Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112

Summary of Discussion in the NSC Planning Board Meeting of October 18, 1954¹

top secret

October 18, 1954

Regulation of Armaments

General Cutler recalled the history of the NSC project for a review of NSC 112.² He thought the Planning Board might center its discussion on (1) U.S. policy (2) recent Soviet initiatives (3) what proposals the U.S. might advance as a result of Soviet moves.

Mr. Bowie felt the discussion should begin with a look at the basic issues. He said he admired the logical coherence of a study on the subject^* prepared by General Loper (Defense), but was unable to agree with its conclusions. As he understood it, the Defense study concluded that, short of world government, it was not in the interest of the U.S. to seek disarmament, primarily because the effectiveness of a disarmament agreement depends on the good faith of the parties and the U.S. cannot rely on the good faith of the USSR.

Although he had not formulated any final conclusions, Mr. Bowie wished to try a somewhat different approach. At the outset, the following factors must be taken into account:

(1) As the Soviet production of nuclear material increases, a substantial range of error develops as to the amount of such material produced by the USSR in the past, even if a disarmament system permits access to current and future production.

(2) If thermonuclear weapons were eliminated, the free world would be at a serious disadvantage in the absence of complicated controls over other armaments.

(3) It is not clear whether an adequate system of inspection and control can be devised for conventional weapons.

However, there are certain counter-balancing factors:

(1) In determining whether any disarmament system is in the U.S. interest, we must ask: What is the alternative? The alternative is a growing capability by the U.S. and USSR for mutual annihilation. While this condition would tend to deter war it would also produce tensions which might eventually increase the risk of war. Disarmament proposals must be measured against this risk, rather than against an ideal standard.

(2) Since nuclear stocks in the U.S. and USSR are adequate for decades of peacetime use, production of such stocks could be discontinued without losing the advantages of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

(3) We must examine not merely the possibility of concealing fissionable material under a disarmament scheme, but also the possibility of using such concealed material in a war. Use in war is a function of deliverability as well as availability, so that disarmament would have to include control of means of delivery (e.g., long-range bombers).

(4) Even if it is assumed that outlawing of all nuclear weapons is not possible, progress toward a balanced reduction of all armaments (including nuclear) might be made. State has been working on this line of exploration, which appears promising, but is not yet ready to submit concrete suggestions.

Mr. Bowie concluded that on the basis of past history and developing capabilities, the prospects for humanity are grim. Each side will get more jumpy as it increasingly comes to feel it is living with a gun at its head. Faced with this prospect we must not accept the conclusion that disarmament does not serve U.S. interests.

General Loper said that in reviewing existing policy as stated in NSC 112, Defense had examined the technical effectiveness of the UN disarmament plan. He estimated that 5 years would be required to put any such plan into effect. By the end of that period the amount of nuclear weapon material produced and concealed by the USSR would be so great and pose such a risk as to make disarmament ineffective and unacceptable to the U.S. Even if this were not true (i.e. even if the risks of Soviet concealed nuclear material were acceptable) disarmament would still not be in U.S. interest because it is impossible adequately to balance the factors of war potential (morale, productive capacity, etc.). Even if weapons are controllable, political shifts in alliances are not. Moreover, no country can be expected to agree to have its whole way of life changed, as would be necessary under a complete inspection system.

However, General Loper thought a rejection of disarmament would be difficult to “sell” to U.S. allies and to public opinion. Accordingly we will have to continue to deal with disarmament; but in doing so we should seek to guide the discussions toward the type of disarmament which best conforms to our interests. In conclusion General Loper noted that the Defense study had not examined the approach mentioned by Mr. Bowie (balanced reduction of all armaments, including nuclear).

Mr. Bowie felt that as long as nuclear weapons are such an important component of total armaments, a great premium is placed on forces in being. Historically, however, we have depended on forces formed after the outbreak of a war. If the importance of the nuclear component could be reduced, the importance of war potential would be restored, and this would favor the democracies, which find it difficult to maintain great forces in being but which have great productive capacity.

General Loper said that any plan which we agree to must be enforceable and such enforceability must be guaranteed in advance.

Mr. Snapp said he had great sympathy for the thesis that disarmament is not a satisfactory vehicle for resolving the cold war; and he was troubled by the idea of continuing disarmament negotiations if we are not really aiming at disarmament.

General Bonesteel feared the U.S. would be forced into a disarmament scheme contrary to its interests and would end up with resources inadequate to fight a war. He thought the technical difficulties should have been emphasized earlier in talks with allies. Now it was important to choose between catering to allies and taking a position in conformance with U.S. interests.

Mr. Amory said he feared a Soviet gambit on disarmament more than he feared peripheral aggression. He asked whether an agreement to abandon production of nuclear weapons would be in U.S. interests if it could be obtained in a year.

General Loper said this hypothesis was too far fetched. It would take a year merely to obtain Senate consent to an agreement.

Mr. Bowie said he would prefer a less secure plan which could be put into effect quickly to a perfect plan which involved delay. He asked whether it was not possible that the Soviets had changed their position and were now seeking a disarmament agreement.

General Bonesteel said to assume this we must further assume (1) the Soviets have given up hope of expansion or (2) they think they can maneuver to catch us off guard.

Mr. Bowie said alternatively we might assume (1) they are prepared to make concessions to reduce the risk to themselves or (2) they are willing to await “the inevitable decay of capitalism” predicted in communist doctrine.

General Cutler asked whether the USSR would use nuclear weapons. If not, it might be to Soviet advantage to eliminate nuclear weapons.

General Bonesteel said the crucial point was that the Soviets would never give up the potentialities which now exist in a combination of guided missiles and nuclear warheads. They would continue to be suspicious of free world disarmament proposals.

Mr. Amory believed a disarmament agreement might be accepted in a relatively short time. He also believed the free world would gain more than the USSR (e.g. in intelligence) from an inspection-disarmament plan which ultimately had to be abandoned.

Mr. Arneson then reviewed the UK-French-London memorandum on disarmament and the recent Soviet moves, which amount to a declaration of intention to propose a resolution in the UN along the lines of the UK-French-London memo.³

After a discussion of procedure, the Planning Board agreed to consider the subject again on November 29 on the basis of a report showing areas of agreement and disagreement to be prepared by the State–Defense–AEC working group, which would be convened by Mr. Bowie.⁴

1. Drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator of the NSC Planning Board Assistants.
2. For text of NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 477.
3. “A Review of the United States Policy on the Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments,” August 27, 1954. [Footnote in the source text. A copy of the subject paper, 148 pages, is in S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, “Armed Forces and Armaments”, as an enclosure to a memorandum of Dec. 1 from NSC Executive Secretary Lay to the Planning Board, which bears the handwritten designation “Loper Report”.]
3. Regarding the Anglo-French memorandum submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee on June 11, 1954, UN doc. DC/SC.1/10, see footnote 3, supra. Regarding the Soviet position, see the editorial note, p. 1525, and the memorandum by Key, supra.
4. By memorandum of Oct. 19, NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitted two background studies to the Planning Board. These papers, “Summary of the Current United States and USSR Positions on Disarmament and of Significant Developments Since NSC 112” and “The Technical Feasibility of International Control of Atomic Energy”, had been generally concurred in by a State–Defense–AEC working group. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112)