ODA files, lot 60 D 257, “CP: Working Group on Colonial Problems”
Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, for the Working Group on Colonial Problems 1
The United States Position in the Netherlands-Indonesian Conflict 1945–19492
At the end of the war in the Pacific, the United States had only indirect responsibility in the Netherlands East Indies. Under a civil affairs agreement with the Netherlands, the United States had permitted the early return of Dutch colonial authorities in Netherlands New Guinea and adjacent islands as these areas were regained from the Japanese. Near the end of the war, however, Indonesia was transferred from United States command to the British Southeast Asia command and it was the British, acting as the Allied agents in Indonesia, who accepted the Japanese surrender and were left to cope with [Page 1151] the immediate post-surrender problems involving the return of Dutch troops. British occupation troops arrived in Indonesia some six weeks after the Japanese surrender to find the Republic of Indonesia, proclaimed on August 17, 1945, apparently firmly entrenched in Java. Fearful of the reaction that an all-out military campaign to restore Dutch rule in Indonesia might produce in India and Burma, the British military command over Dutch protests dealt directly with Republican officials. Despite British efforts to avoid bloodshed, some fighting ensued. Press accounts of British action against the Indonesians served, particularly in the U.S., to focus public attention on Indonesia. On December 19, 1945 the Department of State issued a statement intended to clarify the United States position. This statement indicated that the United States could not take responsibility for the actions of the British, operating under an Allied mandate, and declared, “Our sole desire is to see such a peaceful settlement achieved as will best promote world stability and prosperity and the happiness of people.”
In February 1946, in reply to a Ukrainian demand that British activities in Indonesia be investigated by the Security Council, the United States upheld the British position and suggested that any interference might jeopardize the bilateral negotiations then in progress under British auspices. The United States showed little official interest in the following year until the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement by the Netherlands and Indonesia. This agreement recognized the de facto authority of the Republic of Indonesia in Java, Madura and Sumatra, and called for the establishment of a federal United States of Indonesia. The United States welcomed the initialling of the agreement in November 1946 and, with its formal signature in March 1947, recognized the de facto authority of the Republic of Indonesia as outlined in the agreement. In the face of Dutch protests, the American Consul General was authorized to deal with Republican authorities. British troops had withdrawn from the scene in November 1946.
Negotiations aimed at implementing the Linggadjati Agreement showed little sign of success and, confronted with an imminent breakdown of the talks, the United States presented dual notes June 1947: 1) calling on the Indonesians to accept the Netherlands proposals on the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreements as offering an opportunity to form an interim government; and, 2) expressing to the Netherlands Government fear of the use of force and urging continued negotiations. Eleven days later the United States indicated to the Indonesians that economic aid might be extended to an interim government.
When these moves failed and the Netherlands initiated military action in July 1947, the United States supported the Security Council [Page 1152] resolution of August 1 demanding a cease-fire, and on the same date the United States offered its good offices to the disputants.
This offer was refused by the Republic of Indonesia. However, a Security Council proffer of good offices was accepted and on August 25 the United States was chosen by Belgium and Australia as the third member of a three-man Good Offices Committee (GOC). The U.S. also participated in a Consular Commission appointed by the Security Council to observe the execution of the cease-fire. Meetings of the GOC were held aboard the USS Renville, offered by the United States when no other meeting place could be agreed upon.
Through the assistance of the GOC, the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia concluded on January 17, 1948 the Renville Agreement establishing a truce and the basis for negotiating a final political agreement. However, profound reciprocal mistrust hastened the breakdown of negotiations under the Renville Agreement in May, whereupon the United States joined Australia in pressing a compromise plan as a basis for future negotiation. Both this arrangement, known as the Dubois-Critchley Plan, and the unilateral proposal in September of Mr. Cochran, the new United States representative on the GOC, called for free elections, the establishment of a constituent assembly, representative government, and the early establishment of a sovereign USI. Following the suppression by the Republic of Indonesia of a Communist uprising in September, the United States informed the Netherlands Government that it regarded a solution along the lines of the Cochran Plan as the best way to avoid the serious consequences of failure to achieve a negotiated settlement.
At the very time the United States was in the process of obtaining a conciliatory stand on the part of the Indonesian negotiations, the Dutch on December 17 delivered an ultimatum to the GOC for transmittal to the Indonesian Republic requiring additional concessions and a reply by the following morning. The United States representative refused to deliver this message and informed the Dutch that to press for a reply would be tantamount to abandoning bona fide negotiations. On December 18 the Dutch initiated their second military action. The Republican capital of Jogjakarta was seized and most of the high Republican officials interned. Three days later, acting on the recommendation of Mr. Cochran, ECA suspended authorizations for procurement of supplies to be used by the Netherlands in Indonesia on the grounds that conditions for economic recovery did not exist. Together with Australia, the United States next took the initiative in calling the Security Council into session beginning December 22, and on January 11, 1949 the United States representative on the Security Council stated in unequivocal terms that the Netherlands had violated the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements as well as the UN Charter, and declared that the U.S. desired to see the United States of Indonesia [Page 1153] as “one of the fully sovereign and independent peoples of the world.”
On January 26, 1949 the Security Council adopted a resolution of which the United States was cosponsor calling on both parties to discontinue all military operations, calling on the Netherlands to release political prisoners recently seized and to facilitate the return of Indonesian officials to Jogjakarta, and recommending the resumption of negotiations looking to the completion of transfer of sovereignty by July 1, 1950. The GOC was dissolved and replaced by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) with broader powers of recommendation and supervision of the execution of the Security Council’s resolutions. Membership remained the same.
