A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, “UNA/P master file”
Paper Prepared by the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs
XI–1
Inter-Relationships of International Organizations in Non-Political Fields
character of issue
Since the end of World War II the US has pursued a number of different paths in the field of international economic and social policy. It has been our stated objective to develop well-coordinated multilateral policies for the achievement of our purposes in these areas. To ensure consistency and economy, we have avowedly favored coordinating these policies through the UN. We have applied the same principles to the coordination of economic and social programs within the UN structure itself.
During the same period we have also supported the assumption, by regional and special-purpose organizations outside the UN, of certain economic and social responsibilities which in practice overlap those of the UN.
Without prejudice to the validity of purpose which led us to three different paths—centralization through the UN, regionalism, or ad hoc solutions—a serious issue is nonetheless posed by the widening gap between doctrine and practice in our efforts to achieve consistent and coordinated international economic and social policies.
Given the results of the three different approaches—i.e. the existence of a heterogeneous pattern of UN and non-UN organizations in the economic and social field—a second level of problems arises in day-today operations. This includes such questions as: how to exert constructive influence through various organizations; how to achieve consistent US policies in various organizations; how to avoid unnecessary international bureaucratic structure and attendant vested interests; how to mediate between those vested interests on the one hand and requirements of efficiency on the other; how to avoid inefficient competition, overlapping jurisdiction, and duplication among international organizations; how to keep the international structure responsive to changing needs and requirements; and how to justify to Congress and the public the diversity and apparent diffusion of effort to which we are a responsible party.
These problems appear in relationships: a) between the UN and regional organizations, b) among agencies within the UN system, and c) between UN agencies and non-UN technical and specific purpose [Page 164] agencies. Because there are significant differences in the particular manner in which they arise, these three types of relationships are described separately below.
A. Relations of UN with General or Multipurpose Non-UN International (Regional) Organizations
1. Problem
The most difficult problem of relationships among international organizations involves the general purpose regional organizations, independent of or nominally related to the UN, including OAS, NATO, OEEC, the Arab League, Council of Europe, and ANZUS machinery, if it is created. Most of such organizations have been created primarily for general political or security purposes, but there is a persistent tendency to expand their functions into economic and social fields, which has resulted in overlapping jurisdiction and competition with UN bodies and some lack of coordination of policies and operations both among international organizations and within member governments.
2. Background
Several of these regional organizations have been created and others have expanded since the establishment of the UN. The overlapping responsibilities are particularly marked between the UN regional organizations such as ECE and ECLA and the non-UN regional organizations in the same fields such as OEEC and IA–ECOSOC. OAS, the largest of the organizations which antedates the UN, was reorganized in Bogota in 1948, with many of its economic and social functions being increased (although this development has been handicapped by lack of funds and experience). NATO and OEEC were both created under US instigation. By its very nature OEEC overlaps with ECE, both being concerned with European economic problems. Within re cent years there has been considerable pressure in NATO to extend its economic and social functions. The Council of Europe is also broadening its economic and social operations.
3. US Policies
US policies toward the proper location or division of responsibility in this field are not clear and seem to follow the direction of betting on all horses or of treating questions on an ad hoc basis without thorough consideration of the effect on overall policy. In many instances yielding to various pressures the US has supported the expansion of economic and social activities in the regional organizations, e.g., OAS and OEEC, while at the same time supporting expansions in the UN system but without consideration of the longer term disadvantages or difficulties such parallel expansion might yield.
[Page 165]4. Difficulties Facing the US
It may be possible for us to achieve in regional organizations results not attainable in a more universal structure because the regional organization was designed to deal with relatively concrete and immediate economic problems in a restricted context. OEEC undoubtedly has been able to accomplish results which ECE could not have because of Soviet membership, e.g., establishing plans to increase and allocate Western European coal production. But the same cannot be said of other organizations, and overlapping jurisdiction often results in excessive duplication of effort not commensurate with the results attained. For instance, general conferences of ECLA and IA–ECOSOC may cover the same problems without any particular advantage from separate discussions, e.g., the discussions of price parities on exports and imports, in both organizations. The assumption by regional organizations of economic and social functions also has a tendency to encourage regional bloc psychology and voting in the UN on these issues as well as on political issues, e.g., in the ECOSOC resolution on financing of economic development. When the same problems are being discussed in various organizations there is also a difficulty of coordinating our own policy, inasmuch as different agencies of the Government carry varying degrees of influence in preparing policy toward various organizations. Finally, the fact that other governments frequently do not take a consistent line in different international organizations makes the achievement of US goals more difficult.
