Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

320/3–2152

Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs¹

confidential

[Washington,] May 21, 1952.

• Subject:
• United States Policy with Respect to the Admission of Items to the Agenda of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The United States’ policy in the United Nations has taken an important turn within the last six months as a result of our failure to support the inclusion of the Moroccan case in the agenda of the General Assembly and the Tunisian case in the Security Council agenda.² Until 1951 the United States had been most hesitant to sanction any restriction on the right of a Member to raise for discussion in the United Nations any important political problem of international concern. Only rarely have we opposed such discussion, and then for clearly defined reasons. Our experience in the Moroccan and Tunisian cases suggests the desirability of a review of our past practice.

Basic Approach in Organizing the United Nations

Our non-restrictive attitude on the scope of discussion within the United Nations was implicit in the original thinking with regard to the new organization during the latter years of the war. It is clear from the record that the United Nations was established to serve as an international organization in and through which Member States might freely bring to the attention of world opinion problems of international concern, and in which appropriate remedies might be sought within the limits laid down by the Charter.

Our basic philosophy on this point was considered so important that it very nearly resulted in a breakdown of the San Francisco Conference, when the Russians insisted that the veto should apply in the Security Council even to the question whether or not the Council should take up and discuss a question. When Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in May and June 1945 to discuss pressing political problems with Stalin, President Truman sent Hopkins an urgent message asking him to put to the Marshall the United States view that

“the Yalta formula as agreed on safeguarded the freedom of discussion and the right of any Member to bring before the Council any situation for discussion. And that this right, which was rightly a question of the agenda, should therefore be decided by the Council by simple majority without any power having the right to veto it.” (Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 911)

Stalin accepted the American position, and the San Francisco Conference³ was saved.

The Charter⁴ provides (Article 35) that any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. The implication is that the organ concerned will permit discussion of such a dispute or situation. Under the Charter, moreover, the General Assembly enjoys (Article 10) the right to consider and discuss any subject within the scope of the Charter, including any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations (Article 11); and, subject to one qualification, the General Assembly is authorized to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations (Article 14). In the report of the Secretary of State to the President on the results of the San Francisco Conference, it was stated that the United States Delegation at San Francisco consistently supported the general proposition that an effective international organization must be constructed on the most broadly democratic basis if it is to operate effectively. Senator Vandenberg expressed the hope of the delegation that the General Assembly would be “the town meeting of the world.”

To be sure, the Charter does place limits upon the type of action which can be taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Except for enforcement action taken in the Security Council with the concurrence of the five permanent members, both the Security Council and the General Assembly are limited to the making of recommendations which are not legally binding upon the Members of the United Nations, although they have great moral weight. Moreover, the Charter provides (Article 2, paragraph 7) that none of its provisions authorizes the United Nations to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. The Charter also prohibits the General Assembly from making recommendations with regard to any dispute or situation while the Security Council is dealing with it. Neither of these restrictions, however, prevents discussion in the appropriate body. The practice has developed in both the Security Council and the General Assembly of permitting such discussion even when the competence or jurisdiction of the organ concerned is in the question. A decision on competence takes place after discussion, either on the specific question of competence, or as an element in the voting on any resolution dealing with the question at issue.

United Nations Practice, and United States Attitude

In deference to the desirability of ensuring free discussion, the Security Council and the General Assembly until 1951 exercised extreme forbearance in barring contentious political items from their agenda.

Security Council

Prior to the Tunisian case, the Security Council failed in only two instances to include in its agenda an item proposed by a Member state.

In the first instance—a Soviet item entitled “Information on Allied Forces on Non-Enemy Territory” (1946)—the item was not received because the Soviets failed to meet minimal procedural requirements by demonstrating where or how international peace and security were threatened. The subject matter of the Soviet complaint was later discussed in the General Assembly.

The second instance arose from a Soviet complaint, on August 29, 1950 of “The Unceasing Terrorism and Mass Executions in Greece.” Again the Council felt that no showing had been made that the allegations constituted a threat to the peace or fell within the jurisdiction of the Security Council. It was noted that this and all other United Nations aspects of the Greek case had been repeatedly discussed in the General Assembly; and it was clear that Council members regarded the Soviet item as another diversionary parliamentary manoeuvre designed to stall further action on the Korean problem.

In both of these cases, the United States voted with the majority to exclude the items.

In all other contentious cases, the item was admitted to the agenda on the ground that a prima facie showing of a potential threat to international peace and security had been made. The United States consistently voted for inclusion. It emphatically welcomed Security Council consideration even of Chinese Communist complaints that the United States was guilty of armed invasion of Formosa, and that its air forces had bombed Chinese territory.