After the Netherlands Government in February proposed the holding of a Round Table Conference at the Hague, the United States continued to work so as both to achieve a resumption of negotiations and to secure implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council. Finally, at the RTC itself, the United States member of UNCI played a principal conciliatory role in formulating the agreement that finally emerged on December 27, 1949 as the basis for Indonesian independence.
In reviewing United States policy during this period several conclusions emerge:
1) the primary motivating factor for United States policy was the desire to see established political and economic stability in Indonesia so as neither to drain further the weakened resources of the Netherlands in the postwar period nor to indicate disregard for the political aspirations of the peoples of Asia; 2) the sharpening of the East-West struggle from 1947 on necessitated concern lest a Western European power fall to Communism, but by the same token, the United States recognized that failure to support Indonesian nationalism might cause Indonesian nationalists to turn to the Communists for support. The clear-cut anti-Communist stand of the Indonesian Government in September 1948 made possible more wholehearted support of legitimate Indonesian claims to sovereignty, 3) first inclined to a policy of neutrality and dispassionate conciliation as a result of the above conflicting considerations, by mid-1948 United States policy turned to active support of Indonesian nationalist aspirations when confronted with the unreasonable character of Dutch direct action and the unyielding nature of Dutch demands.
aftermath of the u.s. position in the netherlands-indonesian conflict 1945–1949
The good will for the United States that accrued in Indonesia as the result of United States support for Indonesian independence has since been dissipated to a considerable extent by a number of developments. [Page 1154] Important among these is the belief in Indonesian political circles that the United States did not firmly support Indonesian aspirations until after the Madium rebellion and the second Dutch police action, and that, meanwhile, U.S. material support going to the Dutch made their military actions against the Indonesian Republic possible. This belief has led Indonesian politicians to the conclusion that what support the U.S. gave Indonesia vis-à-vis the Dutch was motivated more by fear of Communism than by regard for the justice of the Indonesian cause. In addition, Indonesia’s fear of involvement in the East-West struggle and the consequent adoption of a neutral position has led to further criticism of United States foreign policy as aimed only at the containment of Communism. United States policy in both Indochina and Tunisia are cited as examples of continued U.S. support for colonial powers. To some extent, the present Indonesian attitude toward the U.S. may be due to Communist propaganda.
However, it is apparent that some reservoir of good will for the United States remains. With some reservations, U.S. aid programs continue to be acceptable to Indonesia. Individual Indonesian politicians remain privately friendly to the U.S. and to U.S. aims. Americans in Indonesia are not subject to the degree of suspicion and distrust that has attached to the Dutch. United States power continues to be respected, although not without a concomitant resentment.
On balance, it would be difficult to conclude that United States policy toward Indonesia has been successful in obtaining that country’s unquestioning friendship. At the same time, the United States does retain some good will and respect in Indonesia, and it is clear that, had support for Indonesia not been forthcoming before Indonesian independence, the United States would now have little or no access to that country, other than perhaps the most formal and restricted diplomatic access. There is much vocal criticism of the United States in Indonesia and inherent suspicion of American motives but much cooperation with the United States on a non-vocal level.
The head of the Indonesian State, President Sukarno, has on several occasions stated quite frankly to the American Ambassador in Indonesia that the one significant act by which the United States could win over public opinion and be assured of public support in Indonesia, would be to give Indonesia support in the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over Netherlands New Guinea.
the u.s. position in the new guinea dispute
Even after the successful establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, a number of thorny questions remained to be resolved between the Netherlands and Indonesia. One such question has been the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea, called Irian by the Indonesians. [Page 1155] At the Round Table Conference, resolution of this issue was postponed through a formula which called for the holding of a conference to determine the disposition of the area by the end of 1950. Though this conference was held, neither it nor subsequent negotiations have solved the problem. Indonesian politicans without exception demand that the area fall under eventual full Indonesian sovereignty; some few Dutch Socialist leaders are apparently willing to acquiesce to a formula that will acknowledge Indonesian sovereignty provided that Dutch interests are duly safeguarded. To date, however, they have not been able to muster sufficient strength to reverse the official Dutch position calling for retention of sovereignty. In the most recent negotiations, which were exploratory and not binding, the Dutch indicated willingness to submit the legal question of sovereignty to an international body for adjudication. Australia has been even more adament in demanding that Netherlands New Guinea remain under Dutch administration. The Australian position, influenced by popular acceptance of the “white Australia” policy, is based on fear that Australian security would be endangered if the area were to be occupied by a weak power.
In the face of these conflicting claims the United States has consistently maintained a neutral position and insisted that the question be worked out through bilateral negotiation. At present there seems to be no solution in the offing that could satisfy Indonesia, the Netherlands and Australia, and it is possible that eventually resource will be had to the United Nations, where the Indonesian question remains on the agenda of the Security Council.
- Incorporated into Doc. CP D–11 at an unknown date subsequent to Aug. 26, 1952, but not included in the Working Group documentation in lot 54 D 5.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, pp. 1158–1192; ibid., 1946, vol. viii, pp. 787–860; ibid., 1947, vol. vi, pp. 899–1101; ibid., 1948, vol. vi, pp. 57–624; and ibid., 1949, vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 119–590.↩