5. Implications for UN System
Insofar as the regional organizations develop strong programs in the economic and social field and receive relatively large amounts of money to carry those programs out, UN prestige and UN influence are correspondingly diminished. This is particularly true if the attention of the responsible officials in an important government such as the United States is directed primarily to regional organizations rather than to the UN. ECOSOC, which was intended as a world forum in which multilateral economic and social problems could be worked out, has little influence over non-UN organizations and is nonproductive to the extent to which the principal efforts in this field are carried on outside the UN. If projected into the future, the development of regional economic and social programs outside the UN system might result in a virtual abdication of many of ECOSOC’s functions. Another observable effect on the UN system is in some instances a tendency to regionalize activities of UN agencies primarily in order to meet the competition of regional organizations. This is particularly notable at present in the ILO.
[Page 166]6. The situation is one of a progressive tendency on the part of non-UN organizations to increase their economic and social functions and a corresponding diffusion of effort and lack of coordinated approach.
B. Relations Within the UN System between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies
1. Problem
The problem of pursuing an effective integrated economic and social policy within the United Nations system is a product of the autonomy of the specialized agencies, the occasional overlapping of jurisdiction among various agencies, and the limited authority of the UN to exert stronger coordination or more effective supervision. This has resulted, in some instances, in unproductive competition among agencies to handle the same programs and in diminished ability of the UN system to meet current problems quickly.
2. Background
From the beginning, the UN system in the economic and social fields has been conceived as a series of inter-related but autonomous agencies, each created to deal with fairly well defined functional areas of activity. The United Nations is generally regarded as the political body, and the other agencies as technical coordinate arms.
Under Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC may, on behalf of the UN, enter into agreements with the specialized agencies and may coordinate their activities through consultation and recommendations and request reports on the implementation of its recommendations. Agreements have been reached with the specialized agencies which affirm their intention of cooperating in making coordination effective and in carrying out the provisions relating to ECOSOC’s responsibility for specialized agencies. UN administrative machinery has been set up to oversee the coordination process.
While the UN, through ECOSOC, thus has responsibility for coordination, it has only recommendatory authority. The relationship between the UN and the Specialized Agencies has been the subject of considerable controversy, with the United States considering the UN as the parent body responsible for setting guide lines for the agencies, and the United Kingdom, for example, insisting that since the UN and all the agencies have equal and independent status, UN’s coordinating role is limited.
In the administrative field, while much remains to be accomplished, there has been a fair degree of coordination between the UN and the Specialized Agencies. This has been due to the fact that they all have some common problems for which they find it mutually advantageous to work out common solutions. The United States, United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries have taken a strong lead in all these agencies to reduce administrative overhead costs and eliminate interagency competition through uniformity. These efforts in cooperation [Page 167] with the heads of agencies, through the Administrative Coordination Committee, have produced a joint pension system, common salary and allowance system, common financial and staff regulations, provision of services on a reciprocal basis, and the adoption of other common administrative practices.
However, the autonomy and physical separation of these agencies has necessitated the establishment in each of administrative management machinery, resulting in parallel administrative operations and expenditures. In addition to increasing the total administrative overhead in international organizations, each organization can thereby build up machinery which contributes to the power of the secretariat effectively to influence government representatives to support policies originating in the secretariat. The most significant outcome is unrelenting pressure that often results in ever-increasing budgets.
3. United States Policies
The US has supported the policy of decentralization of functions in order that technical programs could be carried forward expeditiously with a minimum of red tape and political controversy. At the same time, however, the US has been interested in seeing that available resources are allocated effectively. Toward that end, major US policies in ECOSOC have aimed at: the development of the coordination machinery of ECOSOC; effective concentration of effort and resources; and the establishment of priorities in the economic and social field. All these have been designed to strengthen the role of ECOSOC vis-à-vis the Specialized Agencies.
With a strong lead from us, the GA and ECOSOC have increasingly been reviewing the general program, administrative, and budget policies throughout the UN system with a view to better coordination of effort. This trend has been strengthened by having the Technical Assistance Fund maintained by the UN, which we strongly favored. While initially the Fund was arbitrarily divided up among the various agencies with each agency largely controlling the expenditure of its share, the US has been urging greater central control so that funds are allocated on the basis of the relative merits of projects rather than on the basis of agency claims and pressures.
