Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

320/1–1852: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices ¹

confidential

Washington, January 18, 1952—4:35 p.m.

• Subject:
• Halfway Mark in Sixth General Assembly: Preliminary Observations on Arab-Asian Attitudes²

At the halfway stage in the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the attitudes of the NEA Delegations in the General Assembly with respect to the United States give some cause for reflection. Mr. Vyshinsky and Soviet propaganda, generally, have asserted on a number of occasions recently that during the Sixth Session the United States’ “Voting machine” has “cracked” and that the “moral defeat” of the West cannot now be concealed. Mr. Vyshinsky has noted particularly the vote in the General Assembly in Committee I on December 22, with respect to the Soviet resolution against the United States Mutual Security Act, in which no less than 9 of the 11 abstentions came from the NEA area, as proof of his assertion. Only Greece, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia and Turkey voted with the United States on this occasion. Mr. Katz-Suchy, of Poland, thought the Sixth Session has revealed a weakening of United States leadership and diminishing agreement outside the Soviet bloc, citing the fact that it took 19 ballots to elect Greece to the Security Council, and the 11 abstentions on the Soviet resolution against the Mutual Security Act. This situation would be increasingly reflected, he thought, in the Seventh and Eighth Sessions in the critical years 1952 and 1953. The Australian Delegation has indicated that the outstanding characteristic of the Sixth Session thus far has been the “revolt” of the Arab-Asian states against Western leadership. The London Times editorially remarked on January 2: “Two decisions—on disarmament and on the reunification of Germany—were taken against the opposition of the Soviet Union and its adherents, and with a large group of Arab and Asian States abstaining…. On two major questions the Western Powers have first displayed a tactical superiority and then assembled an overwhelming vote; there has been an apparent gain, but the effective result is insubstantial.”

Particularly noteworthy among the attacks on the position of the United States was that of Sir Zafrullah Khan, on December 13, 1951, in connection with the Moroccan problem when the United States, in the plenary session, voted to postpone consideration, the vote being 28–23–7, with only Turkey and Israel supporting the United States position, Greece and Liberia abstaining, and all the other NEA states voting in the negative. Sir Zafrullah charged that the United States always supported freedom in the abstract, but seldom did so in a concrete case. Another instance came on December 19, 1951, in connection with the Anglo-Franco-American proposal for disarmament in Committee I, when Andraos Bey (Egypt) asserted that while the League of Nations had failed because the United States did not participate in its work, the United Nations might well fail because the United States “had too much to do with it.” The vote on this resolution was 44–5–10, but 8 of the 10 abstentions came from the NEA area, with Ethiopia, Greece, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia and Turkey supporting the resolution. The vote in the plenary session was 42–5–7. While the NEA states, with the exception of Ethiopia, which was absent or abstained, supported the United States position with regard to Italian membership, this was not a significant test of Arab-Asian attitudes, however important the United States considered the resolutions involved. On the other hand, the vote on the resolution with respect to the Collective Measures Committee in Committee I, on January 8, was a test and only India abstained, all others voting for the resolution as finally passed (51–5–3), the plenary vote being identical.³

The record in the Sixth Session, thus far, shows a deepening and broadening of trends observed in previous sessions of the General Assembly, in which the United States, while enjoying a general support from the Arab-Asian states, has received only partial support on critical issues involved in the East-West struggle, and on issues in which these states have had very particular interests. The most consistent supporters of the US have been Turkey, Greece, Liberia, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Lebanon and Pakistan. There does not appear to be any significant change in the voting records of India and Afghanistan, which abstain on controversial political issues. Saudi Arabia and Iran have demonstrated more than a usual tendency toward abstention this year, while the record and the cooperative attitude of Lebanon and Iraq have been in striking contrast to those of the other Arab states. In addition to the usual issues of Palestine and Korea, the US position at the Sixth Session has been decidedly complicated by the Moroccan, Egyptian and Iranian questions. The US still has the general support of the Arab-Asian states, although the atmosphere in the Fourth Committee has been discolored by the Moroccan problem and there appears to be an increasing skepticism concerning the colonial powers and the West generally. Part of the hostility is due to the belief that the United States is tied too specifically to the British position in Egypt and the French in Morocco. The US is therefore, the object of an indirect hostility, privately regretted by certain members of the Arab bloc, who state that it would not normally be directed against the US. The US has, however, through the processes of discussion and consultation with Arab-Asian representatives in this Committee, and consequent compromise, generally been able to reach agreed solutions as to resolutions emanating from this Committee, and has exercised a moderating influence in many instances, notably in connection with the question of South West Africa. Political differences do not necessarily arise in connection with questions in the Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Committees, so that the voting record in these Committees is not always significant politically, although serious differences arise in the Second and Fifth Committee, particularly in connection with economic and financial problems, where the United States has not been able, at times, to join with representatives from the NEA area in support of resolutions.

The Department would appreciate any views as to these reflections.⁴

Acheson

1. Drafted by Harry N. Howard, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. This circular airgram was sent to 18 posts in the Near Eastern, South Asian, and African areas.
2. For matters relating to the Sixth General Assembly, Nov. 6, 1951–Feb. 5, 1952, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. ii, pp. 1 ff.
3. In a letter of Dec. 21, 1951 to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson), written from Paris, Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Senior Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, said: “… The most troublesome thing here is the developing neutralist and anti-United States attitude of the Middle East and Arab states. This has reached a stage of intensity of feeling which it is difficult to understand. The violence of it is epitomized perhaps in the remarkable statement made by the Egyptian Delegate … on the Disarmament Resolution….” Sandifer then described the “outburst” by Sir Zafrulla Khan as “an amazing display of violent emotion when you consider the normal character of the man who made it…. These states, together with a number of under-developed countries, are following, a line … which causes us and will continue to cause a great deal of difficulty. It is the one problem which we will have to devote most attention to during the coming year….” (Letter, Sandifer to Hickerson, Dec. 21, 1951, Hickerson–Murphy–Key files, lot 58 D 33, “Mr. Sandifer”)
4. In a letter to Assistant Secretary Hickerson on February 18, 1952, with copies for the Secretary of State and the President, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris from mid-December, 1951 until the close of the General Assembly on February 6, 1952, set forth her preliminary observations concerning the Sixth General Assembly. Inter alia, she commented: “I would like to say that I think Ambassador Jessup did a most extraordinary piece of work with the Arabs. Most of us who have had to deal with them in this session recognize how difficult it is and that in some way we must try to change this attitude before we come to another General Assembly.” (320/2–1852)