Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, “Exchange of Notes with USSR”

Study Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff¹

top secret

[Washington,] April 23, 1954.

Reply to Russian Proposal on Atomic Armaments

i background

On December 8, 1953 before the United Nations General Assembly, the President, having dwelt on the potential horror of atomic warfare, stated that the United States is prepared “to seek ‘an acceptable solution’ to the atomic armaments race” in private or diplomatic talks and to carry into these talks “a new conception”. The President then set out what has become known as his Atom-Bank proposal. Among the objectives of this proposal he listed, “First—encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material …,” and “Second—begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles.”

The first Russian reaction to the President’s speech was public and proposed that the United States join with the U.S.S.R. in an agreement outlawing use of nuclear weapons.²

In the course of discussions among the interested departments of our own Government subsequent to the President’s speech, the decision was formed that, despite possible contrary constructions, we would regard the speech as having made a new proposal for peaceful development of atomic energy which is essentially unrelated to the problem of control or abolition of nuclear weapons. At a meeting with the President on January 16,³ it was agreed that while the U.S. would press for entirely separate negotiations on the President’s proposal as thus narrowly conceived and would not be drawn into negotiations on the subject of control or abolition of nuclear weapons, we would listen to any proposals which the USSR cared to submit on that subject. Our readiness to listen was made known to the USSR. On January 19, 1954, in the course of private procedural conversations, Ambassador Zaroubin, referring back to the first public Soviet reaction to the President’s proposal, reiterated to the Secretary of State that the Soviet Government would wish its own proposal for outlawing use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction to be considered in the course of negotiations.⁴

In Berlin, on January 30, Mr. Molotov handed the Secretary of State a formal version of the Russian outlawry proposal.⁵ This was in the form of a draft declaration of the Governments of the United States, England and France, Chinese People’s Republic and the Soviet Union. These governments would declare that they are determined to deliver humanity from the threat of destructive war with use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction; that they are desirous of promoting peaceful utilization of atomic energy; that they consider unconditional renunciation of the use of the weapons above mentioned to be in conformance with the purposes of the United Nations and to be a step toward elimination of such weapons from national armaments and toward the establishment of strict international control guaranteeing that they will not be used; and that they solemnly undertake the unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary told Molotov that he would examine the Soviet proposal and that he for his part would hand Zaroubin in Washington an amplification of the President’s proposal.

In Washington on March 19 the Secretary handed Zaroubin a paper elaborating on the President’s proposal as narrowly conceived within our government.⁶ A press release issued on the same date stated in its last paragraph: “The Soviet Government has also transmitted to the United States Government certain proposals in connection with the general subject of atomic matters. These proposals are under study.”

ii the problem

The United States stands committed in general terms to consider any Soviet proposal privately made on the subject of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the U.S. stands committed to register some reaction to the Soviet outlawry proposal made to us once by Zaroubin and the second time more formally by Molotov. An answer to be conveyed to the Russians at an appropriate time must therefore be formulated.

iii discussion

The practical effect—if any—of the unenforceable paper on outlawry now proposed by the Russians would be slight.

In the past the Russians were accustomed regularly to propose outlawing possession as well as use of nuclear weapons. The present proposal would have us foreswear only use. The Russians speak of it as a step toward eliminating atomic weapons from military establishments. They, therefore, clearly do not contemplate that their proposal would in itself do so. The reason for this change in the Russian position is doubtless that the Russian military establishment itself now assigns a substantial role to atomic armaments and that the Russians propose to continue to do so. That means, inescapably, that they propose to retain the freedom to use their atomic weapons when they deem such use to be in their interest, solemn declarations to the contrary notwithstanding.

In so far as any sanction is concerned we, like the Soviets, would retain complete freedom of action following signature of the proposed Russian declaration. There would arise from that declaration a certain moral obligation to which in the nature of things our Government and our people would be more sensitive than would the Communists. Yet it is open to question to what extent that moral obligation would as a practical matter have an inhibiting tendency on our freedom of action over and above that which exists anyway.

The decision whether or not to employ atomic weapons is, by statute, for the President. We recognize it as an important one, upon which considerations other than strictly military ones have a bearing. In making it, the President will doubtless have regard for its effect on the governments and peoples of our allies and indeed on public opinion throughout the non-Communist world. It is exceedingly doubtful that the President would decide to use atomic weapons unless the act of aggression to which he was responding had so alarmed and outraged the free world that world public opinion could be expected to support his action. Under such circumstances, it is exceedingly doubtful that the fact of our adherence to a declaration such as the Russians are now proposing would make a substantial difference. It would have been known that under the declaration both the Russians and we have retained atomic weapons, and the implications of that fact bearing on Russian intentions and bona fides would not have been lost upon a world disenchanted by a decade of cold war.