4. Difficulties Facing the United States
The implementation of ECOSOC recommendations within the Specialized Agencies is often hampered because other governments do not take consistent positions, even when these policies have been supported by the same governments in ECOSOC. (It is also sometimes difficult to execute our own avowed policy of coordination because the interest of certain other US government agencies in relatively greater autonomy for the Specialized Agencies with whose subject matter they have a primary concern).
[Page 168]The relative influence of the US also varies from agency to agency, particularly where other governments have a particular interest in an agency, such as the UK in the ILO, and this contributes to the difficulty of carrying into actual operation the recommendations of ECOSOC. The requirement of, in effect, a second governmental review affords vested interest in the various international Secretariats opportunities to build backfires against policies which they may not approve. Insofar as there is overlapping of competence among agencies or duplication of functions, the US also bears its proportionate share of the additional expense.
5. Implication for United Nations
The chief difficulty for ECOSOC in coordinating the activities of UN’s semi-autonomous affiliates is that while it undertakes full scale debate, and decision on policies in the broad field of economic and social matters is possible, its decisions must go through a second intergovernmental review at the specialized agency level, thus also tending to encourage inter-secretariat frictions and jurisdictional problems between the various specialized agencies and with the UN.
While there has been a fair degree of administrative coordination until now between the UN and the specialized agencies, program coordination continues to be a difficult problem.
So far as the basic principle of autonomy is concerned, an advantage in having separate structures for the Specialized Agencies is the fact that the USSR and the Satellites do not, as a general rule, take part. This has freed the agencies from some of the political difficulties we encounter in the UN. However, it has also proved possible to do this within the UN itself, as the experiences of UNKRA and UNWRAP indicates.
6. Some measure of success has attended these efforts and if it proves possible through centralized secretariat and governmental control, to improve, in general, the quality and organization of services which international organizations are rendering to governments, the implications for the regular operations of the various agencies should be examined.
C. Relation of UN with Non-UN Specific Purpose Organizations
1. Problem
The problem in this area is similar to that of the relationships between the UN and its specialized agencies, with the added factors that: the UN has no authority over the non-UN agencies; there may exist simultaneous jurisdiction or overlapping jurisdiction between these bodies and UN agencies. Where important functions are primarily undertaken by non-UN agencies, there is little opportunity for adequate integration of these activities with other economic and social activities being carried on within the UN system.
[Page 169]2. Background
The most important examples of the non-UN specific purpose organizations are ICEM, GATT and the International Materials Conference. ECOSOC documents E/2361 and E/2361/Add 1, February 4, 1953, lists 52 such organizations, most of them highly technical. Most of these were created prior to the establishment of the UN and many of them are not participated in by the US. A number of them are also quite limited in membership or in geographic scope.
3. United States Policies
While there is a general policy to oppose the proliferation of international organizations, and a presumption that specific purpose organizations with widespread membership should be created within the UN structure, US practice has not always followed the policy. The most important of the non-UN organizations of this type—ICEM, GATT, and the International Materials Conference—were all created outside the UN under UN initiative. (GATT was created after it became apparent that the ITO, within the UN structure, would not become a reality because the US Senate was not going to ratify its Charter. ICEM was created outside the UN after the US Congress passed legislation preventing the use of US funds by a UN agency for the migration function which ICEM performs (although the ILO had prepared plans for the assumption of these functions). The International Materials Conference was established outside the UN as a commodity allocations group among the most directly concerned Western nations.
4. Difficulties Facing the United States
These agencies are carrying out significant functions which for our own political reasons we did not feel able to further through the UN, although theoretically this was possible. However, in all three instances their existence outside the UN structure makes it much more difficult to prevent competitive and uncoordinated action, although the latter represents our general policy in international organizations. The competition among the ILO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and ICEM concerning their respective policies and programs involving refugees and migration exemplifies the difficulty created by parallel and overlapping responsibilities.
5. Implications for Role of United Nations
Inasmuch as the Economic and Social Council has competence to deal with the broad field of economic and social matters it is difficult to maintain a consistent approach to these matters when important responsibilities are placed completely outside its purview. Either the UN must play a minimal role in such an area, in which case it gives up functions we have encouraged it to assume; or it continues to attempt to deal with them, with a resultant tendency to duplication of activities. In either case, if the financial resources and primary attentions [Page 170] of governments are directed outside, the UN loses a considerable amount of prestige.
6. There is a discernible tendency to rely on the establishment of non-UN agencies to meet special needs.