Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, “UNA/P master file”

Paper Prepared by the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs

confidential
X–1

[Washington, undated.]

International Secretariats

character of the issue

The international organizations which have developed since World War II are served by secretariats whose relationships to national governments have posed major problems for the United States. Some have been posed in terms of the political neutrality of the secretariat as an institution. Others have centered on the question of the loyalty to this country of US nationals employed on the secretariats. The philosophy which this nation adopted at the outset toward the role of the secretariats and their personnel has been significantly affected by the bipolarization of the world in the Cold War; current problems of individual loyalties have thrown into relief the fundamental issues which are involved. The two principal issues are taken up separately below:

A. Role of the Secretariat

1. Statement of Issue

The basic question regarding the role and functions of the secretariats is whether they should act only at the official direction of the political bodies representing the member governments, or whether they should have latitude for the exercise of independent initiative. The conflict for us is between a) our desire to create in the secretariats effective and vigorous instruments to forward the objectives of the organizations, and b) our displeasure with abuses which arise when secretariats assume excessive initiative. As a practical proposition, we are somewhat caught between a) our desire to minimize undesirable initiatives sponsored by unfriendly or irresponsible governments, which tend to encourage excessive secretariat initiative, and b) our own encouragement of certain initiatives by secretariat employees on our behalf, to serve immediate interests which we feel to be at stake.

2. Background

While constitutional provisions vary from agency to agency, the international secretariats were in general conceived as agents of the organizations’ governing bodies composed of member states. But certain circumstances have made it possible for the secretariats to exercise an increasingly effective influence over program development. This is especially true of the specialized agencies, such as UNESCO and WHO, which do not have governmental review boards meeting between conferences. The factors responsible for this trend are: a) the existence of rather well-defined and continuous institutional objectives or purposes which the secretariat can promote independently, b) strong personal leadership on the part of the secretary or the director-general, c) infrequency of and shortness of meetings of governmental bodies, d) lack of coordination of national policy from international agency to international agency, particularly with respect to the smaller nations, but generally a problem except in the Anglo-American bloc, e) inability of many governments to cope with the great volume of reports and papers prepared by the secretariats on issues before the Assemblies or Conference, with the result that often their delegations are neither briefed nor instructed on these issues and are easy prey to the lobbying of members of the Secretariat who are skilled in playing upon prejudices, ambitions and hopes, f) the fact that the US and others have actively encouraged the agencies’ executive officers to take the initiative in promoting policies which we or others deem desirable and which have greater chance of success if not openly sponsored by the US.

3. United States Policies

For obvious reasons the US plays a role of primus inter pares in many international organizations. Beyond this, however, because we have the heaviest financial interest which can only be served through close attention to financial, personnel, and administrative matters in all agencies, we have taken a strong leadership role on organizational questions in the Assemblies and Conferences, and in fact have found this responsibility to be inescapable even when it would be expedient to play a passive role.

4. Difficulties Facing the United States

In many cases, US policy has been furthered as a result of secretariat initiative, particularly on technical matters, both program and administrative, where American techniques excel, and where competent secretariat officials of US nationality have a major role in secretariat planning. Generally speaking, the US has been careful to avoid seeking to influence the thinking of its nationals on secretariats, but as a matter of course, many of them in important positions have maintained a close liaison with the US delegations to their organizations.

On the other hand, particularly in the Specialized Agencies, US policy, in an increasing number of cases, has run head-on into secretariat “policy”, often on matters of coordination between the UN agencies, and recently on the size of the agencies’ budgets. Other heavy financial contributors, such as the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth countries, and many Western European countries, are usually persuaded by the same arguments of logic and economy which move us. Support for secretariat requests for general budget increases and for specific programs which seem to us undesirable usually forms around delegations of countries such as India, Egypt, and other underdeveloped countries who desire the proposed services, distrust the US, and are seeking to establish their own prestige.

B. Conduct and Integrity of Staff Members

1. Statement of Issue

The paramount question of the moment in this field, the answers to which will doubtless affect significantly the broader issue, is: a) how to ensure that international organizations select employees whose qualifications and integrity, as judged by their country of nationality, meets a sufficiently high standard to maintain the confidence of that country in the organization as a whole; b) how to achieve this without sacrificing the degree of independence conferred on the administrative heads in the charters and constitutions of the various organizations, which characteristically enjoin them to appoint persons who will serve only the interests of the organizations as a whole and not the exclusive interests of any one government.