This pattern was disturbed when, in April 1952, the United States, joined by the five other NATO members of the Security Council (United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Greece and Turkey), failed to support consideration of the Tunisian item which had been introduced by eleven Arab-Asian states. The United States rested its position not on considerations of substance but of timing; it maintained that the parties should be permitted to negotiate on the basis of a French program of reforms without United Nations interference. The United States did not support a Chilean suggestion that the item be admitted to the agenda with discussion postponed for the time being.

General Assembly

Until the Fifth General Assembly (1950), no contentious political case had ever been barred from the agenda of a General Assembly session. Nor did the United States ever object to the inclusion of such a case on the agenda. United States representatives were among the strongest advocates of broad Assembly authority to discuss international political problems.

We were particularly emphatic in supporting the fullest consideration of any allegations made against the United States. We maintained this position even in the face of Soviet charges of warmongering and of aggression, in connection with our Formosa and Far Eastern policies and in 1951 with the Iron Curtain escapee provisions of the Mutual Security Act.

In the last eighteen months, the General Assembly has had occasion, however, to keep items off its agenda.

In November 1950 an exceptional procedure was adopted to deal with an item submitted by El Salvador entitled “Invasion of Tibet by Foreign Forces.” By unanimous agreement, the General (steering) Committee of the General Assembly decided to adjourn consideration of the item, largely owing to the Indian view that the question might still be settled by peaceful means. In the light of the unanimous Committee decision this can hardly be considered a contentious case.

In December 1951 the General Assembly decided to “postpone for the time being” consideration of charges of “Violation by France in Morocco of provisions of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights,” by the narrow margin of 28 votes to 23. The United States favored postponement to permit the French and Moroccans to carry on conversations looking toward the execution of reforms. We held that it was proper under the Charter that the parties should exhaust direct bilateral channels before the General Assembly debated the case, and that the best interests of the Moroccan people would not be served by debate at the time. In the bitter debate on the subject Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan) declared:

“On this issue the United Nations is on trial and will be judged by the people of Asia and Africa by the stand it takes on it….

“Our experience in this Organization has been that we hear a great deal about freedom, democracy, and the self-determination of peoples from the group which might be called the Western states; but whenever we have had to deal concretely with the freedom, liberty, independence, and self-determination of a particular people, that role is, by and large, with rare and noble exceptions, abandoned by the Western States. We have on such occasions always found the Eastern European States in the same lobby with us. We have been forced emphatically to take note of it time after time, and we have been compelled today to give expression to our grateful appreciation in all humility….”

Although the statement is overdrawn, it illustrates the emotional response generated by the colonial problem in the United Nations.

At its sixth session (1951) the General Assembly also refused to accept on its agenda a Soviet proposal on “The Representation of China in the United Nations” and decided to postpone consideration, for the duration of the Paris session, of any further proposals to alter the representation of China. This action was taken on the ground that the matter had repeatedly been raised by the Soviet Union and discussed in the General Assembly and other United Nations organs, most recently at the close of the fifth session a few days previously, when the General Assembly had expressed its desire not to refer the matter for consideration to the sixth session.

It seems fair to conclude from the foregoing that the Moroccan case represents the only departure from the concept of an open General Assembly, the other cases cited having been barred for special reasons unrelated to the principle of free discussion.

Results of United States Action on Morocco and Tunisia

The effect of our position in the Moroccan and Tunisian cases has been to impair seriously the basic United Nations premise that in principle the Organization should be open for the discussion of all international political problems. A failure to permit consideration of an item submitted by eleven of the sixty United Nations Members could leave no other impression.

It is not the purpose of this paper to argue the wisdom of the tactics adopted to deal with the two cases. The importance of avoiding action which would gravely alienate or weaken the French at this particular juncture is fully appreciated.

It is relevant, however, to review some of the adverse effects of the policy we have followed. We have debased our moral leadership in the Arab-Asian world. We have convinced many non-Europeans that despite our lip service to concepts of self-determination and racial equality, we are actually seeking to perpetuate the old-style colonial system. We have allowed the Soviets to take credit for championing the cause of dependent peoples. We have exhibited NATO solidarity in defense of the colonial interests of a NATO member, rather than as an association of free states against external aggression. In large areas of the free world we have given a fillip to neutralism. At home we have puzzled and disappointed large sectors of American public opinion. And by taking our stand on the agenda question, we have been cast in the role of opponents of freedom of discussion—a peculiarly vulnerable position for our leadership in the United Nations and among the free peoples.

