
Mr. Acheson agreed that this would get us around the legal point but thought it would not get us around the political one. He recalled that Chancellor Adenauer had indicated he could not accept this arrangement. Mr. Eden felt that it was discriminatory. Mr. Acheson said the Chancellor had indicated he believed this would be discriminatory, just as a similar listing of automobiles would be. The Chancellor had indicated, however, that he was willing to make a statement about civil aircraft.
Mr. Schuman thought a statement was not a commitment but Mr. Eden pointed out that the three Governments could take note of the statement. He asked if it was not a fact that a civil aviation industry cannot be developed where there is no production of military aircraft.
Mr. Schuman protested that he had great confidence in Adenauer but that if we had another government in Germany in two, three or four years, it would be difficult—. Mr. Eden said such a development could be difficult also for the British but he thought that if the government got a declaration of which they could take note plus a prohibition on military aircraft, this would be satisfactory and we could not get much more.
Mr. Schuman said he had every wish to end this matter in agreement. On the other hand, Adenauer also had the same wish. Adenauer was very much pressed, he thought. The list after all was very short. He thought that if the Ministers considered German public opinion and German difficulties too much, they risked forgetting their own difficulties. There was a great psychological difficulty on aviation. He thought it ought to be met especially since the rest of the agreement was fair and just.
Mr. Schuman went on to say that his military advisor told him that gun barrels were not so important. The only practical difficulty was that the Krupp works might be reconstituted—although he thought they would find plenty of profits elsewhere for a while ! On the whole, however, the French Government would be more inclined to drop gun barrels than propellants. He said he would write personally to Chancellor Adenauer explaining the French difficulties and appealing for this sacrifice by the Federal Republic.
Mr. Acheson summarized rapidly the state of the discussion about the list and said he felt Mr. Schuman was mistaken about the intensity of the Chancellor’s feeling on aircraft. He wondered whether the Ministers could play around with the language of the Chancellor’s letter and strengthen it in some way as to make it more acceptable to Mr. Schuman. For example, we could have him say that he would not change his mind without consultation, that we regard this matter of the production of aircraft as a very serious one, etc.[Page 167]
Mr. Eden felt he had an even more sensitive public with which to contend on this point than did Mr. Schuman. But in his opinion the public was not right; it was thinking in terms of the last war and not the next.
Mr. Acheson pointed out that from the Chancellor’s point of view all these matters were connected. He would not like to make a final agreement on the all-important question of a financial contribution until the question of security controls was settled. Mr. Schuman warned his colleagues that the Germans wanted everything difficult settled in their favor without delay.
Mr. Acheson, again thinking aloud, suggested that the Chancellor should be asked to send a letter in which he would add that he was fully aware of the importance of the policy he was stating, he would assure us that the German Government would not alter its intention without consulting us, and then he would say that the whole letter would be laid before the Bundestag.
The Ministers adjourned in order to give time for further thought on this problem.
- The source text indicates that Laukhuff was the drafter as of Mar. 17 and Reinstein on Apr. 1. Copies of these minutes as circulated within the Department of State as document Ger–London MIN 8, Apr. 16, 1952, are included in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103 and in CFM files, lot M 88, box 161. A 275-word summary account of the portion of this meeting dealing with Austria, closely following the minutes printed here, was transmitted to the Department as Secto 92, Feb. 26 and repeated for information to Paris, London, and Vienna. (740.5/2–2652) A 600-word account of the entire meeting, following the lines of the minutes printed here, was also included in telegram 262400Z, Feb. 26, from Nash to Lovett (p. 167).↩
- For the text of the tripartite declaration under consideration at this point, see telegram 2153, Feb. 27, p. 278.↩
- For the text of the declaration under reference here, dated Nov. 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 761.↩