310.393/6–1553: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
6465. For the Secretary. In accordance with your instructions in Deptel 5985, I saw Bidault this afternoon. He expressed his acute embarrassment at governmental situation which forced him to receive an American Ambassador at a time when he could not speak with full authority for the French Government.
Regarding the substance of reftel, he said that he was sure that no French Government would take any unilateral decision on the subject of Chinese representation in the UN prior to the Bermuda conference, and he could guarantee that no such action would be taken as long as he had any influence on French foreign policy. He said that he had not been giving any time to detailed questions of foreign policy for the last ten days or so and did not want to make any detailed commitments. However, his own view was that the question of Communist Chinese representation in the UN should only come up as one of the questions to be considered by a broad Asiatic conference which would naturally follow a four-power conference. He did not give any details as to how he thought such an Asiatic conference should be constituted. He thought the situation in Indochina would obviously require such a meeting. All this, however, could be and would be discussed at the Bermuda conference as undoubtedly the question would be raised there by Churchill.
He said that Mendès-France’s idea on Indochina was to tell the US at Bermuda: “We can no longer carry the burden in Indochina. What do you want to do about it?” This, he pointed out, was exactly similar to the British action in Greece some years ago. He said that he had opposed this Mendès-France policy with all his strength as being dishonorable, and he will continue to oppose any such policy. He pointed out that he personally had been responsible for preventing Robert Schuman from granting French recognition to Mao three years ago.
He closed by asking that I tell the Secretary for him that he would not continue in his present position in the next French Government unless there were full assurances of the continuity of French policy both in Indochina and in support of NATO objectives, including EDC, and that he would not support any government that would not give such assurances.