All that having been said, it remains true nevertheless that in the event we should be the ones to make first use of atomic weapons, the proposed declaration could be a propaganda weapon in Russian hands; a weapon perhaps not of much use with enlightened opinion in the free world, but a weapon just the same; after all, even the germ warfare charges had some effect. Secondly, if we sign a declaration such as this, even though the atomic weapon would retain the same place in our military establishment which it now holds, there being no compulsion growing out of the declaration to assign another and more minor role to it, we would have to refrain from making any public statements concerning its use. Thus, even though the declaration might impose no inhibition which does not now exist upon strategic planning or military action on our part, it might impose a new inhibition on our diplomatic freedom of action, so far as diplomacy consists of making clear, where appropriate for deterrent purposes, what one is prepared to do in case of trouble. (It should be mentioned, however, that the fact of our preparedness is really the more important element in a deterrent than the spoken word.)

The upshot of this analysis is that, everything else being equal, it would be inconvenient for the United States to adhere to such a declaration as the Russians are proposing, but that the question presented for us by the declaration is one to which the answer lies in a balancing of conveniences and not, as was the case with the proposal to outlaw possession of nuclear weapons, in critical security considerations. It follows therefore that our position may vary with the time at which the question is put to us.

Three major factors not heretofore mentioned could weigh in the balancing of conveniences, or change the question into one critically affecting our security. These three factors are:

1. A governmental decision, which we have not yet made but are in process of reaching, determining whether or not it would be in the national interest of the U.S. to limit or eliminate atomic armaments, and whether or not, given an affirmative answer to the first question, a reasonably secure plan achieving such limitation or elimination can be found;

2. Russian seriousness in pursuing negotiations for the limitation or elimination of atomic armaments, and Russian receptiveness to proposals looking to that end; and

3. World public opinion jitters at the prospect of atomic devastation as opposed to the feeling that our possession of the atomic weapon, being a potent deterrent, is a factor making for peace.

These three factors will bear some analysis.

If we should decide that atomic disarmament is not in our interest or not feasible, we will have no interest in influencing the Soviet government toward a favorable position looking to such disarmament and no interest in convincing them of our own seriousness in the matter. We will not care about their private feelings, but deal with them only with an eye to world public opinion. Should our decision, however, as is quite possible, go the other way, it will be in the national interest that we take every step to convince the Soviets of our serious desire for disarmament and to ease the position within the Soviet Government of those officials who from the Soviet point of view also favor disarmament. But should it become clear that the Soviets have reached a firm position against disarmament and are not seriously negotiating about it, we would once more be free to deal with them with an eye only to public opinion. Finally, opinion in the free world ever since Hiroshima has vacillated between a sense of horror at the thought of atomic war which it is difficult to think of as exaggerated, and the Churchillian view that the atomic weapon has bought us what peace we have had since V–J Day. A recent outburst of the first current of opinion, particularly in Britain, has forced us to renewed meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, which are also inconvenient for us. It is not inconceivable that world public opinion may in the future, for a time at least, generate a great deal of feeling along the same lines. It could well get to the point where substantial groups of people feel that any sort of peace, with or without honor, is preferable to devastation with hydrogen bombs. At such a time, it may not be a misstatement of the choice open to us to say that we would be forced either to make a gesture such as adherence to the Russian resolution now before us or risk a very serious threat of neutralism in strategic places.

At present the situation with respect to the three factors just discussed would appear to be as follows: We ourselves don’t know whether or not we seriously want disarmament. The Russians have given every appearance of seriousness, but only in the limited area circumscribed by the President’s proposal as narrowly construed. Neither of the first two factors mentioned is therefore really in play as yet. So far as world opinion is concerned, it is clear that the governments of our two principal allies, that is Britain and France, do not at first blush consider the Russian proposal a serious matter. The British seem inclined, for example, in the Disarmament Commission, to pursue aspects of the old U.N. plan. Moreover the Russian proposal was made to us in strict secrecy and on the basis of Russian performance in these negotiations so far there seems to be some ground for expecting that our answer will be kept secret as well. World public opinion is, therefore, also not yet in play.

It would thus seem we can for the present afford to reject the Russian proposal. But our rejection should be couched in reasoned and calm tones, and should not fail to leave us with a possible, though not explicitly indicated, line of retreat which we might wish to take in the future in light of different circumstances.

iv recommendation

The attached reply⁷ in the form of an aide-mémoire to the Russian proposal should be adopted as a U.S. position. The Secretary of State should be authorized to communicate this reply to the Soviet Government, in its present form or in any other form he may deem appropriate, orally or in writing, at such time as in his tactical judgment may be suitable.

1. Drafted by Alexander Bickel of S/P.
2. See telegram 745 from Moscow, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 1302.
3. For a summary of the meeting, see p. 1342.
4. The conversation is described in telegram 487 to Moscow, Jan. 19, p. 1345.
5. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 479.
6. For text, see p. 1372.
7. The draft reply was not with the source text and has not been found in Department of State files.