In assuming these liabilities, we have gained only a temporary respite. We did not prevent acrimonious discussion of the Moroccan and Tunisian problems in the General Assembly and the Security Council, before the decision to exclude the items was taken. We may be confronted with a special session of the General Assembly on Tunisia, where we will have less control over the situation than we would in the Security Council. As a practical matter, we cannot prevent discussion of North African problems in other United Nations forums; the issue is bound to arise at the next regular General Assembly session, either by inclusion in the agenda or during debate in Committee Four (Trusteeship and Dependent Areas) or elsewhere.

Meanwhile, the agitation in French North Africa and throughout the Arab world continues. The experience of frustration in the United Nations strengthens extremist elements seeking complete independence by violent means. The utility of the United Nations as a safety valve and a means of facilitating the peaceful adjustment of tensions is impaired, and its stature correspondingly diminished.

It is no doubt impossible fully to reconcile in the United Nations the conflicting demands of loyalty to our closest allies, vital strategic considerations, support for the advancement of dependent peoples, and a concern for our moral position in the non-European world. It should be possible, however, to avoid adding to our difficulties the burden of opposing freedom of discussion. Once this hurdle is cleared, we can seek to use the varied and flexible United Nations procedures to blunt and moderate emotional forces, stimulate compromise, and damp down extremism.

What conclusions are to be drawn from our recent experience?

1. Without rigidly tying ourselves down to the automatic acceptance of all political items proposed for inclusion in the Security Council or General Asssembly agenda, we should revert to our pre-1951 policy of holding to an absolute minimum the cases in which we will not support free discussion.

2. Grounds for the exclusion of political items might include:

a) failure to make a prima facie case that the item may fall within the jurisdiction of the organ concerned (this is more significant in the Security Council than in the General Assembly, with its broad field of operations);

b) repeated introduction of the same problem for obvious propaganda purposes;

c) general agreement that the item is frivolous or trivial;

d) agreement among all parties at interest that a matter should not be discussed.

3. We should favor consideration by the General Assembly or Security Council of cases involving charges against the United States.

4. If we wish to avoid United Nations action because we believe it would be prejudicial to our interests or to settlement of a dispute, we should not do so by seeking to prevent discussion. We should attain our objective through normal United Nations procedures, including agreement to postpone substantive discussion after admission of an item to the agenda; a decision by the organ concerned to make no recommendation; or passage of an acceptable resolution.

5. We should attempt to persuade other friendly Members of the wisdom of this view; to dissuade them from rash action such as threats of non-participation or of withdrawal from the United Nations; and to convince them that it is more advantageous to debate matters like the Tunisian problem in the Security Council, where we have a large measure of control, than to force their introduction in the General Assembly and other United Nations organs whose action may be more distasteful to us.

Annex A

Security Council Experience

Under the Charter the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members of the Council have seldom challenged the inclusion of a question on the agenda if there was a prima facie case of a dispute or a situation which might lead to international friction.

There are only two instances (prior to the Tunisian case) in which the Security Council failed to include on its agenda an item proposed by a Member State.

The first case of this character involved a Soviet item entitled “Information on Allied Forces on Non-Enemy Territory” which was considered by the Security Council in August and September 1946. The United States opposed inclusion of the item on the agenda on the ground that the USSR had not made a case justifying its consideration by the Security Council. He pointed out that United States troops were stationed on foreign soil in all cases with the agreement of the government concerned; hinted that the Soviet proposal was made only for propaganda purposes; and attacked the formulation of the item because it did not specify which troops in which foreign countries were a menace to international peace, or in what way international peace and security were threatened. Other delegations also criticized the Soviet formulation as pure propaganda and as lacking in the necessary precision as to where and how international peace was threatened. The Security Council decided by a vote of 7 to 2 (Poland, USSR) with 2 abstentions not to include the item on the agenda. It may be noted that the French representative abstained in the decision, on the ground that the mere fact that a proposal was motivated by political or propaganda considerations was not in itself a cause for barring it. He made the point that the question whether peace was in danger could only be determined after study had been given to it.

The position of the Security Council in this instance, as supported by the United States, was that minimum procedural requirements had not been met in the submission of the item. The subject was subsequently raised by the USSR in the General Assembly and was debated there.