2. Background

Experience with the League of Nations secretariat led the large majority of governments^* to conclude in 1945 that the interests of the new international organizations, and thus the interest of all member states, would best be secured if the secretariat personnel were oriented to a postulated “general interest” rather than to the particular interests of individual member states. Consequently, the charters and constitutions of all the UN agencies placed the responsibility for selection of personnel with the chief administrative officer, and reflected the expectation that international officials were to discharge their functions and regulate their conduct in accordance with the “general interest” (of the international organization). Thus such officials were enjoined not to receive instructions from any government in the performance of their duties.

3. United States Policies

The US interpreted its obligations under the charters and constitutions of the various organizations as requiring it to follow a “hands-off” policy with regard to influencing the selection of personnel. In a few instances US officials informally supplied information and advice upon request, but the US scrupulously avoided governmental representations that might be regarded as pressure upon the agency heads.

By 1949 information reaching the Department of State indicated that in some instances US personnel appointed by the UN agencies had a record of Communist or Communist-front activities which cast grave reflection both on their basic loyalty to the US and on their integrity and ability to fulfill their fundamental obligations to serve the purposes and principles of the organization. Among the specialized agencies, UNESCO presented the major problem. Since UNESCO’s appointment procedures provide for consultation with member governments and national commissions on professional posts, the Department was able to advise it when it had derogatory information concerning US nationals considered for employment.

In the case of the UN, a secret arrangement was entered into whereby the Secretary General submitted the names of US nationals for a US “name check”, and the Department reported to the Secretary General on persons it believed to be Communist or under Communist discipline. As opportunity permitted, the Secretary General was to ease out persons so identified. This arrangement continued in operation in the UN until January 1953, at which time Executive Order 10422 was issued, following a reexamination of policy stimulated by various US investigations. This authorized arrangements to be made with the international organizations which would enable the US to conduct complete loyalty investigations on all US nationals employed or considered for employment in such agencies and report its findings to the head of the organization.

The problem of national “loyalty” is distinct from that of the impartiality of international civil servants. The latter, a matter of professional detachment in the presence of conflicting national interests and emotions, has been envisaged, since San Francisco, on the tacit assumption that international officials are generally people of good will, whose integrity as international servants is the outgrowth of loyal service in the national community.

The significance of the step recently taken by the US and the UN lay in the fact that while previously a “loyal” attitude of American employees—if not to the cause of international cooperation, at least to their homeland—was taken for granted, by the late 1940s awareness had become general that American communists must be suspected as potentially, if not actually disloyal to their country, and likely to engage in subversive activities; potentially hostile to international causes not dominated by communists; and without common bonds of public faith connecting them with the structure and fabric of their own society and environment or any society and environment dedicated to the preservation of peace.

The problem of communists was in the center of a general trend toward bipolarization of conflicts in the world and thus in the UN. In the face of this conflict, the force of United States opinion required that civic integrity be reaffirmed as the foundation for any attachment to a “general interest” symbolized by international organization.

The developing situation had by 1951 led the US to alter its original doctrine regarding international secretariats in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Here US nationals not only are security cleared, but are carried on the US foreign service rolls and loaned on a reimbursable basis to the organization. Within this limitation the Secretary-General nevertheless continues to exercise the powers of direction, hiring, and firing which are consistent with the executive power. One major purpose in making these particular arrangements for US nationals (they are not applied to other nationals) relates to the salary and taxation problems, discussed in a separate paper.

While NATO represents a special coalition of selected nations sharing a specific and common interest, the experience there will still to a certain extent enable us to judge whether the maintenance of such national employment ties results in any more partiality than we now expect on the part of Americans employed in other secretariats, and whether other member governments will conclude that secretariat employees with such formal ties also serve the general interest satisfactorily.

4. Recent Developments in the United Nations

The Secretary-General on October 20, 1952 appointed a Committee of Jurists^† who advised him: a) that the UN should not employ persons engaging or likely to engage in subversive activities against any member state, and b) that he had the power to fire persons on whom the preponderance of evidence convinces him that they fell into such a category. Likewise, c) he was advised not to retain persons who by invoking the Fifth Amendment on questions relating to subversion created doubt as to their fitness for public service. The Jurists strongly held that it was necessary for the power of decision in such matters to reside with the Secretary General, although they recommended that he appoint a panel of advisers to assist him in carrying out his responsibility.

The Secretary General reported to the second part of the 7th GA his intention of generally following these policies, and in the plenary debate the majority view was that the independence of the secretariat required that the Secretary General continue to exercise responsibility for selection of personnel without dictation from governments. There was also general acceptance of the policy that the Secretary General should refrain from employing anyone where the preponderance of evidence indicates that the person is engaging in activities aimed at subverting the government of a member state. In this connection, no government objected to the investigations the US is making under Executive Order 10422, regarding this as a matter between the US citizens and their government.

