[Tab A]
The Department of State
to the British Embassy3
Aide-Mémoire
The Department of State refers to the United Kingdom Aide-Mémoire. of April 21, 19544 concerning the line to be taken by the
[Page 1394]
United Kingdom, France,
Canada and the United States at the forthcoming meetings of the
subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The
Department of State is in agreement with the suggestion that the
discussions initially should be directed toward the general principles
which must govern any disarmament program and that, starting from this
position, the Four Governments should be able to press the Soviet
representative for clarification of his Government’s attitude on the
basic principles of disarmament and to show that the Soviet Union is
responsible for the lack of progress.
The Department of State, however, does not agree with the formulation
contained in the United Kingdom Aide-Mémoire.
concerning the circumstances under which the prohibition of atomic and
hydrogen weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would be
acceptable, since under this formulation the agreement to prohibit
weapons of mass destruction could precede the establishment of effective
international controls to ensure the observance of the prohibition.
The Department of State heartily supports the view of Her Majesty’s
Government that a Four-Power Working Party should meet in London three
or four days before the date chosen for the first substantive meeting of
the subcommittee to work out a finally agreed course of action,
depending on whether or not there actually are subcommittee meetings in
the event of a Soviet boycott. This meeting could, among other matters,
devise an initial formula to indicate our acceptance of the elimination
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as a part of a
comprehensive disarmament program. The general United States position on
this subject is set forth in the proposal of the United States to the
Disarmament Commission on April 24, 1952 entitled “Essential Principles
for a Disarmament Program”.5 This
meeting would also consider the type of questions which should be put to
the Soviet representative, which we agree should be generally along the
lines suggested in the United Kingdom Aide-Mémoire.
It would be extremely helpful to the United States Government if the
meetings of the subcommittee in London could be postponed until May 13
or thereabouts. The Four-Power Working Party would then commence its
discussions in London approximately on May 9. The Department of State
believes that this postponement could readily be justified because of
the unanticipated delays in setting up the subcommittee, delays which
have been occasioned by the attitudes and positions of the Soviet
Union.
[Page 1395]
The Department of State has communicated with the United States Mission
to the United Nations concerning the tactics if the Soviet Union
boycotts the subcommittee and the Mission is in communication with the
British Delegation on this matter.
[Tab B]
The British Embassy to
the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
Disarmament
Now that the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission has been set up
the Foreign Office have been considering what line should be taken at
meetings by the United States, France, Canada and the United
Kingdom.
On the assumption that the Russians attend, it is essential that the
Allied Powers should agree on the policy to be adopted The Foreign
Office therefore propose that, as suggested in paragraph 6(b) of the
British Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of April 1 (ref.
1199/44/54),6 discussion should be
directed towards the general principles which must govern any
disarmament programme. This course would be in accordance with the
Resolution tabled by the French in Berlin which was supported by Mr.
Dulles and Mr. Eden.
Her Majesty’s Government accordingly propose that the Western Powers
should take as their basic position the proposition that the prohibition
of all atomic and hydrogen weapons and all other weapons of mass
destruction is acceptable provided:
- (a)
- that it is accompanied by simultaneous and major reductions in
conventional weapons and armed forces to agreed levels and
carried out to an agreed timetable, and
- (b)
- that there must be agreement on the machinery for enforcing
the prohibition and reductions. Such machinery must be in
existence from the beginning of the prohibition and reductions.
Provision will have to be made to enable the United Nations to
reach positive decisions in respect of violations, i.e. the
enforcement measures must not be subject to the veto.
Starting from this position the Allies should then be able to press the
Soviet Representative for clarification of his Government’s attitude to
the basic principles of disarmament and to show that the Soviet Union is
responsible for the lack of progress. The type of
[Page 1396]
question which the Foreign Office
consider should be put to the Soviet Representative is:
- (i)
- whether there is agreement that Disarmament should cover both
conventional and novel types of weapons;
- (ii)
- whether it is agreed that there should be agreed measures of
disclosure and verification of existing levels of armaments and
armed forces on which the reductions can be based;
- (iii)
- whether it is agreed that the object of Disarmament should be
not only to abolish the more obnoxious forms of warfare, but war
itself by removing the disparity between the armaments and armed
forces of the major world powers by means of a programme of
balanced reduction;
- (iv)
- whether there is agreement that States must be prepared to
give facilities to the Control Organ sufficient to enable it to
guarantee that evasions shall be detected, even if this entails
some derogation from the normal concept of State
sovereignty;
- (v)
- whether there is any agreement on the enforcement procedure,
e.g. whether this can be devised so as to avoid the use of the
veto.
Mr. Eden considers that the
above proposals would enable the Western Powers to retain the initiative
and, when publicity is given to the Subcommittee’s conclusions, to make
it clear to public opinion that they are ready to deal constructively
with all aspects of disarmament, including atomic and hydrogen weapons.
Further, the Allies would retain freedom of manoeuvre and would not
become involved at an early stage in a detailed discussion of any one
aspect of disarmament before agreement had been sought on the basic
principles.
If the Soviet Government decide to boycott the Subcommittee Mr. Eden still thinks that it would be
to our advantage for the remaining members to meet and to draw up a
report for the Disarmament Commission. Such a report might elaborate the
main principles enumerated in para. 3 above, and present them as the
basis for a thorough debate in the Disarmament Commission in which the
Soviet Government which had refused to participate in the work of the
Subcommittee would be placed at a serious disadvantage. A decision by
the Western Powers to proceed with the work of the Subcommittee despite
the Soviet Union’s refusal to participate would underline the hollowness
of the Soviet Government’s claim to be one of the leading advocates of
world disarmament. There would also be advantage in showing that the
Soviet Union has not got the power to prevent discussion in the United
Nations on matters of vital concern to the whole world. The whole
practice of the United Nations is that committees and subcommittees can
proceed with their work in the absence of one of their members. There
seems to be no reason why this practice should not be followed
[Page 1397]
in the case of the
Disarmament Subcommittee. A seat should, however, always be left vacant
for the Soviet Representative and the Subcommittee’s records should be
made available to the Soviet Government on request.
If the other Allied Governments are in agreement with the foregoing
suggestion, the British Representative will, if the Soviet
Representative does not attend the meeting of the Subcommittee on April
23, move an adjournment of the meeting until April 26. In so doing he
would express regret that the Soviet Representative had decided not to
be present and the hope that the Soviet Government had not reached a
final decision not to cooperate in the work of the Subcommittee. He
would explain that his motion for adjournment was made in order to give
the Soviet Government a final opportunity to reconsider their
attitude.
At the meeting on April 26 Mr. Eden hopes that the Subcommittee would decide to meet in
London on May 6, as has already been provisionally agreed between the
Four Western Powers.
It is further suggested that if agreement is reached to establish the
Subcommittee in London, a Four-Power Working Party should meet in London
three or four days before the date chosen for the first substantive
meeting of the Subcommittee to work out a finally agreed course of
action.
It would be appreciated if the above proposals could be studied urgently
in the Department of State with a view to communicating the preliminary
reactions of the United States Government to the Foreign Office as soon
as possible.
Similar representations are being made to the Canadian and French
Governments.
Washington, April 21,
1954.