The only other instance in which the Security Council, prior to the Tunisian case, refused to admit a political item to its agenda occurred in 1950, when the Council refused to discuss an item proposed by the USSR on August 29, 1950 entitled “The Unceasing Terrorism and Mass Executions in Greece”. Only the USSR and Yugoslavia voted in favor of the inclusion of this item. Other delegations opposed its consideration because no showing had been made that the allegations constituted a threat to the peace or fell within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, and because all United Nations aspects of the Greek case had been repeatedly considered in the General Assembly where the discussion would undoubtedly be carried forward. The United States representative, moreover, criticized the introduction of this question as a parliamentary maneuver by President Malik of the Security Council.

The other Security Council cases in which, prior to 1952, a substantial question was raised regarding the introduction of an agenda item may be summarized as follows:

1. The Greek Question

In August 1946 the Ukrainian S.S.R. sought to place the Greek question on the agenda, alleging that as a result of the policies of the Greek Government a situation had arisen in the Balkans which represented a grave danger to international peace and security in that part of the world. The United States took the position that the Council could not deny to any Member of the United Nations Which alleged the existence of a situation likely to threaten international peace and security the opportunity to present its case. The French representative stated that it was illogical to contend that, before having examined an application, it was not sufficiently serious to be examined. Therefore, despite Netherlands and United Kingdom objections on the ground that no prima facie evidence had been presented, the Security Council placed the item on the agenda.

2. The Indonesian Question

In July 1947, the Security Council included the Indonesian question on its agenda without dissent, on the application of Australia and India. The President ruled that this action would not prejudge the Council’s competence or the merits of the case. Not being a member of the Security Council at the time, the Netherlands representative was unable to state his views before the item had been admitted to the agenda. In his subsequent remarks, however, he argued that the matter was solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands. The United Kingdom took the position that although it had not been demonstrated that there was a war between sovereign states, the situation might endanger international peace and security and should be left on the agenda. The United States representative felt that the Council must take cognizance of fighting on such a scale and in such conditions as to endanger the peace of the region.

Although the Dutch repeatedly contested the Security Council’s jurisdiction in the case, they cooperated in the efforts of the Security Council (which were ultimately successful) to settle the problem.

3. Czechoslovak Question

In 1948 the Chilean Government proposed the inclusion of an item based on Papanek’s charges that the political independence of Czechoslovakia had been violated by the threat of the use of force by the USSR, thus endangering the maintenance of international peace and security. Although the USSR opposed inclusion of the item on the ground that it constituted interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, the United States and eight other delegations voted to include it on the agenda.

4. Hyderabad Case

In September 1948 the Security Council agreed to discuss the dispute between Hyderabad and India, despite doubts as to the political status of Hyderabad and therefore as to the competence of the Security Council, on the understanding that the adoption of the agenda could not be considered to prejudge the Council’s competence. Although India was not then a member of the Security Council, the Indian representative strongly maintained that Hyderabad was not a state and that the usefulness of the United Nations would be impaired if areas not possessing the characteristics of states could present their grievances before the Security Council.

5. Berlin

Despite Soviet contentions that this question did not fall within the competence of the Security Council; that under Article 107 of the Charter (relating to relations with ex-enemy states) it could not be considered by the Council; and that there was no threat to international peace and security, all the Council members except the USSR and the Ukranian S.S.R. voted to place the item on the agenda. The United States representative pointed out that the blockade was a threat to the peace, and that Article 107 was not applicable since this was a dispute among the victorious powers. After the decision on the agenda question, the Soviets announced that they would not take part in the discussion, although they did eventually cast a veto.

6. Complaint of Armed Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)

This was a complaint brought by the Chinese Communist regime against the United States in August 1950 as a result of the latter’s neutralization policy for Formosa. One day after the complaint was submitted the United States replied welcoming consideration of the case in the United Nations and approving a full United Nations investigation. Although China opposed placing the question on the agenda on the ground that there was no prima facie case and that its government had no complaint to make, the item was included on the agenda.

7. Complaint of Bombing by Air Forces of the Territory of China

The United States position on this complaint by the Chinese Communists, accompanying their charges on Formosa, paralleled its attitude on the Formosa case. The United States indicated that it would welcome an investigation on the spot. Although the Chinese representative criticized the item as a propaganda maneuver without any basis, made by a body not properly qualified to bring a complaint to the Security Council, the item was admitted to the agenda.

