711.022/5–1352
Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Dependent Area Affairs and in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs
- Subject:
- EUR memorandum on “U.S. policy towards colonial areas and colonial powers”
The EUR memorandum on U.S. colonial policy, in brief, takes the position that although our long-term interests require us to maintain a sympathetic attitude toward the aspirations of dependent peoples, our short-term security interests require us to give “full cooperation to the colonial (NATO) powers” and that we should explain this dilemma to the American people.
The particular arguments in support of this position are based upon the existence of the East-West conflict and include the following reasons:
- a.
- Full cooperation with the NATO colonial powers is essential to U.S. security because no others are able to make an effective contribution at this time,
- b.
- Less than “full cooperation” with the NATO countries might thwart their public opinion to a point where NATO might break up,
- c.
- Even if such a break-up were unlikely, failure to support our NATO allies’ colonial policy may create such strong anti-American feelings and resentment as to prevent effective cooperation,
- d.
- That “unqualified support for dependent peoples by the United States” would not only cause a serious rift in NATO but might bring about withdrawal of certain powers,
- e.
- That by the U.S. fostering “premature independence” we definitely play into Communist hands, and
- f.
- That since we cannot “outbid the Soviet Union for the affections of the extremist elements in the dependent territories”, we can not hope to convince these elements that America is more than “a little better” than the European colonial nations.
The EUR memorandum concludes that “our best interests as well as common sense should lead us to pursue the same policy which we have sought to follow for many years—to assist loyally and frankly both parties in the colonial dialogue along the road toward the political autonomy of all peoples on a basis of true democracy and enlightened self-interest of the people as a whole towards the disappearance of colonial bonds”.
UNA agrees with the conclusion. However, the body of the memorandum appears inconsistent with this conclusion and, in effect, urges a short-term policy which seems to us directly contrary to the conclusion. In fact, the argumentation in the memorandum raises in our minds the basic question whether it would not be short-sighted to elevate our immediate NATO interests so far above other considerations, [Page 1112] and whether such a policy would not, in the long run, weaken the free world’s ability to resist aggression.
The memorandum does not adequately analyze the need to harmonize our NATO interests and obligations with the global security interests of the United States, including our interests in the United Nations. A policy of unqualified support of the colonial powers as advocated in the EUR memorandum would alienate hundreds of millions of newly independent peoples who are fundamentally opposed to colonialism. Such a policy manifestly encourages the formation of a “third force” and might even lead these nations to identify themselves with the Communist cause. The virtually inexhaustible manpower and other resources of these nations constitute a tremendous military potential; we should ponder the effect upon our security if this potential should be denied to us or added to the power of the Soviet Union. Such a stark possibility must be averted in our wider interest.
The United Nations is the best instrument we have to maintain the cohesion of the entire free world. The United Nations provides a forum where a discussion may work as a safety valve and assist in reaching agreement for the progressive advancement of the dependent peoples. In the United Nations we are trying to mobilize the support of the Arab-Asian nations for our policy of opposing Communist aggression anywhere in the world.
Although the Security Council is severely hampered by the conflict between Communism and the free world, the General Assembly has been able to maintain action in Korea and, through its “Uniting for Peace” resolution has attempted to prepare itself for any future action which may be needed against aggression. Such United Nations action could not be taken—action in Korea could not have been taken—without the support and approbation of a significant majority of the non-colonial powers which are Members of the United Nations.
We cannot on one hand deny these nations an opportunity to discuss the problems in which they have a vital interest and on the other hand expect their support of our policies.
Colonial issues can poison the atmosphere not only in the United Nations but it can poison the atmosphere of bilateral and multilateral negotiations outside the United Nations where the cooperation of these nations is essential.
On the one hand, the EUR memorandum advises “full cooperation with the NATO colonial powers”. But if this means almost complete identification with their colonial policies and practices, even when these are repressive in nature, as they sometimes are, it is asking more than public opinion generally, even controlling public and Congressional opinion in the United States, would be able to accept. It is part of our difficult task to hold United States opinion together, as well as to influence our NATO colonial allies to follow a course which will [Page 1113] not only not alienate the rest of the world but will not alienate opinion in the United States as well. NATO requires as much support by public opinion in the United States as by public opinion in Western Europe. NATO will be in danger if the people of the United States and the large sectors of the liberal opinion of Western Europe should conclude that NATO is an old-fashioned alliance designed to maintain the status quo at any cost. Moreover, if the present policy of NATO colonial powers leads to continued crises, our immediate NATO interest in the colonial areas would be impaired and our allies administering these areas would be weakened by their efforts to deal with such crises.
