Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

330.13/10–1654

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State¹

confidential

[Washington,] October 18, 1954.

• Subject:
• Disarmament

1. Because of the French attitude toward the role of disarmament in its effect on rearming Western Germany, the following background may be useful to you in your forthcoming meetings on implementing the London Act.²

2. The Disarmament item at this General Assembly assumed more importance than previously anticipated, when the USSR introduced a draft resolution which proposed that the UN Disarmament Commission prepare a draft Disarmament treaty on the basis of the UK-French proposal of 11 June 54,³ as modified in certain respects by the USSR. The UK-French memorandum only dealt with the last of the various elements necessary in a disarmament proposal, i.e., the phasing or “dove-tailing” of the various reductions and limitations of the different types of armed forces and armaments. Consequently, the Soviet proposal was designed to give the appearance of a substantial measure of accommodation on their part, without in fact committing them to any fundamental changes of position.⁴

3. As the debate in the Political Committee has progressed, it now appears that the Soviets have not actually given up their previous call for a one-third across-the-board reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces by the great powers, their often-rejected conception of a control organ to oversee the disarmament program which would have only very limited powers and would be subject to Security Council veto, and their general views on atomic energy control. On the other hand, by accepting in part the Anglo-French memorandum, the Soviets have apparently now expressed willingness to delay the actual prohibition of nuclear weapons until the completion of one-half the agreed reduction of non-nuclear weapons and armed forces. While the USSR proposal on its face abandons previous Soviet insistence that initial prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is a prerequisite to a disarmament program, at the same time Vishinsky attacked the President’s proposal on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy on just this basis, and it seems probable that the Soviets will at the appropriate moment raise this issue again.

4. By careful probing, our delegation has tried to minimize the Soviet effort to delude the Assembly into thinking there is very little difference now between USSR and Western views. However, it seems probable that the Disarmament Commission’s subcommittee of Five, which we have proposed be reactivated, will have one or two preparatory meetings before the end of this Assembly. This rapid pace is being forced not only by the desire of many General Assembly members to see whether Soviet and Western views can be reconciled, but in large measure by the actions of the French representative, Jules Moch. We have been alarmed by Moch’s freewheeling technique, and the fact he apparently has been consulting Vishinsky without keeping his Western colleagues advised of the nature of these consultations. Consequently, we requested Embassy Paris on October 16 to convey to the French Government our apprehensions and our hope that the French delegation could be advised to concert and cooperate wholeheartedly with the UK, Canadian, and US delegations on the disarmament item. We also informed the Embassy that we did not know whether Moch was acting for himself or on instructions from his Government, and thought this might provide a good opportunity to probe this important question.

1. Drafted by Meyers of UNP.
2. For documentation on the Nine-Power, the Four-Power, and the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings at Paris, Oct. 20–23, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1404 ff.
3. For text of the Anglo-French memorandum submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee on June 11, 1954, UN doc. DC/SC.1/10, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 423–424, or Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 2 1954, pp. 182–183.
4. Regarding the Soviet proposal of Sept. 30, see the editorial note, p. 1525.