There was a wide variation of opinion regarding the policy to be followed by the Secretary General in (1) cases of refusal to testify before officially constituted national agencies investigating subversive activities, (2) cases where the derogatory information relates to conduct which is not such as to constitute evidence of present subversive activity but rather the “likelihood of engaging” in such activity. In addition, many delegations doubted the power of the Secretary General to take termination action in any case that fell short of serious misconduct. As a result of strenuous US efforts, the outcome of the debate was: (1) to defeat a 12-power resolution^‡ the effect of which would have been to deny the Secretary General power to take further action in accordance with his announced policy until the whole matter had been carefully reviewed by a small committee of the Assembly and considered by the Eighth Session, after receiving the report of such a committee; (2) to endorse a proposal of which the US was a co-sponsor that permits the Secretary General to proceed with implementation of his policy but requires him to report further developments to the Eighth Session and requests the comments thereon of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions after consultation with the Specialized Agencies.^§

5. Difficulties Facing the United States

US investigations and findings under the recent Executive Orders are related to the question of loyalty to the US Government. The UN and specialized agencies on the other hand are expected to apply a “subversive” standard which must have the same implications for nationals of all member countries.

There is little likelihood of any agency employing a US citizen against whom there is an adverse US “loyalty” finding. The US faces, however, the extremely difficult possibility that the heads of these agencies may, on the basis of their standards, decide to retain a present US employee who has failed to meet the US loyalty test. If we cannot accommodate ourselves to such a situation, if it should arise, we should probably be faced with major and possibly far-reaching policy decisions about our relationships with international organizations and their personnel.

At the 7th GA some other governments privately told us that while endorsing our principle that persons likely to engage in subversive activities should not be employed, they would favor the use of covert rather than overt means to implement it. This was in view of the extreme difficulties they foresaw in carrying out the program, in an organization composed of authoritarian and non-authoritarian states, in such a way as to permit the retention of Free Czechs, Poles, etc. It is apparent that the majority of member states, as indicated in their speeches, continue to attach great importance to maintaining the international character and independence of the Secretariat as the best means of furthering the objectives of the UN and its agencies.

6. Current Status

Arrangements under Executive Order 10422 of January 9, 1953, as amended by President Eisenhower by Executive Order 10459 of June 2, 1953, are well advanced. Forms setting forth the required information have been submitted by about 95% of the Americans on the international secretariats, and others are now being received. There are only 5 cases of UN nationals refusing to fill out the forms. The Department has approached all the organizations to secure informal assurances that they will not employ Americans until investigations have been completed, and satisfactory assurances have been received, with slight exception, from all international agency heads. The principal problem of the moment is that no adjudications are being undertaken pending establishment by the Civil Service Commission of the new review board provided for by Executive Order 10459.

While the Department is proceeding under the Executive Orders, a bill has been introduced in the Senate which would substitute legislation for the executive agreement approach. S. 3 would make it a criminal offense, under penalty of a $10,000 fine or 10 years imprisonment or both, for an American to accept employment with one of the UN agencies without first receiving a certificate of security clearance from the Attorney General. Americans now on the staffs would be subjected to a like penalty if they refused to supply information stipulated in the bill.

Both the Department of State and the Justice Department are on record as recommending that S. 3 not be enacted, on the argument that the Executive Order procedures should be given a fair trial. However, the measure has been approved by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and has been passed by the Senate on the consent calendar. The House Committee has not scheduled consideration of the measure, although Ambassador Lodge has talked informally with its leaders. It is believed quite likely that, if the legislation is passed, other governments will place such restrictions on the employment of their nationals by the UN that little actual discretion will be left to the Secretary General in personnel matters.

1. Yugoslavia, supported by the Soviet Union, proposed in the UN Preparatory Commission in the fall of 1945 that governments should approve the appointment of their nationals to the UN Secretariat, but this was rejected by an over-whelming majority. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. E. S. Herbert (UK), William D. Mitchell, (US) and P. Veldekens (Belgium) [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia,. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. While the Assembly took no action to veto the policy followed to date by the Secretary General, it was evident that many delegations desired to await the outcome of cases presently being heard before the Administrative Tribunal (an independent review body to hear appeals against non-observance of the contracts of employment) before determining whether any positive directives should be given by the Assembly. Persons whose cases are now before the Tribunal were terminated by the Secretary General after refusing to answer questions relating to subversion put by the Senate Internal Security Committee. [Footnote in the source text.]