On the other hand, the memorandum advises against “unqualified support of the dependent peoples”. With this UNA fully agrees, for the same basic reason referred to above. This argument is indeed unnecessary since at no time has U.S. policy given such unqualified support. Many of the demands made by extreme elements in the colonial territories, and particularly by their self-appointed sponsors in the United Nations, are wholly impracticable and therefore inacceptable. The colonial relationship, whatever its historic antecedents, we believe is still in many places useful and necessary. The United States itself maintains such a relationship, and we must be prepared to defend it while constantly improving it and moving as rapidly as may be feasible toward its liquidation through the attainment of self-government (as in the case of Puerto Rico),1 and, in suitable circumstances, to independence (as in the case of the Philippines). On this fundamental and basic American concept of colonial policy there can be no marked deviation either in favor of our NATO allies or of our anti-colonial colleagues in the United Nations.
UNA also considers that the “time” factor in the progress of dependent peoples toward self-government is a delicate matter of great importance. The EUR memorandum refers at one point to “a long period of years”, and at another point to “half a century” as a time when self-government might be achieved. We do not believe that it is sound to generalize on this point. Experience has shown that every case must be judged on its own merits. The trend is for dependent territories to achieve self-government before many people believe they are “ready” for it. And its seems likely that this trend will accelerate in the future. The idea of preventing peoples from achieving self-government until they are “ready” for it is a dangerous idea. What the colonial powers need to do is to concentrate on speeding up the political training and economic and social advancement of dependent peoples so that they will have some capacity for governing themselves well when they do achieve self-government. Whether or not the United States should actively press the colonial powers to take such steps, we [Page 1114] would make a bad mistake by giving these powers “full cooperation” in any other policy.
The United States is thus bound to follow a difficult middle course which may in particular cases make us unpopular with both extremes. This means that we may support the colonial group or the anti-colonial group or we may decline to take a position, depending on the particular circumstances in each case. But the wisdom of this course is apparent to moderate opinion and will become apparent in wider circles if it is properly explained in high level statements.
Full cooperation with our NATO colonial allies cannot be a one-way street. The United States has sought and should continue to seek a basic understanding with our British, French and Belgian colleagues on the colonial question. But such an understanding cannot begin with the premise of accepting their position without qualification. The United States should urge upon them the wisdom of granting freedom of choice to their colonial peoples at a stage early enough to be psychologically advantageous. The British have very nearly learned this lesson and have practiced it successfully in India and more recently in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria.2 It is the French and Belgians who do not wish at any moment to recognize a point where their colonial tributaries might choose to break away from the metropole. It is this mistaken position which is causing the difficulty.
“Premature independence” obviously is as bad as over-due autonomy. And experience has shown that Communism thrives on delayed and repressive colonial policy as much as on premature independence movements. The U.S. should condone or encourage neither. Above all, the U.S. should avoid the danger of such a close identification with reactionary colonial policies that liberal opinion in the world will no longer be influenced by our leadership. Such liberal opinion exists in Britain, France, and Belgium, as well as in India, Thailand, the Philippines, Mexico and the United States. These liberals are today anti-Communist, and it is to our interest that they should remain so.
It is quite true that we cannot outbid the Soviets on colonial questions for the “affections of the extremist elements in the dependent territories”. No such attempt has ever been made. However, it is also true that responsible elements in most dependent areas recognize the difference in motivation between the Soviets and the United States. In the United Nations, the most vocal anti-colonial powers, who have considerable influence on colonial movements, have up until now largely ignored Soviet overtures. In fact, one of the chief objectives of the Arab-Asian group in the United Nations has been to obtain [Page 1115] U.S. support.3 It is therefore again to our self-interest to see that elements, now in control of colonial nationalist movements, are not usurped by the extremists under the pressure of repressive colonialism.
For these reasons, UNA does not believe that either our short-term or long-term interests would be served by following the argumentation suggested in the EUR memorandum. It is of the highest importance for the U.S. and for the free world generally, in this critical period, to urge the freedom-loving colonial powers to repeat what in their best and most enlightened periods they have practiced in the past, namely, to accept a freely chosen partnership with their colonies based on democratic principles. And this can only be achieved when the “inalienable rights” of colonial peoples are fully respected.