8. Iran

In October 1951 the Security Council debated at length the admissibility of the United Kingdom complaint of failure by the Iranian Government to comply with provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian oil case. Objection was made to inclusion of the item by the USSR and Yugoslavia on the ground that it represented interference in the internal affairs of Iran and an infringement of the sovereign rights of the Iranian people. The United States supported inclusion, since a prima facie case had been made, the matter had been the subject of litigation in the International Court of Justice, and the Security Council was competent to consider the dispute on its merits. The item was included by 9 votes to 2.

Annex B

General Assembly Experience

The jurisdiction of the General Assembly extends to all matters within the scope of the Charter, and the General Assembly is authorized under the Charter to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.

The agenda for a regular session of a General Assembly normally includes 60 to 80 items, most of them without direct political significance. It is not unusual for minor items to be withdrawn, scheduled for later consideration or otherwise disposed of without inclusion on the agenda. However, until late in the 1950 session, there were no instances where a contentious political case was barred from the agenda of an Assembly session.

The United States, until late in 1950, consistently favored the inclusion of political items on the Assembly’s agenda in the light of the Assembly’s broad jurisdiction under the Charter. We were particularly solicitous in ensuring that items involving charges against the United States should be fully discussed in the General Assembly. Thus, the United States never opposed General Assembly consideration of the annual major Soviet political proposal, introduced at the beginning of each session. We recognized that even Soviet charges of United States warmongering could be raised for discussion, false though they were, if the USSR so desired.

The United States point of view was well illustrated at the beginning of the 1950 session of the General Assembly in connection with three proposed agenda items. The first, “The Question of Formosa” was placed on the Assembly’s agenda at American initiative and over the opposition of both China and the USSR for differing reasons. In the discussion Ambassador Austin, “maintained that the very fact that the item under consideration was clearly a cause of dispute warranted its inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly as a matter of international concern. The United States Government had consistently favored the fullest and freest discussion of any charges brought against it, and would continue to do so.” The second case was a Soviet item charging the United States with aggression against China; in this instance Ambassador Austin stated that, “The Delegation would vote in favor of including the item since it believed that the United Nations should hear every complaint brought before it.” The third case involved Soviet charges that United States planes carried out bombing and strafing missions in China. Ambassador Austin declared that, “In conformity with his government’s policy of favoring full investigation of charges brought against it, he would support the inclusion in the agenda” of the item.

The same considerations impelled the United States to agree in 1951 to the inclusion on the Assembly’s agenda of the Soviet attack on the alleged aggressive aspects of our mutual security legislation. In commenting on the Soviet charges Ambassador Gross stated that, “The United States had never objected to the inclusion of a complaint against the United States in the agenda of organs of the United Nations. The United States Government considered that any Member of the United Nations was entitled to express its grievances against another Member, if its complaint related to a question which fell within the purview of the Charter and if the consideration of such a complaint was not liable to prejudice the settlement of the dispute by means of direct negotiations or by any other means.”

By contrast, at all regular sessions of the General Assembly the Soviet Union has opposed a wide variety of political items on grounds that their discussion was illegal or inconsistent with various Charter provisions, or for other reasons. The Soviet record shows consistent opposition to consideration of proposals involving the abuse of the veto, Greece, Korea, the Interim Committee, violations of the human rights provisions of the satellite peace treaties, Chinese charges of Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, and charges of Soviet failure to repatriate World War II prisoners of war.

As is indicated in the body of this paper, the question of the “Invasion of Tibet by Foreign Forces,” introduced by El Salvador in November 1950, was not included in the Assembly’s agenda, by unanimous decision of the General Committee. The Committee acted largely on the strength of British and Indian assertions that the Tibetan question could best be settled by peaceful means if the item were not discussed. Noting the unprecedented character of its position, the United States reiterated that it “had always supported any proposal to refer to the United Nations international disputes or complaints of aggression, which could thus be aired, considered and settled at international hearings.” In this case, however, the United States representative announced that he would support the proposal for adjournment of consideration made by the states most directly concerned.

The circumstances in the Tibetan case may be distinguished from those surrounding the Moroccan question. In the former, there was no appreciable support for the El Salvador initiative, not even from the Chinese (Nationalist) spokesman. In the latter case, the complaints against France was made by six Arab states, and the request for inclusion in the agenda was supported by a large number of other Members. The Assembly’s decision on Morocco may thus be said to represent a clear departure from previous Assembly practice.

1. Transmitted on May 21 to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson). The study was made at the request of the Under Secretary.
2. For documentation on these matters, see volume xi, and Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. ii, pp. 135 ff.
3. For documentation on the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, Apr. 25–June 26, 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
4. For text of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 993, or 59 Stat, (pt. 2) 1031.