Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

IO files, SD/A/C.5/178/Rev. 1

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the General Assembly

confidential

[Washington,] October 6, 1952.

Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the UN:

Report of the Committee on Contributions (A/2161)

the problem

It is the objective of the United States to obtain a reduction of its assessed share of the regularly budgeted expenses of the United Nations to not to exceed one-third of total assessments.

The United Nations Committee on Contributions has recommended a reduction for the United States of 1.78 percentage points (from 36.90% for 1952 to 35.12% for 1953). The Committee recommends smaller reductions for 25 other States including a reduction of 0.26 for the United Kingdom. At the same time, an increase is recommended for the USSR (together with Byelorussia and the Ukraine) of 2.85 percentage points, an increase of 0.22 for Poland, and minor increases for 7 other States.

The reduction recommended for the United States is exactly one-half the remaining distance downward to the goal of 33⅓%. As to the other states, the Committee indicates that it is proposing corrections of about one-half the amounts of under- and over-assessment indicated by the data on capacity to pay. The Committee suggests further that unless new disturbing factors develop during the next year, the remainder of the adjustments for the United States and for the other states involved may be in prospect for 1954.

recommendations

1. The United States Delegation should attempt to secure a reduction in the United States percentage share to 33⅓% for 1953. It should take the position that the principle of a ⅓ ceiling, recognized by the General Assembly in 1948, has been implemented all too slowly up to this point; that the special reductions granted in the beginning to certain war-devastated states have long since ceased to be justified in the face of the economic recovery experienced by these states; and that a full implementation of the ⅓ ceiling at this time can be carried through without working an undue hardship on any other state. At the same time the Delegation should acknowledge the efforts of the Contributions Committee in attempting to formulate a generally acceptable report.

2. If it should become clear that the United States cannot obtain a reduction to 33⅓% for 1953, and if in the opinion of the Delegation further United States effort in this direction would run the risk of a complete overthrow of the Contributions Committee’s report with the resultant loss of the 1953 reduction recommended for the United States and of the basis for a reduction to one-third next year, the Delegation should so report to the Department and seek further instructions.

comment

The scale of contributions for 1953 recommended by the United Nations Committee on Contributions continues the trend of adjustment that last year characterized the Committee’s recommendations for 1952. The proposed adjustments are as follows:

Country	official scale for 1952 percent	Recom. scale for 1953 percent	Change percent
Argentina	1. 62	1. 45	−0. 17
Australia	1. 77	1. 75	−0. 02
Belgium	1. 35	1. 37	+0. 02
Brazil	1. 62	1. 45	−0. 17
Burma	0. 15	0. 13	−0. 02
Byelorussian SSR	0. 34	0. 43	+0. 09
Canada	3. 35	3. 30	−0. 05
Chile	0. 35	0. 33	−0. 02
China	5. 75	5. 62	−0. 13
Colombia	0. 37	0. 35	−0. 02
Cuba	0. 33	0. 34	+0. 01
Denmark	0. 79	0. 78	−0. 01
Ecuador	0. 05	0. 04	−0. 01
Egypt	0. 60	0. 50	−0. 10
Greece	0. 18	0. 19	+0. 01
India	3. 53	3. 45	−0. 08
Iran	0. 40	0. 33	−0. 07
Iraq	0. 14	0. 12	−0. 02
Lebanon	0. 06	0. 05	−0. 01
Mexico	0. 65	0. 70	+0. 05
Netherlands	1. 27	1. 25	−0. 02
New Zealand	0. 50	0. 48	−0. 02
Peru	0. 20	0. 18	−0. 02
Philippines	0. 29	0. 39	+0. 10
Poland	1. 36	1. 58	+0. 22
Saudi Arabia	0. 08	0. 07	−0. 01
Sweden	1. 73	1. 65	−0. 08
Syria	0. 09	0. 08	−0. 01
Thailand	0. 21	0. 18	−0. 03
Turkey	0. 75	0. 65	−0. 10
Ukrainian SSR	1. 30	1. 63	+0. 33
Un. So. Africa	0. 90	0. 83	−0. 07
USSR	9. 85	12. 28	+2. 43
United Kingdom	10. 56	10. 30	−0. 26
United States	36. 90	35. 12	−1. 78
Venezuela	0. 32	0. 35	+0. 03
Yugoslavia	0. 43	0. 44	+0. 01

It was foreseen last year that further substantial increases were in store for the USSR, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Poland which states had continued all too long to benefit from the initial dispensation which had been granted them in 1946 on account of their war devastation and the serious financial problems they then faced. Since 1946, economic conditions in Eastern Europe have improved greatly, leaving these states grossly underassessed. The present report of the Contributions Committee indicates that the increase recommended for the Soviet States for 1953 amounts to approximately one-half of the remaining increase for those states indicated by the statistical data. The proposed assessment for the USSR (including Byelorussia and the Ukraine) for 1953 represented an increase over 1952 of 25%. The increase a year ago was 40% over 1951.

