Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

Department of State Committee files, lot 54 D 5, “Working Group on Colonial Problems”

Memorandum by Louise McNutt of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to the Working Group on Colonial Problems¹

secret

[Washington, August 26, 1952.]

Colonial Policy—Indochina²

the problem

The United States is losing the sympathy and support of the independent countries of Asia and the Middle East through the supply of American military and economic aid to French Union forces in Indochina and the support of the Associated States. It is argued by critics that the three States are not in fact independent;—that their status within the French Union makes them little more than colonies; and that action by the U.S. in support of the French Union forces and of the three governments amounts to U.S. support of French efforts to restore a colonial control against what some have believed to be the indigenous “Nationalism” of the Communist Viet-Minh forces.

past situation

Prior to the ratification by the French Assembly, on February 2, 1950, of the three separate agreements with Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia which established those States as independent Associated States within the French Union, the U.S. extended no financial, military, economic or political advice or assistance to the French Administration in Indochina. It was our aim to avoid being involved in the re-establishment of the pre-war Indo-Franco relationship. To this end we sought to encourage the French to arrive at some modus vivendi with the area which would give recognition to the aspirations of the people for self-government. As the threat to the security of the area became more and more apparent, the need for agreement among the French and the three States was given even greater emphasis since it was our view that, in this area of growing Nationalism, the absence of such an agreement would make the area an untenable line of defense.

present situation

Since the establishment of the three States as independent entities, the U.S. has vigorously pursued a policy of granting military, political and economic assistance to the three Governments and military aid to the French Union Army operating in the defense of the area.

Our motivation has been two-fold:

(a) Security:

We have sought to bolster by all practicable means, the strength of the region as a bulwark against Communist infiltration.

The importance of this area to U.S. security and the resulting necessity for the U.S. position can be seen from the following points:

1. The area is one in which conditions of actual warfare exist;

2. Military estimates agree that Tonkin is the tactical keystone to control of Indochina while Indochina is similarly the tactical entry into Southeast Asia;

3. The Viet Minh makes frequent and specific references in its own public statements to both its formal and working connections with world Communism; accordingly, it is not representative of a Nationalistic movement in its usual sense. Additionally, the threat of Communist China to the region and to Southeast Asia as a whole is of extremely serious proportions;

4. Should Indochina be occupied by Communist dominated forces, whether composed of indigenous Communists operating under the cloak of Nationalism or as a result of overt invasion from Communist China, it is doubtful if Thailand and Burma could long maintain themselves as non-Communist Governments;

5. There is no question in the opinions of qualified observers that the withdrawal of the hard core of French Union forces from Indochina in the near future would result in a collapse of the three State Governments and the early formation of Communist dominated Governments in their stead;

6. Communist domination of Southeast Asia would greatly enhance the military capability of Communist armies in other parts of the world through the accession of 70% of the world’s natural rubber supply, 50% of the world’s tin supply and the control over the only source of food (rice) available to feed the food deficit countries of Asia.

(b) Recognition of the Nationalism of the Area:

Concomitantly, however, we have sought to strengthen the three Governments as independent entities both as to their internal structure and as to their relationships with the rest of the Free World. To this end, we have encouraged the French to transfer increasing responsibility to the three Governments; we have encouraged any steps which would result in political, economic and social reforms within the Governments; we have encouraged the participation of the three States in international organizations; and we have urged recognition of the three States by other nations. In this connection, the three States have been recognized by over thirty nations; they belong to several organs of the UN and their applications for UN membership have been submitted.

We have noted, in this connection, that the status of the area as a part of the French Union has been defined by the French as not a rigid one and the French Minister of the Associated States stated in a press conference that the French Union is not a prison and that membership in it is voluntary.

1. Circulated to the Working Group under cover of Doc. CP D–11, Aug. 26, 1952 (the fifth of five attachments).
2. For documentation on Indochina, see volume xiii .