The proposed increases for Belgium, Cuba, Greece, Mexico, Philippines, Venezuela and Yugoslavia are relatively small and reflect improvement in the economic positions of these countries. All but Belgium, Greece, and the Philippines were increased also for 1952 at the last Assembly.

The proposed decreases for Canada, New Zealand and Sweden are in acknowledgment of the principle enunciated by the Third General Assembly that no state should pay a higher per capita contribution than the per capita contribution of the country paying the highest assessment. As the US percentage assessment decreases, this per capita limitation comes to apply to a limited number of states with particularly high living standards. The Contributions Committee indicates that in spite of the proposed reductions, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden will be paying a somewhat higher per capita contribution than the United States in 1953. Iceland’s contribution also exceeds the United States in this respect, but Iceland already pays only the minimum.

Many of the remaining reductions are due to the fact that the Committee decided to permit a somewhat heavier allowance for countries with low per capita income. The Committee took this action pursuant to Resolution 582 (VI) which had requested it to give particular attention to the assessments of such countries.

As regards the proposed reduction of the United States contribution to 35.12%, the Committee states that this is “another major step toward a ceiling of 33⅓% for the largest contributor”. This reduction is one-half the distance to the one-third level for the United States, and the Committee indicates that it is proceeding also at approximately the same rate in removing “maladjustments” in the contributions of other member states arising from under- and over-assessment on the basis of capacity to pay. Further, the Committee states that, in the absence of new disturbing factors, it should be possible a year hence to remove the remaining major divergencies and to propose the establishment of a more permanent scale for 1954.

The United States Congress attached to the Department of State’s Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1952 the following proviso:

“No representative of the United States Government in any international organization hereafter shall make any commitment requiring the appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33⅓ per centum of the budget of any international organization for which the appropriation for the United States contribution is contained in this Act: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances necessitating a contribution by the United States in excess of 33⅓ per centum of the budget, a commitment requiring a United States appropriation of a larger proportion may be made after consultation by United States representatives in the organization or other appropriate officials of the Department of State with the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to the United States representatives to the Inter-American organizations.…”

The Congress attached a proviso also to the State Department’s Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1953 as follows:

“No representative of the United States Government in any international organization after fiscal year 1953 shall make any commitment requiring the appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33⅓ percent of the budget of any international organization for which the appropriation for the United States contribution is contained in this Act: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to the United States representatives to the inter-American organizations.…”

[This letter proviso clearly applies only to commitments made after June 30, 1953 (the end of fiscal year 1953).]¹ It is the view of the Department that the commitment of the United States to pay its duly assessed share was undertaken in 1945 when this Government ratified the United Nations Charter and is not a product of the vote of the United States on the UN budget or scale of contributions. In abstaining on the contributions scale vote in the plenary last year the US Delegate, Representative John Vorys, stated, “We believe, however, that the principle adopted in 1948 should now be applied and any commitment of the United States to contribute more than 33⅓ percent will be based on the provisions of the Charter, not on the vote of the United States representatives.” However, the Department wishes to make every effort to achieve its established objective of a one-third assessment and to satisfy the clearly expressed desire of Congress in this regard without delay. Therefore, the United States Delegation should press for the full reduction for the United States to 33⅓% at once.

The Delegation should point out that in the four years since the one-third ceiling principle was accepted by the 1948 General Assembly, the implementation of the principle has been extremely slow and the United States contribution has been reduced in that time by only 3 percentage points. The Delegation should point out further that certain other member states are still enjoying the benefit of special reductions granted originally on account of war-damage and dislocation although today these states have an economic out-put that is even larger than pre-war.

The United States has recently made high-level diplomatic approaches to other member governments, presenting the United States case for a reduction at once to 33⅓% along the general lines set forth above. The responses of the governments approached are still being reported and an analysis of them will be made available to the Delegation at an early date. With the evidence furnished by these responses, the Delegation should undertake extensive discussions with other delegations to gain support for the United States position before it is formally stated in committee.

A reduction of the United States share to 33⅓% would entail consequential adjustments for certain other members, including further reductions for Canada, New Zealand and Sweden if the per capita limitation is to be applied. The application of such adjustments is an intricate matter and the United States Delegation should leave to other delegations the initiative as to the procedure to be followed. The United States Delegation should, however, give favorable consideration to the calling of a special session of the Contributions Committee during the course of the Assembly to draw up an amended scale, if this action is proposed.

If the states subject to the per capita limitation should be unwilling to waive at this time their claim to further reduction, the United States Delegation should support their move for such reduction. Although the per capita limitation is not an altogether satisfactory rule in practice, the United States is morally bound to support it if the benefiting states insist, since the United States in 1948 accepted the inclusion of the per capita limitation as a necessary condition in gaining acceptance of the one-third ceiling principle.

As stated under “Recommendations”, if it should become clear that the United States cannot obtain a reduction to 33⅓% for 1953, and if in the opinion of the Delegation further United States effort in this direction would run the risk of a complete overthrow of the Contributions Committee’s report with the resultant loss of the 1953 reduction recommended for the United States and of the basis for a reduction to one-third next year, the Delegation should so report to the Department and seek further instructions.

1. Brackets in the source text.